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ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN T. KNOX 
CHAIRMAN 
January 2, 1979 
Hon. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and 
Members of the Legislature 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Governor and Members: 
Joint Committee on Tort Liability 
Series 1978 Staff Report 
COMMITTEE ADDRESS: 
liTH & L BUILDING 
SUITE 950 
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814 
(916) 445-0118 
COUNSEL: 
WILLIAM C. GEORGE 
COMMITTEE ANALYST: 
CATHY E. CRAFT 
SECRETARY: 
JOYCE FABER 
Attached is the Joint Committee on Tort Liability Staff 
Report for 1978. After several committee meetings, it became 
apparent that we would be unable to achieve a committee consensus 
on a variety of issues. For that reason, I am submitting the 
staff report as such and not as the report of a majority. Each 
member of the Committee has the opportunity to author or sponsor 
those legislative recommendations which are soon to be drafted 
in bill form. 
I have requested that our citizen advisory committees to 
continue and provide critical comment on proposed legislation. 
In addition, the advisory committees will be submitting their own 
reports and recommendations in early 1979. The staff reports 
are not the reports of the advisory committees, and the members 
of the advlsory committees are unable to establish majorities 
for approval of each of the staff recommendations. The separate 
advisory committee reports will probably reflect the majority 
opinions of each such committee. 
This Committee was established by the Legislature in 
response to an alleged tort system "crisis." Problems were mani-
fested in the form of ever increasing liability insurance premiums. 
In response to questions about such premium increases, insurers 
blamed the uncertainty of a tort litigation system which allows 




mended solution was to bring certainty to the law so that liabil-
ity exposure could be better anticipated. Premium rates could 
then be a more accurate reflection of this anticipated exposure. 
Although we have found deficiencies in the litigation 
system which, if remedied, will result in a reduction in trans-
action costs, such deficiencies alone do not justify the alleged 
significant increases in liability premiums. We believe that 
further examination of the litigation system and the liability 
insurance process is warranted. 
At times the work of the staff was unrewarding. Corres-
pondents to the Committee made allegations concerning various 
problems. When asked for substantiation, however, much of the 
supporting material was apocryphal. Many state appellate and 
Supreme Court decisions receiving notoriety were based upon 
pleadings (e.g., sustaining of a demurrer or granting of summary 
judgment) with the factual issues not yet tried. Many critics 
of the legal system base their disapproval upon these decisions 
and apocryphal materials. 
Other times, the staff received factual materials, encour-
agement and thoughtful comment from interested persons, including 
judges, lawyers, physicians, manufacturers and consumers. Some 
of these persons assisted by providing practical analyses of 
staff proposals. 
The final supervision of this Report and the ongoing work 
of the Committee were done by William c. George, Esq., Counsel to 
the Committee. He brought to the work broad experience as a deputy 
county counsel and an inquiring mind. This report is in large part 
due to his tenacity and energy. 
I would like to thank all of the staff who have thus far 





Joyce A. Faber 
Prof. John Fleming 
Darlene E. Fridley 
William C. George 
Martha C. Gorman 
Fred J. Hiestand 
Denise Jarman 
Joan Manee 
Gayle L. Phillips 
Brian Regan 
Estelle Schleicher 
Prof. Gary Schwartz 
Charles Spann 
Because of their extra effort, I wish to especially thank 
the following persons who contributed their skills as this project 
progressed: secretaries Joyce Faber and Darlene Fridley who under 
pressure of getting out the 1978 report gave up weekends and holi-
days, and Denise Jarman and Gayle Phillips, staff interns who 
provided imagination and interest in approaching their tasks. 
iii 
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Ms. Jarman, a legal purist, furnished critical perspective to 
staff proposals. I would also like to thank Justice Robert S. 
Thompson of the Second District Court of Appeal and Professor 
Gary Schwartz, who gave of their time beyond official committee 
duties by offering thoughtful suggestions and criticisms. 
The following is the 1978 Staff Report of the Joint 
Committee on Tort Liability. 
truly ~o~ 
N T. KNOX, Chairman 
























ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN T. KNOX 
CHAIRMAN 
January 2, 1979 
Hon. John T. Knox, Chairman 
Joint Committee on Tort Liability 
Room 2148, State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Chairman Knox: 
COMMITTEE ADDRESS: 
liTH & L BUILDING 
SUITE 950 
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814 
<916) 445-0118 
COUNSEL: 
WILLIAM C. GEORGE 
COMMITTEE ANALYST: 
CATHY E. CRAFT 
SECRETARY: 
JOYCE FABER 
Attached is the 1978 Staff Report of the Joint Committee 
on Tort Liability. The Report consists of sections concerning 
liability for automobile, government, medical malpractice, 
procedure, products and restaurant and bar owners. We have 
attempted to ascertain what should be the reasonable expecta-
tions of litigants and based our recommendations thereon. 
Ideally, liability should follow responsibility (Li v. Yellow 
Cab Co., [1975] 13 Cal. 3d 804). We believe in the concept of 
comparative fault and think that logically it should be extended. 
The sections of the Report need no amplification, but 
comments upon some special areas are warranted. In government 
liability, the Legislature should consider the application of 
the Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra., principles to inverse condem-
nation. Although this is not specifically a tort area, it is 
related. There appears to be manifest injustice to public 
entities as a result of holdings such as: Albers v. County of 
Los Angeles, (1965) 62 C.2d 250, Sheffet v. Count of Los An eles, 
(1970) 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, and Blau v. City of Los Angeles, 1973) 
32 Cal. App. 3d 77. In each of these cases, there were two 
parties whose conduct gave rise to the damage, but only the pub-
lic entity shouldered the loss. It would seem appropriate that 
the Li concept of liability following responsibility be extended 
to inverse condemnation. 
Proposition 13 may compound an already poor situation for 
public entities by decreasing maintenance and increasing potential 




Assuming any proposed legislation is not unconstitutional, 
the Legislature should clearly manifest its intent to the judiciary 
by appropriate comment accompanying statutes. It appears that the 
pr iple of separation of powers itself has been eroded by recent 
decisions, especially those which have limited or abolished statu-
tory immunities. Some of these changes have a direct financial 
impact on public entities. 
We have referred to our Report as Series 1978 because 
further work must be done in the insurance and professional lia-
bility areas. Also, there will be additions to product liability 
and procedure. These new materials will be Series 1979. 
When our recommendations have been reduced to bill form, 
we intend to present them to our advisory committees for review 
and comment. When the recommendations are in final bill form, 
they will be available for introduction. 
( 
ILLIAM C. GEO~GE, ounsel 
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The automobi liability report is the product of a review 
of written materials relevant to automobile tort liability problems 
and the economic impact of automobile related accidents; infor-
mation gathered at Automobile Liability Advisory Committee meetings; 
review of the transcripts of public hearings relative to automobile 
liability problems; proposed legislation and adopted legislation; 
decisions of the California courts of appeal and the California 
Supreme Court and some other state review court decision; and 
visits to other public agencies, including visits to other states 
and meetings with other state insurance department personnel and 
persons interested in automobile liability problems. From the 
collected information, automobile liability issues were identified 
and examined within the law. Proposed solutions of the problems 
were formulated and when possible discussed with persons who were 
knowledgeable in the law and/or aware of the practical problems 
which may be introduced by any proposed solution. After the 
discussions of the proposed solutions, recommendations were formu-
lated based upon the assumed issues and the most practical solutio&s. 
Like other study areas undertaken by the Joint Committee on 
Tort Liability, the Automobile Liability area was identified as a 
problem area because of public and consumer allegations that the 
costs of automobile insurance had become excessive. Insurers' 
reasons for the increase in insurance costs related, in major 







amount of the claims. Therefore, 
had to the tort ity system which 
claim results and, in turn, increased insurance costs, 
system itself since there may be reasons for 
costs other than tort system problems. 
Following is a discussion of the problems, the facts sur-
or related to the automobi 
issues to be resolved, and some 
sues. 
liability system, some of 




either the general 
As a of this se 
are unable to purchase 
increasing appar-
rate and income. 
rate, some persons allege 
and therefore are going 
According to Street Journal article (5/19/77, p.l,l9) 
some Florida' 
a t 
allege that the automobile 
value of their vehicles. 
For example, a 24 year old driver having a clean driving 
record driving a 1966 Ford Mustang ($1200 value) was being charged 
an premium of $1100.00. Other examples of high rates 
inc , a $1,320.00 minimum coverage premium for an under 25 year 
old male driver. 
I 
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Al a requirement, 
high insurance s are caus numerous motorists to go without 
insurance the almost 30% of the drivers are without 
automobile insurance 
has precipitated other 
1 Street , supra.). The hioh cost 
------------------~~ 
such as using counterfeit 
documents as proof of insurance in order to reoister a vehicle. 
In addition, some motorists request automobile body shops to pad 
repair bills to recoup some of the premium costs. 
Other motorists 
other states to take 
and register their automobile in 
lower premiums. However, the 
most significant 
is the increase 
feet of high cost of automobile insurance 
the number uninsured motorists. Under the 
tort liability system, this a problem for those who may 
(Wall Street Journal, supra.). 
costs raises other issues 
be injured by an 
The problem 
in light of numerous 
the profits of 
person finding it 
les magazines and papers describing 
companies for the last two years. A 
difficult to pay for insurance for 
his automoiile even more perplexed when told that in view of 
recent insurance premiums for such insurance 
are not necessary for 
According to 
probable risk. 
November 1978 issue of Nation's Business, 
$150 billion in premiums were paid to insurance companies. 
Allegedly the insurance companies paid close to $2 billion in 
premium taxes to the 50 states. Here we are only speaking of 
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premiums. In to receipt of the premiums, property/ 
$62.5 11 bonds and $26.8 billion 
s , the companies only 
on is referred to as underwriting losses. 1 
Insurers allege their arise primarily from 
costs repa to automobiles and the rising cost of medical 
are 
However, es inf , insurers say their costs 
fraudulent claims. 
1 Insurance Company of Florida believes that 
70% of all bodily injury ~laims against the company 
are •.• Allstate's Mr. Pike says that 
last year (1976) the average cost bodily injury 
claims on company in Miami was $5,931.00 com-
with $1,791.00 Atlanta~ (Wall Street 
Journal, 
Included in the severity of claims according to insurers, 
are numerous verdicts, the major portion of which includes 
damages and suffering. Among the factors contributing 
to payments is design of automobiles. 
Because of demand for increased fuel conservation, automobiles 
have become ler and lighter. Collisions between smaller and 
cars cars inevitably produce more serious 
inj lighter cars. In addition, collisions between 
cars more injuries than would be the case 
if two cars collided. is due, in part, to the more 
conf area of a ler car. As a result of such confined area, 
there a more rapid deceleration of the auto occupant's body 
between and secondary impacts. Also, is almost a 
factor subject to judicial notice that the sheet metal used in 
lcosgrove, "Insurance--A Premium Place In American Economy," 




the smaller and lighter cars is thinner than that found in the 
larger, heavier cars. Not only does this contribute to occupant 
injury, but so ses damage or collision costs. 
Property damage is an area which must be handled apart from 
bodily ury. same s are not applicable in both cases. 
Both Michigan and Massachusetts had significant problems with 
property damage coverages. 
out the report. 
area will be scussed through-
In addition to problems involving the vehicle and roadway, 
consumers question the methods used by insurance companies for 
rating and for determining whether or not to sell insurance. 
According to the Los Angeles Daily Journal, 8/15/78 (p.l, Col. 1, 
p.2, Col. 6), Los Angeles Supervisor Kenneth Hahn alleged that the 
state Insurance Commissioner, Wesley Kinder, had failed to act 
upon charges that insurance companies were discriminating against 
metropolitan area sts. The suit to which Supervisor Hahn 
was referring is a suit by the County and City of Los Angeles 
against two major automobile insurers to compel the Insurance 
Commissioner to hold public hearings on rating practices of such 
companies • 
In addition to territorial discrimination, there are allega-
tions that age and sex considerations are not relevant to rates. 
In June of 1978, the Committee of National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners approved a report asking insurance companies to stop 
taking age and sex into consideration and that the rating be based 
on loss data (National Assoc. of Ins. Commissioners, Automobile 





















event such owner 
However, as time 




Sections 11580.2 and 
sumes method of com-
1 pursuant to the 
number of product 
defective street cases, 
injury accidents 
78-7 
will go without to the extent they have first 
party coverage. persons in multiple vehicle 
accidents will probably share some responsibility for their in-
juries. Under the Comparative Fault doctrine their potential 
recovery will be diminished. The presence of the uninsured 
motorist, which is approximately 14-25 percent of the drivers in 
caiiforrlia, further diminishes the potential recovery in many accidents. 
From the foregoing, we estimate a substantial number of 
persons injured in automobile accidents will be required to look 
to a source of compensation other than an at-fault driver. Even 
accidents involving two insured drivers will result in a limita-
tion of recovery for those persons involved in catastrophic 
accidents. The catastrophic accident for our purposes is one 
involving economic loss $25,000 or more. The required coverages 
for public liability and property damage in California are $15,000, 
$30,000 and $5,000 and in any accident involving catastrophic 
injuries, the potentially liable driver will seldom have insurance 
in excess of the required minimum limits. He will also, in all 
probability, be judgment proof for any amount in excess of the 
minimum levels. Before the injured party may hope to recoup any 
of his economic loss, he will have to satisfy the condition pre-
cedent under the fault system to establish liability on the part 
of the other driver. Only then can he be compensated from such 
other driver's liability insurance funds. Between the time of 

















mere need of the 









An examination some ts will indicate the 
of the problem ial in California. The number of vehicles 
and drivers and the amount of roadway and the amount of motorist 
activity demonstrate need for an adequate and fair automobile 
injury compensation system. 
II 
FACTS 
A. Data. In 1977, according to information from the California 
Highway Patrol, the Department of Motor Vehicles and data contained 
in the Statistical Abstract - State of California, the following 
conditions obtained: 
B. 
1. Licensed drivers: 14,599,000 
2. Registered vehicles: 15,447,979 
3. Miles of road: City - 48,758 
Unincorporated state 
highway - 12,718 
County roads - 71,857 
Total 133,333 
4. Miles driven: 153,596,262,400 
5. Population: 21,896,000 
Accidents: 
1. Property Damage Accidents: 318,115 
(Not all agencies in state report property damage 
only accidents} 
2. Injury Accidents: 193,270 
3. Fatal Accidents: 4,443 
4. Number of Persons Injured: 284,079 
5. Persons Killed: 4,942 
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C. The young driver and the drinking driver: 
Six thousand four hundred fifty seven (6,457) drivers 
were involved in the 4,443 fatal accidents. Of these 6,457 drivers, 
2,183 had been drinking and 1,535 of those had been under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. Two thousand five hundred seventy 
five (2,575) of the 6,457 drivers were between the ages of 15 and 
24 years. Of these 2,575 drivers, 1,002 had been drinking. 
In fact, of all the drivers in fatal accidents 2,183 or 33.8% 
had been drinking. Of the total number of licensed drivers in 
the state (14,599,000), 21.6% or 3,151,200 (i.e. ages 15-24) were 
involved in 39.9% of the fatal accidents, and 37.5% of the injury 
accidents. Drivers between the ages of 25-29 years 2,007,200 
or 13.7% of the total, licensed drivers accounted for 14.6% of 
the fatal accidents and 14.6% of the injury accidents. Drivers 
between the ages of 15-19 years constituted 7.7% of the total 
numbers of drivers, but caused 17.6% of the fatal accidents. All 
other drivers, i.e. 30-65 and over, caused fewer fatal and injury 
accidents than their proportion to the total driving population. 
D. Place of accident: 
Of the 4,942 persons killed, 2,396, or 48.5%, were 
killed on city roadways and 2,546 or 51.5% were killed on unincor-
porated roadways. However, in the injury category, 205,648 or 
72.4% were injured on city roadways, and 78,431 or 27.6% were 
injured on unincorporated roadways. 
E. Collision factors: 
In 1977 the primary collision factor in 31.4% or 1,394 
78-11 
of the ace was the influence alcohol 
or alcohol 12.4% or 550 the , (4,443) 
the primary 
fatal accidents 
was excess Therefore, 43.8% of the 
influence of alcohol 





the ages of 15-24 account 
and injury ace 
involved in or 
is apparent that drivers between 
a sproportionate number of fatal 
a significant number of drivers who are 
accidents have been drinking or have 
been engaged excessive speed. 
F. Type accident: 
In 1974, 40.8% of the accidents and 33.8% of 
injury accidents only a single vehicle. In 1975 it was 
57.3% for fatal 33.3% 
and 32.7%; and 197~ 57.2% 
action or suit 




a property damage 
a 
injury; 1976, the tota were 56.3% 
33.0%. Absent any potential product 
entity there is little likelihood 
ured persons. 
accident: 
from 1977, we can estimate 
ifornia drivers will be involved in 
, 1.3% will be involved in an injury 
accident, and .03% 1 be involved in a fatal accident. 
From ts is apparent that one-third of all the 
injury accidents and about one-half of all fatal accidents will 
involve a single le. 
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Although the probability seems high it is estimated that 
on a national basis approximately 25% of drivers will be involved 
in a property damage accident. A consequence of these accidents 
will be significant repair costs. 
According to Jack Scagnetti, Auto Insurance Part IV, 
Motor Trend, (Mar. 1978, p. 92), hospital service charges for a semi-
private room soared 268.6% from 1967 to 1976 and physicians' fees 
188.5% for the same period. The economic loss for auto accidents 
in 1976 was $40.89 billion. 
H. Visits to other agencies: 
In October 1978 some members and staff of the Joint 
Committee on Tort Liability travelled to Michigan, Massachusetts, 
New York, New Jersey and Indiana. They met with insurance commis-
sioners and representatives of the trial Bar of those states and 
spoke to persons who were familiar with the formulation of and 
administration of no-fault laws in various states. Commissioners 
from Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania and Indiana were contacted. All of those states, 
except Indiana, have some form of traditional no-fault automobile 
insurance. 
The approach was to meet with the commissioner or other 
insurance department representative of a no-fault state, discuss 
the law and the problems connected with administration of the law, 
ask for factual information to determine how well the plan accom-
plished the objectives of the legislation and ask for any samples 
• 
of proposed s 
iencies of the plan 
insurance department 
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was to overcome some of the defic-
to the commissioners or other 
, meetings were held with representatives 
of opponents of no-fault automobile insurance. In most instances 
the opponents of no-fault insurance were members of the trial 
lawyers' association particular state. In addition, 
Committee people met with other persons knowledgeable about the 
operation of no-fault plans but not connected either with the 
state insurance department or with the trial lawyers' association. 
In some states information was factually more complete than in 
others but in most states the Committee was able to obtain a fairly 
realistic picture of the successes and problems with the no-fault 
operation. After meeting with commissioners and other representa-
tives of the individual states, Committee representatives met with 
a group of insurance commissioners in Indianapolis, Indiana. At 
that time no-fault automobile insurance issues and other automobile 
insurance problems such as how to decrease the number of uninsured 
motorists within the state were reviewed . 
Although the primary objective in the trip was to 
discuss automobile no-fault, there were meetings with insurance 
commissioners to discuss problems of state regulation of insurers. 
The following is a brief summary of some of the findings: 
MICHIGAN 
A meeting with Commissioner Thomas Jones, a deputy commissioner 
























information Commiss , it appears that the 
percentage of se rates was less than the per-
centage of increase rates other states operating under the 
tort system. A factor which influences rate increase or reduc-
tion is the amount of money set aside in reserve. Some Michigan 
companies may still be reserving liability cases to guard 
against the possibili of the no-fault statute being declared 
unconstitutional. These reserves will influence the cost of 
insurance. 
The Michigan Department of Insurance acknowledged that 
there were problems with the motorcycle coverage. Some court 
decisions have lowed motorcyclist to be treated as a pedes-
trian under no-fault law. This is contrary to the intent of the 
legislature in orginally adopting no-fault insurance. Motorcyclists 
have a disproportionate number of the catastrophic accidents in 
ratio to the total number of motorcycles to automobiles in the 
state. In addition, when injuries occur in a motorcycle accident, 
the injuries, on an average, are more severe than in automobile 
accidents. Because of this exposure the legislature felt that it 
was better to retain motorcyclists in the liability system. 
Michigan is going to do more study on the motorcycle coverage 
problem. 
Commissioner Jones and his department agree that the most 
difficult issue under the no-fault system is the handling of 














system is the 
its. However, the 






be required to j 
suggested that there not 
rates since he felt 
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Commissioner is that insurers 
s. In addition, he 
a requirement of prior approval of 
influenced the rate-setting by hedging. 
For catastrophic claims excess of $250,000 the Commis-
sioner is recommending an association of insurers which will spread 
the losses above $250,000 among the member companies. Membership 
of the association would be mandatory as a condition precedent of 
writing automobile insurance in Michigan. 
Mr. T. Sinas, representative of the Michigan Trial 
Lawyers Association stated that there was difficulty in interpreting 
the present Michigan In addition, there were issues concerning 
the use of collateral benefits and challenges to the constitution-
ality of the statute because of disparity of treatment between 
governmental ts benefits. 
According to Mr. S are too many delays in receipt 
of first party If there is a dispute between insurer 
and claimant, such dispute must be ultimately resolved in a trial 
court. These suits, according to Mr. Sinas, are calendared with 
other suits, therefore move too slowly. He felt that the sanction 
against companies, i.e. 12% interest on the claim amount, is not 
realistic since most insurers can equal or better that by re-
taining the money. 
Mr. Sinas says that loss of consortium should be another 
item included as compensable under the statute. In discussions 







resort to tort system 
be 
Is 













, of the Division 
James Stone met with Committee rep-
In , ttee personnel 
I 
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met with G. 1 commissioner and Eugene 
G. Coombs, Jr., a Mr. Ryan in the firm of DiMento and 
Sullivan. Lastly, there was a meeting with Paul Sugarman, a trial 
lawyer representative. Mr. Ryan, Mr. Coombs, and Mr. Sugarman 
are all very famil with the Massachusetts no-fault law. 
The Massachusetts plan, a very moderate plan compared to 
Michigan, is one of the in United States. It has a 
$500 threshold with a verbal alternative for fracture, dismember-
ment, disfigurement, loss of sight, hearing or death. In addition 
to the no-fault coverage, Massachusetts has a compulsory liability 
coverage of $5,000/$10,000/$5,000. The maximum benefit in no-fault 
is $2,000 which is to include medical costs, wage loss, replacement 
services and funeral costs. are no survivor benefits. Even 
very moderate no-fault have resulted in a reduction in 
litigation. Motor tort filings have declined from 1970 
through 1975 in both Massachusetts Superior Courts and Massachusetts 
District Courts. The jurisdictional limit of the district court 
was $2,000 or less prior to 1974 and $4,000 or less thereafter. 
Mr. Ryan was enthusiastic nor critical of the no-
fault plan in Massachusetts. Mr. Coombs was generally supportive 
of it. Mr. Sugarman indicated that the plan was meant to carve 
out a certain number of claims at the bottom of the dollar amount 
and to that extent it has been successful. According to Mr. 
Sugarman, the cases which have been taken from the courts should 































out of the system. 
general 
information. 
of the commissioner. 
in our insurance 
-2 
NEW YORK 
In New met Dick Stewart, 
the and 
adoption to Mr. Stewart, 
there was a , E a member of the 
no-fault plan. Prior to the most recent changes, the New York 
plan provided a $500 
dismemberment, s 
the use of a body 




month for 3 

















resulting in death, 
, or permanent loss of 
function, or system. Liability 
$10 000 person, $20,000 per accident 
damage. 
is a maxiuum of $50,000 for 
costs, wage losses up to $1,000 per 
services s at the rate of $25 
slature modified the law by: 
could t to have 
be primary to the 
entitle him to a reduc-
In addition, it pro-
from dual recovery by 
coverage. Wage loss 
there was no true loss 
for medical expenses 
for the medical 
schedule. 
expenses, the law 
expenses and establish 
costs. There are 
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were i 
tewart Mr. Lawrence , deputy 
, now , were of the no-
Mr. Stewart states 1 should be in-
at at i He felt that if 
deficiencies were a re-
were concessions during 
s. 
Albert the New York Trial 
no- t New York was a 
( s was not th we spoke) . 
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Mr. Albert s 





of New York's 
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He also s 
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access to the 
in New is dis-
insurance companies 
Under the collateral 
source without a in 
that approximately 16% 
He did feel that arbitration 
ial. 
the reason that tort system case 
filings have declined is because collateral source ization. 
According to Mr. collateral source utilization allows the 
insurance companies a greater amount of money upon which to make 
profit. He advocates an approach to reduction of automobile in-
surance rates by: 1) first party benefits to $5,000; 
2) eliminating the 1 or monetary; 3) making 
payments of first party benefits only to basic amounts, a lien on 
third party ac ; 4) providing a reasonable fee schedule for 
health providers i e. make one rate for the same service; 5) elim-
inating 
6) establi 
of the total 
to eliminate double loss reserving; 
is charges and losses since 65% 
is property damage coverage; 7) 
establishing a commiss to investigate the insurance industry's 
bookkeeping s reserve system, investment income profits 
and rate-making procedures; 8) increasing limits under liability 
policies to $25,00 $5 ,000. 
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In New representatives of Committee met with 
Legis Study Commis and the legislative 
the s commis together with James Sheeran, 
Insurance ssioner, of his s , and Morris Brown, 
. a 's The commission 
room and facilities for scussion with repre-
New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Company, 
Insurance Casualty 
Insurance , New 
Insurance 













along with representatives of 
plan 
,0 0 each ace 
to $100 
$12 day 
was detailed and 
1 limits 
, $5,000 property 
provides for unlimited 
week for a year, replace-
to $4,380 and survivors 
wage replacement services benefit levels 
1 0. its are to be paid within 
a written notice of the claim. 
rate of 10% per annum. The 
and necessary treatment of 
the body. The $200 does not include 
, or other 
There is no exemption from the tort system if 
medical expenses. 
injured party 




disfigurement, loss of any bodily func or loss of the 
body member in whole or in part. 
The plan allows subrogation by the insurer. However, the 
subrogation is carried out by inter-company arbitration or inter-
company agreement. If person liable for the accident is unin-
sured then the insurer may exercise its subrogation rights against 
such person in tort. 
Even though the threshold in New Jersey is relatively low, 
it appears that there has been a significant decrease in automobile 
tort case filings. The combination of the low threshold with the 
unlimited medical benefits seems to blunt the enthusiasm for liti-
gation. On the one hand, the recipient of the unlimited benefits 
is readily satisfied and on the other hand there is little basis 
for litigation necessary to interpret the threshold. However, 
the legislative study commission has recommended that New Jersey 
adopt a verbal threshold. It is the opinion of the members of the 
study commission that although litigation arising out of interpre-
tation of threshold terms will increase, at some period in time 
this will level off and then diminish. The objection to the present 
threshold is that many insurance companies are capitulating on 
claims under the threat of suit. The insurers feel that they are 
paying more than the plan intended. One of the objectives of no-
fault insurance program is to properly compensate claims regardless 
of their size. It is alleged that under the fault system, small 
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commerc vehicles, school and 
coverage. That 
les, such as commercial 
no-fault benefits. The 
under other insurance. 
be retained but 
to the first $75,000 





5. Extension of the time period for payment from 30 to 
60 days. 
6. Elimination of the dollar threshold and adopting a 
verbal threshold. 
There are other recommendations from the Commission, but 
are not discussed • 
New Jersey was probably the most interesting state because 
of its combination of the low-dollar threshold and unlimited 
benefits . 
INDIANA 
Committee representatives also visited the Regional Confer-
ence of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners at 
Indianapolis and met with commissioners from Indiana, Kentucky, 
Pennsylvania and Florida. In addition to meeting with the commis-
sioners, staff attended meetings dealing with uninsured motorists 
and compulsory coverage. 
There were discussions with the commissioners of various 
aspects of their no-fault coverage. Generally, commissioners from 
states having no-fault plans endorsed the plans. 
Indiana Commissioner H.P. Hudson stated that he was not a 
proponent of no-fault until called upon to do some research in the 
area in preparation for an appearance before a congressional sub-
committee. He studied the experience of several states plus data 
from the federal government and changed his attitude toward no-
fault. Under a proper no-fault plan, according to Commissioner 
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t s a 
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except when an 
I an motorist is 
resort to the tort system for 
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Mr. Hudson also estimated the number of uninsureds varies 
from state to state and low is approximately one-half percent 
in Delaware and the high is 33% in the District of Columbia. 
According to one of the study groups at the meeting the 
uninsured motorists comprise from 5%-40% of the drivers of any 
state. A survey was conducted among the 50 states of which 27 
responded, 11 indicating that they conducted a survey and 16 
indicating that they had estimated the number of uninsured motorists. 
From those that conducted a survey, the number of uninsured motor-
ists ranged from 5%-35% and from those states that estimated, the 
range was from 5%-40%. Illinois estimates approximately 15% unin-
sured motorists statewide with approximately 40% in the Chicago area. 
Part of the discussion centered on the cost of insurance as being 
a disincentive to the purchase thereof. The reasons behind the 
high cost were also considered. Generally, the insurers indicate 
that the higher cost of medical services and automobile repairs is 
a major factor in premium increases. 
The facts must be considered within the law in order to 
highlight the issues. 
III 
THE LAW 
Motor vehicle liability insurance regulations are found 
generally in Insurance Code Sections 11628 and following and un-
insured motorist coverage is found in Insurance Code sections 11580.2 
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In case of Maloney v. 
97, Traynor in 
s, 
sed possibility of implementing 
tort automobile actions. How-
problems. 11 
liability on users 
, without also 
1 how the new rule 
contribute confusion to 
. • • Only the 
wise to do so, can avoid 
a comprehensive plan 
accident victims in 
to the law of negligence." 
at 4 6f~ 
Legislature to enter 
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issue, are cases that 
seem to point to the need for 
liability insurance 
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area. In February 1973 the Supreme Court addressed the Guest 
Statute issue in the case of Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 
106 Cal.Rptr. 388. The case concerned Vehicle Code section 17158 
which precluded recovery by an injured guest for the careless 
driving of his host unless the drivers action amounted to willful 
misconduct or involved intoxication. The Court in the opinion by 
Justice Tobriner examined the statute and the rationale behind 
the statute. According to the Court the reasons for the statute 
are found in " • • . (1) the protection of hospitality and (2) the 
elimination of collusive lawsuits. " (Brown v. Merlo, supra, 
at 859). The opinion states: 
II .• [I]t completely ignores the prevalence of lia-
bility insurance coverage today, a factual development 
which largely undermines any rational connection be-
tween the prevention of suits and the protection of 
hospitality." (Brown v. Merlo, supra, at 859). 
In his analysis Justice Tobriner states: 
"First, if the characterization of an injured guest's 
lawsuit as an act of 'ingratitude' ever had general 
validity, its rationality has been completely eroded 
by the development of almost universal automobile 
liability insurance coverage in recent years. Where-
as in the late 1920's and 1930's the statute's opera-
tion might realistically have been viewed as relieving 
most generous hosts from potentially great personal 
expense, today with the widespread prevalence of 
insurance coverage, it is the insurance company and 
not the generous host, that in the majority of in-
stances wins protection under the guest statute. 
Thus, in a day in which nearly 85 percent of the 
automobile drivers carry liability insurance, the 
statute can no longer sequester the defense that it 
is a necessary means to thwart 'ungrateful' guests. 
In plain language, there is simply no notion of 
'ingratitude' in suing your host's insurer." (Brown 
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case of Schwalbe v. Jones (1975} 120 Cal. 
Rehearing granted) the Court addre~sed the 
being precluded from recovering against 
After Brown v. Merlo, supra, the Legi~lature 
law to prec only the owners from recovering against 
owner's vehicle. The Court stated: 
, we believe that the Legislature's 
to hospitality and pre-
s to systain the con-
of present section 17158 just 
to support the guest rule itself. 
fa claim that section 17158 
car owners to exercise control over 
them fails to serve as a suf-
alternative justification. 
can claim no more constitu-
its predecessor." 
( 19 7 5) 53 4 p. 2d 7 3, 7 8 • ) 
determined that the owner guest statute was 
In March 1976 Court after a rehearing of 
matter rendered another opinion in Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 
16 Cal. the constitutional validity of Vehicle 
158 as amended by the Legislature precluding owner 
negl drivers of owner's vehicle. 
In case California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Hoskin, (1978) 
82 App. 3d 789 insurance company sought declaratory relief 
to whether an owner passenger injured in a vehicle driven 
her son when it collided with another vehicle which was uninsured 
was to recover under the Uninsured Motorist provisions 
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ec to ine how used 
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sue tort e.g., 
Transportation, 
suffering) . '' 






















is , the report stated 
cone The report gives 
a of no-fault plans the context of the 
of insured tort 1 ty. In another report, the 
Department of Transportation on March 26, 1971, issued a final 












to a Massachusetts study, 
In states 
f , scus catas 
such states. As , a catas 
over 
II 







s is one $25,000 
automobile 
insurance benefit on single car accidents. As it 
-45 
was out 1 S car ace account a signi-
f the state of 




would not state 
25% more 
victims are to recover 
than under the tort 
II measure the ability of 
to provide benefits to 
excluded from tort benefits 
Such victims 
ly 
, cannot succes ly shift 
their accident 
under tort system." 














between duration of dis-
duration of 





























insurance such as 
care insurance, 
1 
, which can 
an automobile accident. In 
a plan 





















fees and other 








case never gets to 
should 
• 
















t on the re-
auto ace lack of 
an process. 
t are: needs 
sue s of financial 
. diminishing I 
costs; ial 
resources. 
, at p. 9.) 
t 
As is Insurance H.P. 
is a never 
as a reason auto insurance. No-
Personal cannot be com-
Inj comparing 
the medical and 
are benefits be 
$30,000 or $40,000 the Bodily 






within which to 











































the logic of a no-fault auto 
the Legislature consider 
adoption of a no-fault automobile insurance plan which is 
to personal injury protection. Medical and rehabilitation benefits 






































cases in the 
at same time will 
t. 
t automobile insurance 


































4. replacement services s i.e. those 
self and family, not 
5. Limited survivor's 
for benefit of 
ing economic losses. 










3. Damages for non-economic detriment only if 
the 
di To 
added the concept 
of or other scus above. 
Disabi mean to 
some or 
qual 
h. The reparation has the 
right of uninsured motorists 
an~ to the extent a cause action sts 
of the of basic repar-
ation benefits. 
i. Public entities, federal, state and local and self-
insurers should security for basic reparation 
benefits. 
j. Public 1 
for bodily 
accident 
lity limits shall be a minimum $25,000 
--





1. The shall to elect deductibles 
increments to a maximum the basic benefits 
$1,000. 













p. Bas 30 60) 
not ect to 18% annum interest. 
or intentional mis-
fact may be recovered 
by sum authorized to be recovered 
shall bear interest at rate of 18% per annum 
and1 any the insurer 
entitled to recover the amount paid, such insurer 
also be to reasonable attorneys fees. 
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q. Insurers, i.e. or enti 
provide or security, refusing 
shall give written such 




r. If c an action against an insurer 
for any claim ly rejected and recovers such 
claim or a portion , such claimant be 
entitled to reasonable attorney's in addition·· 
to interest on such recovery. 
s. Provision be made physical 
of the claimant through notice to the Court if 
there is a matter in issue involving the mental or 
physical condition the claimant. Provision for 
the physical examination should so include limita-
tions on sufficient to protect individual 
outs of the matters issue. 
t. Some provision should be made to assure that 
rates ished for the be based 
factors logically relate to exposure. 
u. Out-of-state insured motorists would be deemed to 
have basic no-fault benefits when in California. 
3. Vehicle Code section 16056 should be amended to increase 
limits for bodily injury, each person to $25,000, each 
accident $50,000 and property damage $15,000. Pursuant 
to Insurance Code section 11580.2 this will result in 
the same limits for uninsured motorists coverages. 
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would appear to have been the principal 
increases both tort and no-fault 
other as 
shifts in accident frequencies and severities, inadequate thresholds 
in some no-fault states, inflation in jury awards and claim settle-
ments, et cetera, have also obviously affected insurance costs 
and prices. 
2. The experience of the states, taken overall, does 
indicate increased benefits under no-fault can achieved 
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I s AND WRONG WITH AUTO NO-FAULT? 
J. 
I. Introduction 
No- t insurance has as "the one 
reform of the 1960's, 1 one that is 
!! st of the automob e owners, as 
well as e accident v 112 and so decried 
as a s certainly to s destruction 
of of the individual evenhanded just of the 
common law. 113 
s memorandum 1) sets forth or differing 





tates where no-fault 
4 s . sis will 
Poor", Sacramento Bee, 
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Proposed for Traffic V 
18, 1966, p.2. 
ims", 
sembly leadership 
s of specific 
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's no-fault e law 
most closely s a 11 11 no-fault 
No- automobile surance l term fraught with ambiguity. 
One authority lists requls s of "true", as opposed to 
"pseudo", automob 6 e no-fault: 1) alteration or complete elimina-
tion of the tort 1 tern in handl of automobile 
accident reparations; 2) who or ial substitut of a compen-
sation system the p 
accident ions; 
legislation, assuring 
of tort 1 lity to handle automob 
3) a system, probably made compulsory by 
there /will7 be universal application of 
the substitute em. This same authority defines a "pure" no-fault 
system as one 
eliminate tort 1 
igenc_:::_l claims s out automobile 
ury property damage c 7 
Jeffrey O'Connell, a law professor at the ity of Illinois 
who col with ssor Robert at Law 
5 O'Connell, " of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of 
Surveys", 56 . L. 23, 27 (1977). Hereinafter c as 
O'Connell, Survey, supra. 
6 Rokes, No- Insurance 5 (1971), sa pseudo-no-fault 
proposal as one that 11 merely provide/87 an extens of the medical 
payments, di il , ace death, uninsured motorist and/or 
property damage coverage without altering the basic tort liability 
system". Id. at 4. 
7 Id. at 5. 
78-72 
PAGE 3 
00 an 8 work advocating automob no- 8 
def s a t plan as "eliminat{In_g_7 all, or almost all, 
c based on st j_Tn_g_7 re unlimited 
s ical expenses wage loss/es7 no matter how 
ext ens O'Connell distingu s between "modified 
no- provide "only modest no-fault benefits . 
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any viet ss a fault claim and 
su dr 
A recent s released by U.S. Department of Transportation, 
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three s l) loss bene s are 
; 2 economic 
loss bene s tort l sat 
same loss; some restrict on ims 
to sue tort s (e.g. pain suffering) . 
8 - A Propo for 
~~~~L~·~R~e~v~. 328 (1964). 
9 O' 1 .... , !! s . at 27. 
1 at 26. . 
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II . Is No-Fault Meeting Its Objectives? 
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accident .15 
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.L ' s to a 
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2. In ext s to s ss on 
relatively more on ury. 
3. To ly. 
4. To pay claims more e by using less of 
premium dol on insurance s. 
5. To e amount 1 ion court st 
stemming from auto ace s. 
6. To reduce -- or at st stab ize costs of 
automobile surance. 
In so as stat st s states various kinds 
of no- can to 1 a pure no- system 
1 Michigan's can s' be re 
to, but emphasis 1 neces on Michigan 
experience . 
Mich IS no- insurance statute was enacted 
October 31, 1 72, took effect on 1, 1973. 16 Under 
Michigan's law, accident victims cannot sue in tort for non-economic 
15 0' Connell, "No-Fault urance: Is It, How Is It Doing, 
Where Is It Going?", Address of Professor Jeffrey O'Connell delivered 
before the faculty and law students of the University of Texas, 
School of Law, June 21, 1977. 
16 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 500-3101 - 500.3179 (Supp. 1975). 
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paid in a more t tort 1 
s. This 0 to be expected 
since t c eas to process 
and pay than ird tort 1 
only the of 
insurer s . 
It seems clear no- t in states d here, • 
is meeting its announced of providing insurance compensat 
for personal ace losses that is that 
provided by tort system." 38 
A 1971 s Department Transportation found that 
the "auto urance 1 itz? em in 1968 was so 
that took more one 1 1n system costs to deliver one 
dollar net at to of auto ace s.~~39 
In , of course, no- are more e than 
tort 1 terns does away with many of the 
1 es 1 so inflate 
tort s for economic 
losses are restr ions on tort actions for minor 
auto accidents, much of the claimant's expenses, insurer's claims, 
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registered icle compiled by Pro ssor tle. 
culat arti ly inflated 
first two s of no-
Study states reasonable conclusion 
can be drawn seems to shi from third 
tort 1 c to , no- in auto 
insurance terns of no- states strongly st that these 
systems are, at t to some extent, iz the administrat 
cost-savings theoretically inherent in such a shi Unfortunate 
the data has not been developed that could support or refute the 
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or four years after an incident the res-
taurant owner is suddenly involved in 
a suit The time is so great, the 
have no way of 
need in reserves." 
.. 
Insurance broker George Salisbury 
counts 1000 cases pending In California. 
78-130 
hysi • possible for 
nts to ensure that every 
patron who leaves is sober .. 
it may be years after an ac-
ident before I iugation turns up 
against the on-sale licensee .. Although 
a personal injury action in California 
in most cases must be filed within one 
year. the attorney can allege 
several Does in the petition. The 
legal eventually grinds out 
the name of the establishment where 
the primary defendant had been drink-
ing, and John Doe is identified as a 
bar or restaurant owner. 
This is an extremely difficult situa-
tion to defend. Neither the insurance 
nor the operator himself 
can locate witnesses. Former employ-
ees have moved without leaving a 
trace. a strong defense, in-
surance companies are inclined to set-
tie out of court for sums they believe 
will be much less than a jury would 
award to a sympathetic victim. 
"Insurance companies have a fun-
damental pub! ic relations problem," 
Salisbury emphasizes. "People tend 
to think they are an endless source of 
money. That isn't true. The money 
they have is the money of their cus-
tomers. When the company sustains 
these the cost of insurance 
naturally rnes up." 
Many ' rators argue that the in-
npanies have been too 
· . ttle out of court. ''The 
and defendant should be 
to go to court," says Ron 
Fletcher. ''Once you settle out of 
LU11\IntUI1 ' UINNtl 
court, people think 'Oh, this is 
easy.' '' 
"The insurance companies are tak-
ing a frightened view and paying 
exhorbitant judgments," declares 
Jerry Stevenson, chairman of the 
California Beverage and Dining As-
sociation. :·1 think they should stand 
and fight.'' 
Winegar concedes that this argu-
ment has merit, then points to the 
tremendous cost of defending a suit, 
ranging on an average from $10,000 
to $25.000. The insurance company is 
generally better off with a settlement, 
he insists. 
Salisbury agrees. • • Anytime you 
take a case to court there may be a 
decision handed down that establishes 
a new precedent. It could open up a 
whole new liability to the public" On 
this basis he defends the out of court 
settlements made prior to 1971 when 
case law followed the 1955 Cole vs. 
Rush decision. 
Stock Market Losses. The cost of 
settling liquor liability suits has un-
doubtedly hurt some insurance com-
panies in the last few years. There 
may be another explanation, however, 
for the dramatic rise in insurance 
premiums that has struck not only res-
taurants but other pol icy holders in-
cluding doctors and automobile 
operators. At a recent SCRA meeting 
convened to discuss the liquor liability 
problem, general manager Bob Riley 
cited an Underwriter's Report that in 
1974 and 1975 the liability insurance 
industry suffered substantial deficits 
of which over 50 percent were stock · 
market losses. 
Policyholders may be paying higher 
premiums to restore insurance re-
serves seriously depleted through 
failed management and investments. 
Some industry spokesmen do admit 
there is some truth to this accusation. 
But they also point out that every 
business ex~riences cycles of profit 
and loss; the cost of the product or 
service it sells will be affected accord-
ingly. 
Di Amico, Winegar, Stevenson: How to rouse the sleeping giant? 
In any event, insurance brokers 
claim the liquor liability market is so 
thin it's difficult find in~ carriers to in-
sure their restaurant clients. In many 
cases the cost to the operator is pro-
hibitive even when the coverage b 
available. So some restaurants an~ be-
Page WESTERN FOODSERVICE 
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California Department of Highway Patrol Report of 
fatal and injury motor vehicle traffic accidents 1971-76. 
DATE DEATHS INJURIES 
1971 1,007 27,848 
19.72 1,153 15,112 
1973 1,356 16,640 
1974 1,769 32,980 
1975 1,121 17,696 
1976 1,680 50,987 
DJ:jf 
78-140 




CONVERSATION WITH RONALD R •. McQUOID, June 27, 1978 
was insurance e counsel carrier. 
the exclusion from coverage of fur-
in this case was applicable. He 
of the settlement in this case. This is interesting 
the memorandum of the phone conversation with . Milton 
same day points out 
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Attorney for Robert and Anthony Ewing 
415/494-0611 
Denise Jarman 
June 23, 1978 
SUBJECT: Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 389 
Present Status of Case: Settlement reached 5/78, amount: $130,000; 
Dismissal filed 8/24/78. 
When asked what comments or recommendations he might 
have for the legislature in the Dram Shop area, he appeared happy 
with the situation under present case law. His reasoning in imposing 
liability against a bartender is "why should he occupy a privileged 
position? Surgeons, whose job is delicate, attorneys, drivers are 
all held liable." 
When asked about the social host he stressed two key 
elements in imposing liability, foreseeability and obvious intoxi-
cation. He would limit the finding of these elements to such 
factual situations as the slurring of words, falling of a chair, etc. 
My ideas: Statute defining the term "obvious intoxication". 
DJ:df 
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E X H I B I T F 
., ., 
LIQUOR LIABILITY INQUIRY 
~iled to selected Directors (dinner house ) of the Southern California and California State Restaurant Associa 
were mailed on 4-17-78; of the 14 returned (41.2%), 13 were used to comnile the fol 
1974 % INCREASE 1975 % INCREASE 1976 % INCREASE 1977 % INCREASE 1978 % INCREASE INCREASE OVER PREMI 
PIRM II OVER 1973 OVER 1974 OVER 1975 OVER 1976 OVER 197'f CHANGE YR/NUMBER OF YRS. 
1 0 0 567 3000 255 73233/3 
2 0 0 301 89 2 674/3 
3 19 9 69 149 -7 404/5 
* 4 0 58 121 219 -16 836/4 
* 5 NA 22 173 0 233 1011/4 
* 6 0 0 1901 NA NA 1901/1 
• 7 . -14 76 180 110 NA 790/4 
8 243 21 182 537 NA 7348/4 
9 NA 289 212 270 NA 4387/3 
10" NA NA 683 611 989 2900/3 -.....) 
• co 11 NA NA 332 1 NA 337/2 I ....... 
12 NA 71/2 
~ 
NA NA 32 29 U1 
13 NA NA NA 761 NA 761/1 
1 
(~rrier change resulting in substantial 1977 premium reduction followed by radical 1978 premium increase 
* Single unit operator 
AVERAGE 35 53 429 426 212 14090/5 
NA- Means not available 
FIRMS RESPONDING IN RATES 
1 NA NA 39 296 192 1503/3 
2 NA NA 168 162 16 715/3 
AVERAGE NA NA 104 229 104 1269/3 I 
78-146 
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The total percentage increases on the preceding page are based on the following 
base year and ending year liquor liability insurance premiums. 
PREMIUMS 
FIRM NUMBER BASE YEAR ENDING YEAR % INCREASE 
1 $ 150 $110,000 73,233% 
2 222 1, 718 674 
3 2,700 13,600 404 
4 510 4, 775 836 
5 450 5,000 1,011 
6 127 2,541 1,901 
7 505 4,495 790 
8 350 26,071 7,348 
9 643 28,852 4,387 
10 300 9,000 2,900 
11 1,349 5,900 337 
12 5,043 8,605 71 
13 4,992 43,000 761 
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION 
FOUNDED IN 1906 
REPRESENTING THE FOOD AND AlCOHOL BEVERAGE SERVICE INDUSTRIES OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
Affiliated with the California State Restaurant Association 
448 South Hill Street. Suite 612, Los Angeles, california 90013 I Telephone Area Code 213, 826-3371 
ROBERT M. RILEY, General Manager 
Through the offices of Assemblyman John T. Knox, Chairman, 
California Legislature Joint Committee on Tort Liability, and 
Assemblyman Robert G. Beverly, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Committee, a Restaurant and Bar ~vners Advisory Committee to the 
Joint Committee has been established. SCRA Director Ron Fletcher, 
Lord Fletcher Inn, Palm Springs is Chairman of the industry 
Committee. This Industry Advisory Committee was appointed for a 
possible solution or relief in view of continuou~,ever-increasing 
liquor liability insurance premium costs. As the Advisory 
Committee is to meet within the next 15 days, it has been requested 
that we obtain written communications from a number of on-sale 
licensees, such as your firm, setting forth a schedule of the 
increases in the firm's liquor liability insurance premiums for 
at least the last three years. If possible, six years would 
furnish this Advisory Committee with a more realistic trend. I 
am certain that your accountant or insurance broker can furnish 
you with this information with ease. 
Your cooperation in forwarding the information requested 6n the 
enclosed self-addressed, postage paid card will assist the 
Restaurant Industry Advisory Committee in bringing to the 
attention of the Governor and Legislators that appropriate action 
is imperative to bring about a favorable vote on SB 1175 that is 
now before the Assembly Judiciary Committee. It will also assist 
the Committee to further its efforts in connection with the Joint 
Committee on Tort Liability. 
Cordially yours, 




BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OFFICERS 
STANLEY F. STOCKTON, President 
Smoke House, Burbank 
CHRIS SKOBY, 1st Vice President 
Royalty Restaurants, Newport Beach 
WARREN l. WARD, 2nd Vice President 
Raffles Restaurant, Downey 
HARRY B. VICKMAN, Secretary·Treasurer 




Norm's Restaurants, long Beach 
WALTER BOTELLO 
m~t~ E~~'i'J'f~~~'y Redondo Beach 
~~~z~'B~THHou88iN~estaurant, Santa Monica 
Bob Burns Restaurants, Santa Monica 
GARY BURSON 
Disneyland, Anaheim 
DON F. CLARK 
Clark's Broiler, Bakersfield 
JOHN F. CLEARMAN 
~~:~T:"~~ ~eLs1~TQ~nts, San Gabriel 
fl~~{i_c~~ei~~~Ss, los Angeles 
Collins Foods International, Los Angeles 
MERRILL R. DARLIMG 
Bray's 101 Restaurant, Goleta 
BRUCE E. DeMERS 
r8~'il'yo:~~~~R~c., Newport Beach 




lord Fletcher Inn, Palm Springs 
RICHARD N. fRANK 
it:,~fl.A~s:g~~i~A~estaurants, los Angeles 
Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants, Glendale 
ANTHONY A. GHIO 
Anthony's Fish Grotto, San Diego 
JAMES L. GRAY 
Far West Services, Inc., Irvine 
MiCHAEl W. GUARMIERI 
Tiny Naylor's Restaurants, Santa Fe Springs 
GORDON E. HAMMOND 
Pasadena Cafeteria, Pasadena 
OLLIE HAMMOND 
O!l!e Hammond's Steak House, Beverly Hills 
KENNETH F. HANSEN 
"Scandia," West Hollywood 
BURT HIXSON 
The Warehouse Restaurants, Marina del Rey 
ANN JARDINE 
Tip's Restaurants, Inc., Valencia 
CARL KARCHER 
Carl Karcher Enterprises, Inc., Anaheim 
ROBERT H. KAWASHIMA 
Miyake Restaurants, Inc., Pasadena 
WAYNE G. KEES 
Samba's Restaurants, Inc., Santa Barbara 
KENNETH D. KNOTT 
Knott's Berry Farm, Buena Park 
MARTIN KOSS 
Piece O'Pizza Restaurants, Los Angeles 
KALMAN l. LOEB 
Rodger Young Center, los Angeles 
ARCHIE W. LUPER 
loop's Restaurants, Ventura 
G. NICK MALOOLY 
Diamond Bar Country Club, Diamond Bar 
RAYMOND G. MARSHALl 
Acapulco y los Arcos Restaurantes, Pasadena 
THOMAS C. MEES 
~~~~~'i."~~~ci~~ Luis Obispo 
Denny's Inc., La Mirada 
W. W. "BifF" NAYLOR 
f~~dJ'~~~~~urants, North Hollywood 
Little Joe's ltaflan Restaurant, los Angeles 
HERBERT W. OBERST 
Oupars Restaurants, Encino 
HORST OSTERKAMP 
Don the Beachcomber, Pacific Palisades 
LARRY S. PHELPS 
~~Kni~fKE Inc, Pasadena 
~~~~s ~i~~~\o Oaks, Glendale 
Prager's Bell & Crown, Westminster 
PAUl ROTHMAN 
Associated Hosts, Inc., Beverly Hills 
DOUGLAS SALISBURY 
i~"l. W.f~o~~c , 1 rvlne 
Griswold's, Claremont 
RICHARD A. SNYDER 
w.~~~~uJt. ~TI:N~s Inc<, Baldwin Park 
Golden Bird, Inc., Culver City 
E. E. (BUD) TAYLOR 
Firehouse Inn, Pomona 
HOWARD VARNER 
Host InternationaL Inc., Santa Monica 
RUBEN VILLAVICENCIO 
Alphy's Restaurants, La Habra 
ARTHUR WONG 
Far East Terrace. North Hollywood 
KING WONG 
King's Four-In-Hand, los Angeles 
RALPH M. WOOD, JR. 
The Admlral Rlsty, Palos Verdes Peninsula 
DIRECTORS EMERITUS 
Thomas M. Bergin 
Andrew Blrk 
Edmond J. Clinton 
C. H. Corcoran 
Robert T. Feagans 
Robert J. Hudecek 
Eugene James 
AI lapin, Jr. 
Shelton A. M, 
C. R. Me 
John 8. N01th:·r 
George ft ;~r! 
Erhard A. SctL,b 
l. E. Sm1tl 
Arthur 0. W!!II;H 
DIRECTORS AT LARGE 
Steven A. Butler 
William P. Gawzner 
Dan lee 
Peter E. Lee 
Albert le\ 
R. C. A. luba 




SCRA COUNCIL OF 
ALCOHOL BFVERAGE LICENSEES 
Distribution: SCRA Membership on lr27-77; of the 2508 questionnaires 
mailed, 278 were returned and used as the basis of the following survey. 
Although the response rate is somewhat less than staggering (11.1%), one 
must keep in mind the fact that the 2508 questionnaires mailed went to 
only about 1000 firms due to multi-unlt membership. It is also assumed 






. ICIA COWCIL. OF 
ALCOIDL BIVIIAGI LICENSEES 
Date 
Name of Person Completing Questio~ire ------------------------------------------
Position or Title· ---------------------------------------------------------------
A. B. Name and address of firm 
(if different from A.) 
Telephone No. ( ) 
1. Are you or any of your Locations presently licensed by the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control? Yes ....!E_, No ,22.__ (if "No", do you plan to obtain 
a license sometime in the future? Yes _!!_, No ~) 
2. What type of license(s) do you or your firm presently have? 
(Indicate how many of each type) 
3% a. On-Sale Beer 12 (*2) c. On-Sale General: 
65% Regular ~ (*206) 
31% b. On-Sale Beer and Wine 1?5 (*139) 1% Seasonal __l_ 
(*licenses held by establishments holding Club 4 
2 or more licenses) TOTAL LICENSES: 558 
3. Approximate percentage of gross sales you can attribute to alcohol beverage 
sales (including beer and wine sales) See pages 3, 3a. 
4. Amount of Liquor Liability coverage you are presently carrying, $ §ee ~aggs 4. 4a, 4 
5. Approximate percentage of increase in your Liquor Liability premiums over the 
See ~allis 5. Sa. 
past five (S) years: 50% 100% ; 200% If more than 200%, 
please indicate how much _________ %. 
6. Has a "Dram Shop" (Liquor Liability) suit ever been filed against you or any 
of your lor.ations? Yes 25 , No 19? . If "Yes", please indicate how many, 
how much and disposition: 
Sett lement(s) obtained: Pending - 15 ( 4 from 1 licensee) no amount; 1 @ $50, 000; 
1 @ $150,000; 1 @ $1 million; 1 @ $1.5 millie 
a. In court 0 1 @ 2 million. 
b. Out of court 1 @ $1.1 million; 1@ $40,000; 6@ $2,000 to $10,000; 
78-150 
.. 2 .. 
7. Other than Liquor Liability insurance, what do you feel is (are) the most 
p1essing problem(s) facing on-sale licensees today? 
8. Which, if any, of the ABC Regulations do you feel are too restrictive or 
burdensome? See aoe 7. 
----~~----------------------------------------------------
9. Do you feel that the legal drinking hours should be extended on the weekends? 
9% 87.8% 3.2% 
Yes ;w , No 195 No response ? • 
10. Do you agree with lowering the constitutional age limit for drinking? 
41.8% 50.9% No response 16. ? • .3% 2.2%' 8 6% 9.6% 2.t:J% 
Yes 9,3 , No 113 • If "Yes", Wii:at age? (J (2}; 18 (8.0); 19 (9); 20 (2). 
11. Would you or one of your representatives attend seminars designed to enhance 
the overall efficiency and/or profitability of your alcohol beverage business? 
?1.6% 19.8% 4.5% 4.1% 
Yes 1,)9 , No 44 • Maybe __22_. No r>esponse _9_. 
12. From the licensee's viewpoint, toward what areas should the Association be 
directing more of its efforts? Please explain: See pa~~~c~B ______________ _ 
Additional Comments: See pa;re 9. 
RETURN TO SCRA OFFICE (envelope enclosed): 
448 South Hill Street, Suite 612 
Los Angeles, California 90013 
pd ' 3 
78-151 
Question 3: Approximate percentage of gross sales you can attribute 
to alcohol beverage sales %. 
% Sales No. of Respondents 













































Question 4: Amount of Liquor Liability coverage you are presently 
carrying $. 
Amount of Liquor 























$2 6 , 000' 000 
$60,000,000 
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Question 5: Approximate percentage of increase in your Liquor 
Liability premiums over the past five years %. 
Liability Insurance 


















Greater than 1000% 




































































do you feel is (are) the most pressing 
of intoxication 
government 





Lava of minors 
How to determine intxociated 
3rd Party Liability 
taxes 
Alcoholic license costs 
How to stop serving a customer 
Fair trade laws 
honest employees 




about liquor liability 
Vagueness of "obviou1ly intoxicated" 
uae permits 
Over issuance of licenses 
Personal tax on inventories 
Illegality of discount for large liquor purchases 
Broken in lost from liquor sneaked out 
Unemployment insurance 
Change of blood intoxication level 
Bad public image of licensees 







that settle too easily 
Harrassment of customers by law enforcement 
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RESPONSES TO QUBSnOR #8 . 
"Which, if any, of the ABC Regulations do you feel are too restrictive or burdensome?" 

























Responsibility of intoxication judgement by restaurateur 
ABC Pilot Project 
Non-liability for employees 
Laws concerning serving to minors 
Responsibility for parents giving wine/liquor to minor children 
Restrictions on In-store promotion of alcohol 
3rd party liquor liability 
Age restriction of cocktail waitresses 
Restrictions on marrying well and wine bottles 
Dis-continuity of enforcement by ABC and Health Departments 
Over restrictive government regulations 
Controls on advertising. 
Stamp by licensee on liquor bottles 
Non-issuance of licenses within 100 ft. residence 
Drinking hours 
Tax posting regulations 
1% of billing late charge 
S.B. 1;354 
Red tape in license transfer procedures 
Drinking age of 21 
Mailing license to Sacramento when closed 10 or more days 
Obtaining licenses 
Listing of house wine brand names 
78-160 
RESPONSES TO QUESTION #12 
"Fron the licensee's viewpoint, toward what areas ahould the Association be directing 
































Elimination of 3rd party liquor liability 
Limitations on liquor liability suit awards 
Lower liquor liability in.urance premiums 
Controlling ABC & Health Departments 
Relaxation of regulation by government 
Improving public image as responsible dispensers 
Expanded lobbying in general 
Re-establishment of tip credit 
Enlightening ABC as to restaurateur's position 
Changing the evaluation basis for liquor liability insurance 
premiums 
Education of employees about liquor liabi l,ity 
Minimum Wage Control 
More detailed explanation of pending legislation 
More liquor liability & training programs 
Increasing liquor license availability 
Lowering drinking age 
Forming mutual liquor liability insurance plan 
Education of East Side & Chinatown 
Truth in Menu citation control 
Exchanging of ideas 
Educational seminars 
Generating local statistics 
Alcohol education for young people 
Increasing criminal penalties for the drunk driver 
Increasing criminal penalties for use of false I. D.'s 
Promoting membership in the CDBA 
Legal assistance for the restaurateur 












Formation of thie council il a great idea 
Need for a panel of restaurateurs to test equipment and 
publish results 
Need for availability of multi-iingual bulletin service 
Liability should be on actual server (waitress, bartender) 
78-162 
THE FOOD AND ALCOHOL BEVERAGE SERVICE INDUSTRIES 
SEVEN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COu~TIES AND STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
l1e ~"•· 1 s hown t li c:1nrl reflect only taxable retail ales which are attributable 
1it '1 the prim:Jry function is foodservice :designated as "separate 
l' i1 t i nd drink 11 lace "). The total, therefore, does not include non-taxable 
t t' " n f,wd c·rv·ice sales within other types of reta 1 stores rugstores, 
nt stnres, etc.), hotels or motels, many recreation facilities, institutions, 
et The total tines 1nclude ~:wles of in-plant feeding fa'ilities or similar operations 
n which t'JE; ood operation is a business separate from t1e facility in which it is 
located. \NOTE: 197 sales figures reflect "catch up" menu price adjustments during 
Philse 1 I o ce controls and inclusion of "hot food to go" under taxable sales 
effe tive 1-1-72 as well as the natural sales growth of the industry.) 
According to the National Restaurant Association, the estimated 1976 U.S. sales of 
"separate ating ;md drinking places" totaled $51.8 billion which represented approxi-
mntelv 6 percent ol the toti!l sales of public eating establishments and institutions 
(categories as shown in the NRA Wa ton Report, 3-27-78). If "separate ea -
drink es" ;lcc,Jtmt for 66 percent of C;llifornia's foodservice sales, the 1977 
total Cil ifornia loodservice sales would have been in excess of $11.8 billion. 
This figure sti 11 would not include the retail value of "Commercial Equivalent 
Potenti 1'' of foodservice in military services, correctional institutions, 
federal hospitals, state and local "short-term" hospitals, boarding homes, 
or homes for the blind, orphans, mentally and physicillly handicapped, etc.) 
SOUHCE: Szlles T;lx Permits zmd Taxable Sales: "Taxable Sales in California," prepared 
by Stat st c l Research and Consulting Division, State Board of Equalization, State of 
C;lliforni;l ru•rly ts). Number of permits is the number reported as of July 1 









COUNTY PERMITS (ADD 000) PIINITS (ADD 000) 
Los Angeles 12,301 $ 661,027 1J.735 ' 911,680 (io change) 11.71 37.9'7. ------------· ----------- ------------ ---------- ----·-------
Orange 1,146 79,824 1,787 156,162 
55.9"%. 95.6% 
------------ -----------· ------------· ---------- ------------
Rivers ide 797 31,438 870 49,276 
9.21. 56. 71. 
------------- ----------- ------------· ----------· ------------
San 1,223 42,130 1,329 64,501 
Bernardino 8. 71 53.1% 
------------ ------------ ------------· ~--------- ------------
San Diego 1, 929 87,738 2,159 119,532 
ll.ft 36.2'7. 
------------· f------------ ~-----------· ---------- ------------
Santa 333 21,260 433 31,672 
Barbara 30 .. ~ 49.0'%. 
------------ ----------- ------------ t------·---- ------------
Ventura 419 17,664 539 30,170 
28.61. 70.8'7. 
TOTAL 35,311 1, 713,498 38,392 2,401,664 
STATE OF 8. 71. 40. 27. 
CALIFORNIA 
1971 1972'* 
Loa Angeles 13,987 $1,289,625 14,282 
(1. chana•) (.21.) 4. 87. 1. 91. 
------------- ----------- -----------· 
,_ _________ 
Orange 2,381 287,819 2,515 
1. 5'7. 9.71 5.61. 
------------- ----------- -----------· ~-----------· 
Riverside 971 79,960 984 
(1. 1'7.) 7.11. 1.37. 
------------- ----------- -----------· ---------· 
San 1,410 106,612 1,445 
Bernardino 3"1. 8.9"%. 2.51. 
------------- ----------- ------------ ---------· 
San Diego 2,480 236,794 2,547 
2.4'7. 9.3'1. 2. 7"1. 
------------- ----------- ------------~---------· Santa 533 51,555 547 
Barbara 3.31. 7.6'X. 2.61. 
------------- -----------
.,.. ____________ 
~---------Ventura 633 51,976 670 
. 61. 9.2'1. 5.81. 
TOTAL 40,765 3,623,456 41,711 
STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA 
.81. 6.Jt 2. 3"%. 











































16. 71. 57.81. 
40,445 3,408,101 
5.3% 41. 9'f. 
1973 
14,326 $.1,669,730 
.3"%. 10. 61. 
---------- ------------·-
2,535 415,624 






. 7'1 11. 37 • 
---------- -----------·--2.614 332,831 
2.6'1 15.91 
---------- --------------547 64,287 
0'1 12.0'1 
















































































2. 2% 11.5% 
---------- --------------
557, 2,993 650,495 
14. 6.4% 16. 
---------- --------------
1, 1 ,887 
4.2% 15. ----- --- ---------- --- .... ·---------
174,879 1,457 198,661 
10. 1. 13. 6i. -------··--- ---------- --------------
681 2,914 502,275 
13¢ 5.5% 15.6% 
----------- --------- --------------
83,679 584 94,387 
13. 1. 7% 12.8% 
----·------ --------- --------------
94,914 722 109,572 
14. 4. 5% 15.4% 
6,098, 44,459 6,895,356 
11. 3.0% 13.1% 
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POPULATION TRENDS 








San Bernardino 503,591 
San Diego 1,033,011 
Santa Barbara 168,962 
Ventura 199' 138 
TOTAL 








































SOURCE: Population Figures - U. S. Bureau of Census (1960 & 1970) 
Courtesy of: 
- Department of Finance, Population Projections for 
California Counties (1975 & 1980) 
Southern California Restaurant Association 
448 South Hill Street, Suite 612 
























CALIFORNIA FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY 
(1977) 
I. Number of Units 
A. Separate eating & drinking places 45,897 
(per capita: 475)* 
B. Drug, Dept. & Variety Stores with food service 3,500 (estimate) 
C. Hotels, & Motels with food service 2,900 (estimate) 
D. Elementary Schools, High Schools and Colleges 7,700 (estimate) 
E. Hospitals, Rest Homes and other institutions 1,700 (estimate) 
TOTAL 61,697 
II. Sales 
A. Separate eating & drinking places 
(per capita: $359.37)* 
B. Other commercial food service operations 
C. Retail value or commercial equivalent potential 





$11 • 8 53 • 58 9 ' 000 
II. Food and Drink Purchases: $4.1 billion (estimate) 
IV. Number of foodservice employees 
A. Separate eating and drinking places 






A. Separate eating and drinking places 
B. A 11 others 
TOTAL 




DATA SOURCE: 1) "Taxable Sales in California," State Board of Equilization 
2) Employment Data and Research Section, State of California, Employment 
Development Department 
3) National Restaurant Association 
*Based on population estimate of 21,820,000 
6-78 
Compiled by: 
Southern California Restaurant Association 
448 South Hill Street, Suite 612 





I. SALES TAX PERMITS 
On July 1, 1977, there were 45,897 sales tax permits issued by the 
State Board of Equalization to "eating and drinking places" in California. 
ln 1977, food and alcohol beverage sales of this group totaled $7,841,589,000. 
This total, representing 7.88% of all taxable transactions in the State of 
California, made the food and, alcohol beverage service industries the fourth 
largest collector of sales tax in the State, exceeded only by department and 
dry goods stores (8.46%), new motor vehicle dealers (10.05%) and servicef 
stations (8.74%). NOTE: The true percentage (and perhaps the ranking) is 
actually higher because these figures do ~ include foodservice operations 
within other types of retail stores (drug stores, department stores, etc.), 
hotels or motels, many recreation facilities, institutions, etc. 
Source: "Taxable Sales in California," (Sales and Use Tax), State Board of 
Equalization 1977 Annual Report, May, 1978. 
II. EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLLS 
The food and alcohol beverage service industry is the State's largest 
retail trade employer. The number of "eating and drinking places" reporting 
under the California Unemployment Insurance Act totaled 25,995 in the first 
quarter 1977. This figure does not include restaurants in hotels, department 
stores, etc. or business establishments that do not employ any employees 
subject to the california Unemployment Insurance Act (self-employed '~om & 
Pop" operations). 
In march 1977, the number of employees in "eating and drinking places" 
reporting under the California Unemployment Insurance Act totaled 428,880. 
78-168 
- 2 -
In comparison, the building materials and garden supplies industry totaled 
')2,174; genvral merchandise stores 213,244; food stores 203,167; automotive 
dealers and service stations 179,975; apparel and accessory stores 86,653; 
furniture and home furnishings stores 60,684; and miscellaneous retail 
185,078. NOTE: These figures do not include self-employed individuals. 
The only industry groups that employ ~ people are health services 
(461,289), and governments (1.7 million) --- and even these groups include 
many foodservice employees. 
The tot a 1 .:mnual wages for the 25,995 "eating and drinking place" 
establishments reporting would be approximately 2.2 billion dollars 
(projected from the first quarter 1977 wages of $505,984,555). Again, 
these figures do not include income of self-employed individuals. 
ln the first quarter, 1977, the number of "Hotels, Motels, and Tourist 
courts" reporting under the California Unemployment Insu~ance Act, and 
their number of employees, were 3,776 and 90,146 respectively. A 
conservative estimate of the number of food and beverage employees in 
these operations and their annual wages would be 38,000 and $220 million 
respectively. 
Source: California Employment and Payrolls, January - March 1977; Employment 
Development Report 127; 5-19-78. 
I II. HEALTH PERMITS 
A clearer picture as to the number of restaurants of all types including 
those in stores, hotels, etc., may be obtained by looking at the "restaurant" 





The Department's estimate is derived from a projection based on the 
r.Jtio of the number of restaurants to population in the 22 counties 
participating in the State-Wide Environmental Evaluation Program Systems 
(SWEEPS). The lwenty-two counties have a known inventory of 47,564 
restaurants and population of 16,539,800. The State population is 
21,206,000; thus the State Department of Health estimates the total 
number of restaurants in the Slale to be 60,983 • 




Source: California Department of Health~ Local Environmental Health Programs 
Section, October 1977. 
IV. ON-SALE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LICENSES 
As of April l, 1977, the number of various on-sale licenses issued by the 
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control was as follows: 
6,850 on-sale general licenses (bona fide public eating place) 
4,432 on-sale general licenses (public premises) 
8,065 on-sale beer and wine licenses (bona fide public eating place) 
2,014 on-sale beer and wine licenses (public premises) 
5,487 on-sale beer licenses (with food) 
223 on-sale beer licenses (public premises) 
1,207 various club licenses* 
28,2 78 TOTAL 
*Club license details: 
117 special on-sale general licenses (clubs) 
79 on-sale general for clubs (no longer issued) 
708 club licenses (fraternal clubs, etc.) 
303 veterans club licenses 




NOTE: These totals do not include seasonal licenses, special on-sale 
licenses lor transport<ltion facilities (ships, trains, dirpl3nes, etc.) 
nnr temporary (m-sa le licenses issued by the Department. 
SourcP: califon1ia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; Report of Number 
of On-Sale Alcoholic Beverage Licenses· as of April 1, 1977. 
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Taxable 
Permits Sales '% of Total % Change Per Capita 
Add 000 
1967 
Eating/No Alcohol Beverages 18,833 $1,082,937 3.08 3.7 $ 55.44 
Eating/Beer & Wine 11 ,36f) 408,328 1.16 5.0 20.90 
Eating & Drinking/All Types Liquor 8 1995 1 1259 1819 3.59 _L& 64.49 
Total 39,188 2 a 751,084 7.83 5.7 140.83 - -
1968 
18,828 1,149,431 2.95 6.1 58.10 
11,474 438,147 1.12 7.3 22.15 
91225 113601801 3.49 ~ 68.79 
39,527 2,948,379 7.56 7.2 149.04 - -
• 1969 19' 140 1,246,319 2.94 8.4 62.77 
11,582 470,949 1.11 7.5 23.72 
91303 114831943 3.50 ...LQ 74.74 
40,025 3,201,211 7.55 8.6 161.23 - -
1970 
19,427 1,337. 723 3.09 7.3 66.87 
11,572 499,219 1.16 6.0 24.96 
91446 1 1571 1 159 3.64 2..:.2. 78.55 
40,445 3 a408, 101 7:89 6.5 170.38 - -
!.lli 
19,492 1,419,524 3.03 6.1 70.05 
11,696 539,435 1. 15 8.1 26.62 
91577 11664 1497 3.56 2..:.2. 82.14 
40.765 3,623,456 7.74 6.3 178.81 - -
*1972 
20,234 1, 770,525 3.30 24.7 86.27 
11,865 668,294 1.24 23.9 32.56 
91612 118401194 3.43 10.6 89.66 
41,711 4,279,013 7.97 18.1 208.49 - -• 1973 
20,315 2,020,965 3.27 14.1 97.44 
12,018 763,879 1. 24 14.3 36.83 
91796 210541781 3.33 ll.:.l 99.07 
42,129 4,839,625 7.84 13.1 233.34 - -
1974 
20,090 2,250,498 3.30 11.4 107.51 
12,235 875,631 1.29 14.6 41.83 
91920 2 1321 1551 3.41 13.0 110.90 
42,245 5,447,680 8.00 - 12.6 260.24 -
.!.211 
20,400 2,509,244 3.41 11.5 118.85 
12,707 1,011,880 1.38 15.6 47.93 
101058 2 1577 1385 3.51 11.0 122.07 









13' 121 1,163,102 
10,186 218881198 
44,459 6,895,356 
21' 928 3,202,799 
13,664 1,371,865 
10,305 312661925 
45,897 7, 841,589 
io of Total % Change Per Capita 
3.39 13.3 132.46 
1.39 14.9 54.17 
3.45 12.1 134.52 
8.23 13.1 321.15 - -
3.22 12.6 146.78 
1.38 17.9 62.87 
3. 28 13. 1 149.72 
7.88 13.7 359.37 - -
*In 1972, gasoline at service stations and hot food "to go" became 
subject to sales tax; price increases following price controls 
showed their full effect. 
SOURCE: "TAXABLE SALES IN CALIFORNIA" 
Prepared by the Statistical Research and Consulting Division 
State Board of Equalization, Box 1799 
Sacramento, California 95808 
Compiled by: 
Southern california Restaurant Association 
448 South Hill Street, Suite 612 






SALES TAX REVENUE TO STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS @ 6%* 
Eating/No Alcohol Beverages 
Eating/Beer & Wine 
Eating & Drinking/All Types Liquor 
TOTAL 
Eating/No Alcohol Beverages 
Eating/Beer & Wine 






















*Combined state & local sales tax increased from 5% to 6% 7-1-73. Some 
counties have a 6~% combined rate for rapid transit district purposes. 
This chart shows calculations at 6% of the state totals for the years 
indicated. 
NOTE: The sales tax revenue from food and beverage sales in hotels, 
department stores, recreation centers, etc., etc., are not reflected in 
these figures. The Association estimates that such sales in 1977 were 
approximately $2.1 billion which would have meant sales tax of $126 million. 
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CALIFORNIA LIQUOR TAXES 
Fiscal Year 1976-77 
(Figures do not include state and local sales taxes) 
1. Liquor - $105,000,000 
2. Beer - $ 20,000,000 
3. Wine - $ 2,250,000 
(Source - State Dept. of Business Taxes) 
Note: According to the trade publication Beverage Bulletin, 



















Other Income 8 
Second Annual Tableservice 
Restaurant Operations Report '77, 
National Restaurant Association/ 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Wh-. It Came From 
Inc reo 
1976 1975 (Oecraat 
Food Sates 75. U 76.21 
Other Income 
-- --~-·- --·. 
Co•t of Mercnand•" So4d 
Food 31 2e 31.6e 
6 4 61 




Direct Operating E•pen ... 
Muatc and Entertatnment 
AdVflrflting and Promot1on 
Utthttea 
Admmtatrettve and General 
Repatrt and Mamtenance 
Occupation Costs 
26 o• 26 ee 
HI 38 
1.1 1 e 
23 2.2 
Rent. Property Taxes ond lnsuranc• 58 5.7 
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23 Analyze Your Own Restaurant 
Thts report was prepared wtth the cooperation of the Laventhol & Horwath 
Offtces m 
LOS ANGELES 
3700 Wilshtre Blvd 
Los Angeles CA 90010 
SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO 
1200 Thtrd Ave One Cahfornta St 
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ticipatcd since the h costs were 
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wlwn orw considers that our industry 
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minimum vvagt~ increases. I cuts 
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adjust to." 
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nwnt. and have found that. 
our New York patrons, it 
Coast diners." Other 
Food product availabil 
a mixed bag of ions. 
produce cost. qua itv 





Laventhol & Horwath's Five Significant tion facilities. Among the operators who will 
be attracted to the "Mega-Restaurant" are 
those who now say. "If I don't have the capac-
ity to approach three million dollars in sales. I 
am not sure it is worth it." 
Industry Predictions 
a of years. California has been re-
as a pace setter for emerging trends in the 
restaurant industry. Normally. these trends have 
been fairly well acknowledged by the industry 
to inclusion in our reports. Because Laven-
thol & is involved with many restaurants 
at the development stage, we often gain a perspec-
tive of emerging factors not yet sufficiently de-
veloped to be considered trends. 
Beginning with this year'sColifornia Hestcwrunt 
Operations, we have incorporated some of our res-
taurant industry specialists' observations as infor-
mal predictions. We believe that each of the predic-
tions is likely to become more visible or possibly 
solidify as a genuine trend within the next one to 
two years. Based on our observations. we offer this 
year's five predictions: 
1. "Chefs" will begin to return to dinner house 
kitchens in sufficient numbers to displace the 
"broilerman" as the key kitchen employee. 
We use the term "chef' to identify employees 
with technical and/or professional training in 
the arts. The return to the use of 
chefs is due. in part. to the high degree of 
competition in California. This competition 
is prompting progressively more dinner 
houses to offer increasingly intricate and at-
tractive food presentations which are beyond 
the scope knowledge of most skilled 
broilermen. Since very few culinary educa-
tion programs exist on the West Coast, 
California restaurateurs will begin actively 
recruiting their chefs from the growing num-
bers of programs in the Mid west and East. As 
an alterna.tive to such sophistication, some 
chains may for out-of-state expansion, 
thereby retaining the simplicity in prepara-
tion and presentation that has been their 
trademark. 
2. The "Mega-Restaurant" will become a com-
monplace California restaurant industry term 
as the number of restaurants of over 10,000-
square feet (not including specialized ban-
quet space) increases dramatically. Most of 
restaurants will combine several food 
and beverage concepts under one roof, thus 
taking advantage of the economies inherent 
in shared management and shared prepara-
3. The terms "fast food," "coffen shop." and 
"dinner house" will gradually lose meaning 
as definitive descriptions. Presently. at least 
two California-based chains have integrated a 
menu containing coffee shop items into a 
dinner house environment. thereby success-
fully tapping both markets. Similarly. a 
number of fast food chains now feature a pro-
duct line competitive with coffee shops. The 
next step is the inclusion of modified table 
service. Additionally. some theme "dinner 
house" type restaurants have scaled down 
portion sizes and prices to compntn in the 
$4.00 to $5.00 food-check range dl dinner. 
while still providing dinner hous1~ decor and 
service. 
4. Since competition through investment in 
decor and atmosphere has about peaked, lim-
ited menu operators will target service as a 
major area of emphasis. Now that an average 
priced limited menu restaurant meal costs 
close to the median in many continental res-
taurants, the public expects more than a 
waiter in shorts and tennis shoes who an-
nounces that he's prepared to be your 
"buddy" for the evening. While the historical 
friendliness of service in the limited menu 
restaurants will be maintained, it will be 
coupled with more professionalism. 
5. "Planned obsolescence" will become a 
common term in the heavily themed area of 
the California restaurant business as 
operators begin to recognize that highly 
specialized themes may have a relatively 
short life. Such operations will be designed 
to facilitate "reconception" when sales pro-
gression falls behind normal growth; 
operators will be less inclined to wait until 
sales are down dramatically before making 
concept changes. To facilitate possib1~: "re-
conception," a "theatre set" concept will be 
adopted by restaurant designers in the com-
ing years. 
In our next study, we will report on our predictions 
and offer our outlook for the following year. 
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Changt~s in the California minimum wage and 
tip cn~dit and increases in the cost of doing busi-
ness (which were forecast in last year's report) had 
a significant effect on the source and distribution of 
the revmnw dollar in both dinner houses and coffee 
shops in 1 !176. In an effort to offset sharply higher 
payroll costs. coffee shops increased menu prices. 
curtailt~d adn~rtising and rigidly controlled direct 
opr~rating Pxpenses. ThP effect was to increase the 
food sales portion of the revenue dollar and to 
sharply reduce the food cost portion. As a result. 
although payroll and relatt~d expenses. utilities, 
administralivP and gtmeral and occupation costs 
all took larger portions of the dollar. net income 
before income taxes rose to 8.8 cents from 7.6 cents 
the year before. 
Operators of full-service dinner houses were not 
as fortunate. Apparently faced with customer resis-
tance to higher prices. they turned to merchandis-
ing the sale of alcoholic beverages, since that por-
tion of the revenue dollar rose by 5 percent. How-
ever, higher payroll and related expenses. and in-
creases in other operating expenses, were not offset 
by higher sales. As a result. net income before in-
come tax dropped by one-third. from 11.7 cents a 
year ago to 7.8 cents. The restaurant dollars are 
compared below and operating results are ana-
lyzed in greater detail in the report which follows. 
CALIFORNIA RESTAURANTS TABLE-
Coffee Shops Dinner Houses SERVICE 
RESTAURANTS 
Where It Came From 
United States 
1976 1975 1976 1975 1976 1975 
Food sales 94.4< 92.1•" 65.3• 67.7• 75.7• 76.2' 
Beverage sales 5.4 7.4 33.3 31.6 23.5 23.2 
Other 1ncome .2 .5 1.4 .7 .8 .6 
Where It Went 
Food cost 1 29.4' 34 0' 28.1' 30.1< 31.2< 31.6• 
Beverage cost 1 1.4 2.2 9.7 8.6 6.4 6.1 
Payroll and related expenses 34.0 31.0 28.8 26.1 30.6 30.4 
Direct operating expenses 4.3 5.5 6.3 5.5 5.5 5.4 
Music and entertainment .2 .7 1 9 .8 .7 
Advertising and promotion .7 1.8 1.2 .7 1.7 1.8 
Utilities 2.9 27 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.2 
Administrattve and general 4.7 4.4 5.4 4.5 5.4 4.7 
Repairs and maintenance 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.7 
Rent. property taxes and insurance 9.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.7 
Interest .3 .2 .3 N .8 .7 
Deprec1ation 1.7 1.6 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Other deduct1ons 1.3 .7 .1 .2 .3 .6 
Net income before income taxes 8.8 7.6 7.8 11.7 5.4 6.2 
1Stated as ratios to total sales see Exhibit 11 for ratios to department sales 
N - Negligible amount 
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MAJOR REGULATORY AGENCIES WITH WHICH THE FOOD & BEVERAGE SERVICE INDUSTRIES INTERACT: 
1. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL (State liquor laws and 
regulations). NOTE: To a lesser degree, some interaction with U. S. 
Treasury Department (Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau). 
2. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: 
A. INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION and DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS 
ENFORCEMENT (State labor laws and regulations) 
B. DIVISION OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES (discrimination in employment) 
C. DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY (CAL/OSHA) 
3. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Federal labor laws 
and regulations). 
4. City or County Health Departments (sanitation and consumer protection). 
5. Local Fire Departments (fire safety; occupancy loads, etc.) 
6. Local Building and Safety Departments -- (local construction standards, usually 
based on state laws and sometimes on state regulations, ·but with differing 
degrees of interpretation; new facilities and remodeling)~ 
7. Taxing Authorities (audits, reports, regulations, etc.): 
A. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION (sales tax) 
B. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT (unemployment and disability insurance 
C. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
D. Local Business Licenses and Permits. 
8. Others: 
A. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (federal) 
B. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (federal) 
C. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (federal) 
D. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (federal) 
E. FOOD & AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT (state) 
F. FISH & G~~ DEPARTMENT (state) 
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PROFILE OF FOODSERVICE INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT 
Attached are copies of National Restaurant Association's Economic Reports 
containing data regarding employment in the foodservice industry and '~hat 
Americans Drink." No attempt has been made to compile or estimate California 
data from these reports. 
Some interesting highlights from the reports 'include: 
1) Wamen account for nearly 69% of all specialized foodservice occupations. 
2) Teenagers (ages 16 to 19) account for more than 31% of all specialized 
foodservice occupations. 
3) Teenage employment has risen more than three times as fast as adult 
employment since 1972. This is generally attributed to the gr~th of 
fast-food operations and the tendency to part time employment of 
teenagers. 
4) Employment growth in foodservice occupations has outpaced growth in 
total employment for five consecutive years (1972-1977); h~ever, after 
three years in which the gain in foodservice employment was more than 
double that for total employment, the 1977 difference was narrowed to 
4.5% foodservice and 3.5% total employment. 
5) 1975 data indicates that almost 68% of separate eating and drinking 
places are establishments having only 1-9 employees; the proportion 
of establishments having 50 or more employees is 3.5% nationally (4.0% 
in California), but these account for more than one-fourth of the total 
number of employees. Establishments having 20 or more employees represent 
only 16% of the total establishments but employ 60% of the workers. 
6) In 1976, approximately 56% of the workers in foodservice occupations were 
part time employees. This percentage bas increased from 53% in 1975 and 
51% in 1974. 
7) Per capita consumption of non-alcoholic beverages rose 25% from 1955 to 
1975, while per capita consumption of all alcoholic beverages rose 61% 
in the same period. 
8) In 1975, alcoholic beverages accounted for nearly 11 billion dollars of 









April 1 0, 1978 
IKE TO 6-8 PERCENT 
NRA's for a menu price increase of about 
7 percent, which was based in part on a projected 
increase in food costs of 4 to 6 percent, now also 
appears too low. The likelihood that our original es-
timate is now too low is strengthened by the evidence 
from the january and February Consumer Price In-
dexes showing prices of food away from home up 
8.5 from the previous year. NRA will continue 
to monitor data on food and other costs in the com-
ing months and will make any necessary adjustments 
in its forecast at midyear. 
PLOYMENT, MORE GROWTH, BUT 
or are managers, numerous 
.,.. .... ~ ... ~'""ri by the foodservice industry in 
... , ... ,,,.,,.., as cashiers, bookkeepers and jan· 
foodservice Occupations Gain 4.5% in 1977 
Employment growth in foodservice occupations out-
paced in total in 1977 for the fifth 
consecutive the for which comparable 
data are The in growth rates nar-
rowed, however, as foodservice occupations gained 4.5 
percent and total employment rose 3.5 percent in 1977 
compared to gains in foodservice which were more 
than double those for total employment in the three 
previous years. This shift may be one sign of intensified 
efforts operators to control labor costs in the face 
of rising average earnings. 
last year number of in food-
service occupations nearly million, a jump 
of 176,000 or 4.5 percent after increasing 7.7 percent in 
1976. In addition, restaurant, cafeteria and bar manag-
ers numbered 548,000 in 1977, up 8.5 percent from the 
previous year. 
The accompanying table shows the number of per-
sons employed in foodservice occupations and as res-
cafeteria and in 19n and per-
lnc·rp;~c;.,.n since 1972. trend to-
ward menu restaurants, the growth from 
1972 to 1977 was counter 
rate 16.6 percent was 
waiters waitresses. It is noteworthy that 
of waiters and waitresses rose by a sub-
stantial186,000 in the five year period, however. 
Although women accounted for of 
food service occupations last year, in num-
ber of males holding such jobs has outpaced that for 
women in recent years. Men are more likely than 
women to be waiters' assistants where they made up 
77.6 percent of the total in 1977, dishwashers (69.6 per-
cent) or bartenders (58.1 percent). 
foodservice Employment, 1977 
and Percent Change 1977/1972 
Number of Percent Change 
Workers, 
19i7176 1977 
Restaurant, Cafeteria & 
Bar Managers 
Foodservice Workers 
Bartenders 548,000 +8.5% 
Waiters' Assistants 4,095,000 +4.5'i'o 
Cooks 272,000 +4.2% 
Dishwashers 192,000 +0.5'11. 
Food Counter & 1,106,000 +3.9% 
Fountain Workers 257,000 +2.4% 
Waiters 454,000 +7.8% 
Foodservice Workers 1,310,000 +4.1'Yo 
(n.e.c.) 505,000 +7.2% 
Note: n.e.t not else'INhert" dassified 
Source: Employment .1nd Earnmgs, Sure.tu of labor Stat1Sf1ts NRI\. 












Women jobholders are well represented in the food-
service industry accounting for 2.8 million or nearly 69 
percent of those in specialized foodservice occupations 
and 190 thousand or 35 percent of restaurant, cafeteria 
and bar managers in 1977. In comparison women rep-
resented 40.5 percent of all employed persons and only 
22.3 percent of ail managers and administrators. 
Foodservice occupations are an important source of 
employment for women accounting for about 8 percent 
of all jobs held by women. Of the 2.8 million women 
employed in specialized foodservice occupations the 
largest number, nearly 1.2 million, were employed as 
waitresses. Women are most prominent among waiter/ 
waitresses accounting for more than 90 percent of the 
total and food counter and fountain workers where they 
make up nearly 86 percent of the total. On the other 
hand, women are least likely to be waiters' assistants 
or dishwashers. 
It is noteworthy that women are becoming more 
prominent as both bartenders and waiters' assistants. 
While the number of male bartenders declined from 
1976 to 1977, the number of females jumped nearly 19 
percent. Women replaced men as waiters' assistants 
also as the number of females holding such jobs rose 
10.3 percent from 1976 to 1977 while the number of 
males declined. 
The continuing growth of women in foodservice oc-
cupations is primarily attributable to teens. While the 
number of teen females in foodservice nearly 
58 percent from 1972 to 1977, the nu adult fe-







Restaurant, Cafeteria & 
Bar Managers 
Foodservice Workers 
Bartenders 190,000 +7.3% 
Waiters' Assistants 2,805,000 +4.2% 
Cooks 114,000 +18.8% 
Dishwashers 43,000 +10.3% 
Food Counter & 623,000 +2.1% 
Fountain Workers 78,000 -6.0% 
Waiters 389,000 +8.1% 
Foodservice Workers 1,184,000 +3.7% 
(n.e.c.) 375,000 +3.6% 
Source: Employment dnd Earnmgs, Bureau of labor Statistics, NRA. 
Teens in foodservice 
The foodservice industry continued to 
panding job opportunities for teenagers in 










work part-time affording numerous teens an avenue to 
gain valuable work experience, many while attend-
ing school. 
Last year nearly 1.3 million teens 16 to 19 years of age 
were employed in specialized foodservice occupations. 
The importance of foodservice as an of teen-
agers is obvious when it is noted that nearly 7 
of all employed teens worked in foodservice 
tions in 1977. More than one fifth of employed 
teens hold foodservice 
Teenagers have become in 
the foodservice industry in recent years as welL Last 
year teens held 31.3 percent of the in 
ized foodservice . Five years earlier 
there were 844 teenagers in foodservice oc-
cupations accounting for a more modest 25.9 
of the 
Teenage employment in foodservice occupations, in-
creasing by more than 50 percent since 1 risen 
more than three times as fast as last 
year teen employment rose 7.6 twice the 
rate of the adult After 
improving each year rate for 
teen employment in 
from 10.2 percent in 1976 to 7.6 percent last year, how-
ever. 
Employment in foodservice Occupations by 
Age 1977 
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9.5 percent In 1913 and 5.6 percent in 
• 16 percent of the ntablishments, 
workers each, accounted for 60 
• drinking place penetration, measured by 
resliOelilli population per establhhment, is riling rap· 
idly In the South. 
BLISH ME CONTINUES 
data do not conform to data from the 
Retail due in p~~&rt to a definitional 
do us with valuable indicators 
the trend toward larger estab-
1975 CBP count eating and drinking places 
considerably below the count of 
with payroll in 1972 Census 
for the much lower CBP 
mailings are not made to 
50 employees if they are not 
a downward bias Is ere-
some fewer than 50 employees 
to enumerate establishment or 
operate. Total employment as of March 
12 is however. 
It is noteworthy the for which com-
COP counts are an upward trend 
number of and drinking places from 
in 1973 to 265,1 1975 as well as substantial 
in employees. 
Establishments 
The table below shows the 1974 and 1975 CBP eating 
and drinking place counts broken down by employ-
ment size of establishment (1973 data are not available) 
to the 1972 Census count by employment 
Census res are adjusted to include those 
,..,.,.,.,,.,,11 for the full year, since such 
in CBP. 











The National Restaurant 
Association 
3 
STAJE .. BY-STATE EATING & DRINKING PLACE 
ESTABLISHMENTS & EMPLOYMENT 
- --~----~- - ----.-------· ·-· 
Number of l'eKM~ Ch.ans• ~ Percent Change Proportion ol 
Est.obltltments 1t15 Esl.lblishments 
1975114 1174173 1!17S174 1174173 tuvinsSO+ 
Employee<~ 
United Stoles 265,1111 +1.1% + .9% 3,12111,1541 + 1.1% + 5.6% 3.5% 
New England 
.\'1aine 1,096 +5.2 -4.7 11,313 + 2.3 + 2.6 3.0 
New Hampshtre 990 +1.4 + .II 11,875 + 5.2 + 6.1 2.1 
Vermont 637 +3.4 -4.8 6,438 + 1.7 - 2.5 .9 
Massachusetts 7,514 - .9 + .8 95,582 - 2.8 + .3 4.5 
Rhode Island 1.347 +1.5 - .8 13,782 - 5.9 + 7.6 2.6 
Connecticut 3,954 +3.0 +2.1 43,412 + 5.2 + 2.4 2.8 
Middle Ailanlic 
New York 24,829 -1.3 + .7 227,522 + .6 + .8 2.3 
New Ieney 9,168 - +2.6 92,307 ... 1.6 + 3.5 3.3 
Pennsylvania 14,1156 +1.0 - .4 152,656 + 2.5 + 4.6 3.J 
South Atlantic 
Delaware 608 -2.6 +1.1 11,8117 + 8.7 - 1.8 3.8 
Maryland 4,294 +2.3 + .9 59,66() + 2.8 + 4.3 5.2 
Dist. of CoL 951 -1.0 +1.3 18,618 - 1.0 - 5.6 9.7 
Virginia 4.689 +2.5 +3.7 58,968 + 3.4 + .5 4.1 
W. Virginia 1.796 +2.9 -3.1 16,036 + 2.0 + 4.0 2.4 
N. Carolina 4,807 +1.8 +2.9 55,524 + 3.8 + 4.0 2.5 
S. Carolina 2,264 +3.5 +2.2 26,361 + 8.0 + 6.9 2.7 
Georgia 4,373 +1.5 +6.2 61,945 + 1.3 + 7.0 4.5 
flonda 9.528 +3.8 +2.2 147,163 + 1.7 + 6.9 5.6 
East South Central 
Kentucky 3,145 +1.3 +2.3 38,207 + 1.0 + 8.4 3.4 
Tennessee 3,975 +2.9 +2.3 46,031 + 1.3 + 8.5 3.9 
Alabama 2,625 + .8 +2.0 32,633 + 2.& + 1.7 3.3 
Mississippi 1,770 +2.1 -1.4 17,080 + 5.4 - 1.0 1.8 
West South Central 
Arkansas 2,071 -1.1 + .1 18,541 6.3 + 7.8 1.3 
louisiana 3,771 +1.3 - .8 43,791 + 7.1 .5 3.3 
Oklahoma 3.509 + 1.4 + .6 39,950 - .1 +10.6 2.5 
Texas 14,725 +1.0 + .9 179,017 4.3 +12.2 3.6 
East North Central 
Ohio 14,556 +1.4 166,544 + 2.8 + 1.3 3.7 
Indiana 6,709 +1.9 + 1.4 82,812 - 1.8 + 5.2 3.3 
Illinois 14.590 +1.5 - .4 184,419 + 2.1 + 6.0 4.2 
Michigan 10,997 + .6 - .3 132,849 6.1 +11.0 4.0 
Wiscon"in 7,993 + 1.4 T-1.7 81,679 + 2.7 + 7.7 3.0 
West North Centr•l 
Minnesota 4,595 +3.0 1.9 68,369 + 1.6 + 8.9 6.2 
Iowa 4,700 +2.8 + .7 46,829 + 3.3 + 7.2 2.3 
Missoun 5,992 +1.3 .1 75,236 t .6 t 7.5 4.4 
N. Dakota 1.122 +4.0 +2.0 10,168 + 7.2 + 8.4 1.7 
S. Dakota 1.071 - + .3 10,635 + 2.2 + 5.4 1.6 
Nebraska 2,508 +1.1 + .3 27,314 - 1.1 + 6.2 3.1 
Kansas 3,210 +4.1 - .6 35,266 + 1.q + 7.4 2.1 
Mountain 
Montana 1,529 - + 1.1 13,171 + 5.3 + 3.9 1.2 
idaho 1,178 + .5 -4.7 12,840 + 1.4 +10.5 2.1 
Wyoming 671 +5.8 +2.6 7,214 + .2 +13.8 1.9 
Colorado 3,724 +4.0 + 3.2 55,014 + .1 +11.4 4.8 
New MexKo 1,466 +3.1 + .5 16,477 4.4 +12.9 2.5 
Arizona 2,683 +2.4 +2.5 39,154 - .1 +10.0 4.4 
Utah 1,496 +2.3 +4.2 20,760 + 4.4 + 2.4 3.1 
Nevada 972 +3.0 +4.3 10,641 + 6.& + 7.1 2.4 
P~cifi< 
Washington 4,791 + .2 +2.1 56,072 + 5.4 + 6.5 2.7 
Oregon 3,500 +1.0 +1.6 
I 
43,321 + 8.4 + 4.9 2.9 
California 29,594 +1.6 + 1.0 373,703 + .6 + 5.7 4.0 
Alaska 495 + .4 +7.6 5,719 +27.7 +15.6 2.8 
Hawaii 1,282 + 3.5 +4.2 24,225 + 1.2 + 5.7 8.4 
Source-~: 1973, 1974, 1975 County Busmess Patterns, Bureau ot thE" Census. 
employing 50+ accounted for slightly more than one-
fourth of the workers while those with 20-49 employees 
accounted for nearly 35 percent of employees. Thus, 
only 16 percent of the establishments employed 60 per-
cent of the workers. 
Regionally, the South Atlantic states were most likely 
to 'have large establishments with 23.3 percent having 
more than 20 employees. Only 15.3 percent of estab-
lishments in the Middle Atlantic states had 20+ workers, 
on the other hand. 
Eating and Drinking Place Penetration 
Increases in South 
A measure of eating and drinking place penetration. 
resident population per establishment, can be derived 
from CBP and Census population estimates. These data 
78-188 
indicate that there were 804 persons for each eating substantial population increases over the thrc~e year 
and drin establishment on a national basis in 1975, period from 1973 to 1975. Eating and drinking place 
as is shown the table. variation was dra- penetration al!iO increased significantly in the East 
from one establishment per South Central states although it did not buck rapid pop-
the Mountain states to one ulation growth such as was experienced in the South 
South Central region. Atlantic region. In contrast, resident per 
noteworthy that the number of per- establishment remained fairly constant the Middle 
ment dropped in the South Atlantic Atlantic, Mountain and Pacific states and actually in-
increased penetration in the face of creased in the West South Central region. 





East South Central 
West South Central 
East North Ct>nlral 
















Note· For ~taft»"> rf'~tona! de•dgnatJon reiN to the table on p<igt> t 













AND DRINKING PLACE 
ESTABLISHMENTS PER 
RESIDENT POPULATION, 1973-1975 
1975 1974 1973 
United States 804 808 810 
New 785 790 793 
Middle 76J 760 768 
South Atlantic 1,012 1,022 1,029 
East South Central 
Percent by Employment Size 
10.19 20-49 50.99 
Employees Employees Employees 
15.9% 12.6% 3.0% 
14.8 13.4 2.9 
11.7 9.7 2.2 
18.0 14.3 3.8 
18.5 11.5 2.8 
19.0 11.5 2.7 
15.1 13.1 3.3 
16.7 12.4 3.2 
18.3 13.7 2.8 
16.7 14.4 3.3 
Industry Index 
Percent 
four Weeks Change 
RETAIL SALES* Ended vs. 
(millions of doll.lrs) 12111m Year Ago 
Eating & Drinking 
Places $ 4,788 +9.9% 
Food Stores $12,517. +IU% 




















$ 61,183 +10.0% 
$149,363 + 7.1% 
1 '156 1,166 
West South Central 866 863 







1977 to Date vs. 










Food Away From Home 
Food at Home 
Note. For <.,lates' reglOnd! dp..,Jgn&tJon rt>ter to !he lahh.• on page 3 l)ource· BureJu of Labor StattStJO! 
Source'> 1975, 1974 ( ount¥ Bu•>~rH'"" Patterns; f(,ttndte.., vt rhe Papuldl10n of Stares w1th 
Canponpnh of ( hange 1970 to 1975 Surt"d!H of tht> Crnsu~ 
• ~ew census sample 
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RATORS 
will important 
Census figures provide the 
size and growth trends 
are made. 
will most likely use 
census data to assist in 
territories as well as 
needs. 




in several new ques- which encompasses more than 100,000 establishrntllts. 
Census officials design in order This new breakdown will provide us with price data for 
with a more useful product. the firsf time. Pr.ice information, along with type of 
asks for average check amount service offered, are two of the most important deter-
as possible answer mining factors used to classify establishments in more 
do a great deal to clarify detail such as coffee shops or luxury restaurants. 




to work either pari-time, 
nArr<>nT 01 all those persons who 
at one time or another 
A total of 5,716,000 
or in foodservice 
during 1976. Of that number 
worked part-time, 1 to 34 hours a 
or 44 percent worked full-time 
that data from Work Expe-
refer to all persons who held 
any time in 1976. Thus, the 
foodservice occupations used 
than the average of 3.9 
at one time in foodservice oc-
include barten-
' dishwashers, counter 
many workers 
industry in managerial 
of work such as cashiers, 
. The total number of workers 
is therefore much greater 
for foodservice occu-
as in 1975. 
Men are less likely than women to hold part-time 
rather than full-time jobs in foodservice occupations. 
While about half or 49.8 percent of men who worked at 
some time in 1976 in foodservice occupations worked 1 
io 34 hours per week, 58.3 percent of the women were 
part-timers. 
Full-Time Employment 
Approximately 2,527,000 persons held full-time jobs 
in foodservice occupations at some time during 1976, 
up nearly 2 percent from the 2,481,000 in 1975. The 
increase in persons working in full-time jobs reverses 
a decline from 1974 to 1975 and most likely reflects 
improved overall economic conditions as well as con-
tinued growth in foodservice. 
less than half or 45.6 percent of those persons who 
held full-time jobs last year worked for a full 50 to 52 
weeks. Of the remaining full-time workers, 24.3 percent 
worked 27 to 49 weeks and 30.1 percent 1 to 26 weeks 
during the year. 
Women who worked at full-time foodservice occu-
pations at some time during 1976 were much less likely 
than men to work for the full year. Of the 854,000 males 
working at full-time jobs, slightly more than half worked 
50 to 52 weeks during the year while only 42.7 percent 
of the women holding full-time jobs worked for the 
entire year. 
Full- and Part· Time Workers in foodservice 
Occupations, 1974-1976 
1975 1974 
Total who worked 
during the year 5,716,000 5,329,000 5,041,000 
Full- or part-time 
Usually full-time 2,527,000 2,481,000 2,491,000 
Usually part-time 3,189,000 2,848,000 2,550,000 
Percent part-time 56'Yo 53% 51'Yo 
\ource Work h.penenn• of the Pnpuldfl(ln, Bureau of labor 5lta:tilifl(\ 
Full-Time Workers in Foodservice 
Occupations, 1976 
Men Women 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Total who worked 
during the year 854,000 100.0% 1,673,000 100.0'}u 
Weeks of 
full-time work 
50-52 weeks 439,000 51.4% 714,000 42.7% 
27-49 weeks 177,000 20.7% 437,000 26.1% 
1-26 weeks 238,000 27.9% 522,000 31.2% 




to hours rose only 

















develop~ent in food prep-
is the wide of convenience foods which 
labor cost and promote portion con-
in processing equipment has 
microwave oven which reduces cooking time. 
developments have occurred in 
equipment for quick freez-
thawing of frozen foods. 
Outlook 
concludes that productivity in the eat-
industry should keep on im-
continued gains in real per capita and 
spur rising industry output. 
is also expected to become more capital 
saving equipment comes into wider 
Upward 
productivity rose at an av-
0.5 percent between 1958 and 
for which BlS has made data 
increase of 0.5 percent is just half 
growth trend. It reflects 
and aggregate hours that were well 
in later years. 
productivity increases acceler-
annual rate of 2.3 percent from 1964 
were due to rapidly expanding 
hours advanced at only a mod-
on page 3 indicates that the index 
and drinking places advanced 17.6 
to 1968 while the aggregate em-
index rose only 7.4 percent. 
1966 productivity improvement has again 
annual rate of 0.4 percent. Both 
grown vigorously, however, as 
and drinking place output rose 24.9 
to 976 and the index of employee 
a 23.4 overall gain. 
that annual changes in labor produc-
significantly from the long-term 
2 
trend. The largest gain in eating and drinking place 
productivity in the past eighteen years of 3.4 percent 
occurred in 1970 and was followed in 1971 by the largest 
decline of 2.2 percent. 
In the two most recent years for which eating and 
drinking place productivity figures are available, pro-
ductivity rose 2.1 percent in 1975 as a result of rising 
output and a moderate increase in hours. On the other 
hand, last year productivity declined 1.7 percent as 
growth in the index of employee hours outpaced the 
gain recorded in output. 
Rising Consumer Income Affects Industry 
Output 
The eating and drinking place industry's output gains 
are reflective of the trend toward increased real per 
capita spending for food away from home. The rela-
tionship between changes in industry output and 
changes in real per capita income is illustrated below. 

















BlS points out that relatively slow annual advances 
in eating and drinking place output of 1.6 percent be· 
tween 1958 and 1963 occurred when real per capita 
income was rising at a slow 1.5 percent annual pace. 
More rapid income increases are linked to accelerated 
growth in eating and drinking place output from 1963 
to 1968. It is noteworthy that average annual increases 
in output consistently have equaled or outpaced growth 
in real per capita income during each of the periods. 
Demographic factors influencing the long-term trend 
toward increased eating and drinking place output 
which were highlighted in the BLS study include the 
rapid rise in the number of single person households 
who spend a greater proportion of their food dollar 
away from home and the increase in working wives. 
Productivity, output, and hours in eating and drinking places, 1958·76 




















a 1.7 percent 
other retail and 
pen oM dpen-11 productivity 
..... . . 78.8 with gasoline 
90.3 89.7 table on page4 
1%1 89.8 retail and ser-
91 
• 1%3 . .. . . . ....... 93.8 91.7 1964 . . . . . . . '. ... 93.1 89.6 %.5 limitations 1%5 .. %.0 95.5 99.5 
1966 .. . . . 98.0 99.4 101.4 
1%7 ..... . .. ' .. 100.0 
1963 ..... . . 103.6 
1%9 ....... .. . . . 100.1 
1970 .... '. . .... 106.7 
1971 . . ' ... ........ 101 110.3 
1972 . . . . . . .. 104.4 113.5 
. . ' ..... . .... 
. . .. .. ' .... 
.. . . . . . .. .... 105.0 121.3 
1976 ............. 131.9 127.8 





Number Percent Number '•cent 
13.2 505 12.1 
87.0 88.6 
201 5.4 261 5.9 
33.6 1,450 32.8 
866 23.1 ,065 24.1 
5.8 251 5.7 
8.2 421 9.5 
471 10.6 
yeors prior to 1971 ore not 
78-194 
of Output Per Employee-hour in Selected Industries, 1970..76, 
and Percent Changes, 1975-76 
(1967 = 100) 
food stores ............. . 
Franchised new car dealers .... . 
Gasoline service stations ...... . 
and drinking places ..... . 
and motels ............ . 
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Four Weeks Change Year to Change 
RETAIL SALES Ended YS. Date YS. 
(miiHoM of dollars) 9124f17 Year Ago 9124177 Year Ago 
Eating & Drinking 
Places $ 4.458 +6.6% $ 41,655 +9.5% 
Food Stores $11,813 +8.8'% $108,937 +7.8'% 






1977 to Date vs • 
Year Ago 
Food Away From Home 
Food at Home 
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endmg June year shown, 





August 29, 1977 
......... ,..., .. , of juices took place in the recent years--
to 1975---as juice consumption rose 60.4 per-
cent after increasing only 11.0 percent from 1955 to 
1965. 
PER CAPnA BEVERAGE EXPENDnURES, 
1955-1975 
1155 1NS 1175 
Milk $ 29 $ 31 $ 48 
Soh Orin ks 8 19 59 
CoHee 12 10 14 
Tea & Cocoa 2 2 4 
Fruit & Vegetable Juices & Drinks 4 6 13 
All Nonalcoholic Beverages $ 55 $ 69 $138 
Beer 31 35 69 
Wine 6 7 19 
Whiskey, Gin, Rum 24 34 58 
All Alcoholic Beverages $ 61 $ 74 $147 
All Beverages $116 $145 $284 
Not.,s: Alcoholic i>ewfllj!l!ll lor yur endinfl June 30 of year shown. Per capita expendlturiH at 
retail •tore prkeo. May 1\01 add du.e to rounding. 
Source: Natwnal food Situation, U.S. Department ol Agriculture. 
The most notable change in beverage consumption 
'"'"''"~··~~has been the rapid increase for soft drinks. Soft 
consumption jumped in the early 1960s ·and has 
rapidly since. Over the twenty year period, 
capita soft drink consumption more than doubled, 
136 
Wine Registers Sharp Gain 
Consumption of alcoholic beverages, which ac-
counted for nearly $11 billion of total foodservice indus-
sales In 1975, also reveals changing patterns. Per 
consumption of alcoholic beverages rose 44 
,....,,.,....,,nt in the twenty years, a more rapid pace than 
drinks. After increasing 13.0 percent 
from 1955 to 1965 per person alcoholic beverage con-
sumption rose 27.4 percent in the following ten years. 
Wine registered the most dramatic consumption in-
crease among alcoholic beverages. After a relatively 
slow 11.0 percent increase from 1955 to 1965, per person 
wine jumped nearly 73 percent in the 
The upward trend in beer consump-
considerably slower paced than that 
beer consumption rose by appro xi-
from 1965 to 1975 after increasing by 
in the decade. 
wine occurred mostly in 
Hard liquor consumption, on 
the been rising for twenty years. After 
an increase of 30 percent in per person consumption 











WORKERS, BARTINDERS ,· !L, 
MOTEL AND <:LUI SERVICE W~((EIS 
Wage increases as follows: 
a) May 1, 1977 . . . 
b) September 1, 1978 
c) September 1, 1979 
d) September 1, 1980 
OF TKI 
HOTEl AND RESTAURANT 
EMPLOYEES AND i'AITENt)EIS 
ltmRNATIONAI. UNION 
-AND.....; 
THE . .. 
GOLDEN GATE RESTAURANT 
ASSOCIATION . 
* 
l!l'RCTM: AUGUST 19, ·19.72 
BOOKS l'ltiNTEO- MAY I, 1974 
Approved by 
H. R. E. and B. I. U. 
aDd . 
SAN FRANCISCO LABOR CO'UNCJL 
. 7% on scale 
6% on scale 
7% on scale 
6% on scale 
All percentage increases to be rounded to the nearest nickel. 
All percentage increases apply to scale only. 
Inequity Adjustments: 
Effective September 1, 1977 
Effective September 1, 1978 
50¢ adjustment for full shift dishwashers. 
. 50¢ adjustment for full shift dishups. 
I r 
l 
JOB CLASSIFICATION AND WAGE SCHEDULE 
MANAGERS WORKING AT THE TRADE. HEAD WAITERS, 
HEAD WAITRESSES, CAPTAINS AND HOSTESSES 
Managers working at the Trade, Head 
Waiters or Head \Vaitresses, or 
Men or Women in charge of De-
partments: 
7Y, hours within 8 hours minimum 
scale 
Captains: 
7Y, hours within 8 hours 
Hostesses: 
PER DAY- EFFECTIVE 
9/l/72 l/l/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 
31fz% 31fzo/o 51fz% 51/z% 
No increase on Short-Hours less 
than 6 hours for the year 1974. 
$31.35 $32.40 $34.20 $36.10 





7~ hours within 12 hours...................... 27.45 28.40 29.95 31.6<> 33.50 
7~ hours within 8 hours........................ 25.85 26.75 28.20 29.75 31.55 
6 hours straight.................................... 21.45 22.10 23.30 24.60 26.10 
6 hours within 9 hours........................ 22.70 23.45 24.75 26.10 27.65 
3 hours or less, straight.................... 12.20 12.60 12.60 13.30 14.10 
In case it is found to he in conflict with the law, portion thereof in conflict shall be voided. 
" 









CASHIERS AND CHECKERS 
Cashiers: 
7~ hours within 12 hours 
7~ hours within 8 hours 
6 hours straight 
4 hours straight 
3 hours or less, straight 
Checkers: L 7'l:! hours within 12 hours r 7~ hours within 8 hours 
6 hours straight 
4 hours straight 
3 hours or less, straight 
Combination Cashiers and Checkers: 
7~ hours within 12 hours 
7~ hours within 8 hours ..................... . 
6 hours straight ................................ .. 
4 hours straight ....................... _ .. __ __ 
3 hours or less, straight 


















PER DAY- EFFECTIVE 
1/1/73 1/1/74 l/1/75 
3%% 5%% 5%% 
$24.00 $25.30 $26.70 
22.40 23.65 24.95 
18.95 20.00 21.10 
13.60 13.60 1·4.35 
11.65 11.65 12.30 
26.10 27.55 29.05 
24.50 25.85 27.25 
21.05 22.20 23.40 
14.75 14.75 15.55 
12.60 12.60 13.30 
27.80 29.35 30.95 
26.40 27.85 29.40 
22.95 24.20 25.55 
15.60 15.60 16.45 
13.60 13.60 IUS 
WAITERS, WAITRESSES, BUS PERSON 
... _EmmVE 
1/1172 111m 1/1174 1/1/11 
7~ hours within 12 hours ............ -.. $20.40 $21.10 $22.25 $23.45 
7~ hours within 8 hours ...................... 18.50 19.20 20.25 21.35 
6 hours straicbt .................................. 16.15 16.70 17.60 18.55 
+ 
6 hours within 9 hours ................ - .. 17.35 17.95 18.95 20.00 
3 hours or less, straight .................... 10.15 10.50 10.50 11.10 
2 hours or less straight 
(~unch only) .............................. _ .... _ 8.35 8.65 8.65 9.15 
EXTRA WORK 
7~ hours within 8 hours ...................... 20.50 21.20 22.35 23.60 
6 hours straight ....................... - ........ 17.55 18.15 19.15 2020 
4 hours or less, straight .................... 11.80 12.20 12.20 12.90 
Hot Dog Men or Women: 


































Waiters, Waitresses, Bus Person: 
Applying only to bona fide "Cash Houses" in which the waiters or waitresses collect 
their checks direct from the customers. Houses in which the customer receives the 
check from the waiter or waitress but pays same to a cashier, or houses in which the 
check reads "pay cashier" are not considered "Cash Houses." Cash house scale shall 
not apply to counter waiters or waitresses. 
PER DAY- EffECTIVE 
Steady Work: 
9/1/72 l/l/73 1/1174 1/1/75 1/1/76 
7% hours within 12 hours .................... $18.40 $19.05 $20.10 $21.20 $22.45 
7% hours within 8 hours ___ ................. 16.50 17.05 18.00 19.00 20.15 
6 hours straight .................................. 14.65 15.15 16.00 16.90 17.90 
6 hours within 9 hours ...................... 15.90 16.45 17.35 18.30 19.40 
4 hours straight .................................. 11.80 12.20 12.20 12.90 13.70 
3 hours or less, straight .................... 9.95 10.30 10.30 10.90 11.55 
Extra Work: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 18.50 19.20 20.25 21.35 22.65 
6 hours straight .................................. 15.70 16.25 17.15 18.10 19.20 
4 hours or less, straight .................... 11.80 12.20 12.20 12.90 13.70 
3 hours or less (lunch only) ............ 10.80 11.15 11.15 11.75 12.45 
' 
NIGHT CLUBS AND COCKTAIL LOUNGES 
(a) No split shifts or short shifts shall be permitted in Night Clubs. No split shifts or 
short shifts shall be permitted in Cocktail Lounges or Taverns where hot meals are not 
regularly served. 
(b) Employees coming under the jurisdiction of Dining Room Employees Union, 
Local 9 shall not a~ a condition of employment be required to perform any duties or 
work which in whole or in part fall outside the jurisdiction of said Unions. 
(c) Waiters or Waitresses shall not be permitted or required to wash or dry bar 
glasses. 
J Waiters, Waitresses, Bus Person 
U\ Minimum rate effective September 1, 1972, $16.50; January 1, 1973, $17.05; January 1, f 1974, $18.00, January 1, 1975, $19.00; January 1, 1976, $20.15 for seven and one-half 
(7lf:t) hotlrs or less, plus $1.50 where meals are not provided. 
Extra Work· 
Minimum Rate Effective September 1, 1972, $18.50; January 1, 1973, $19.15; January 1, 
1974, $20.20; January 1, 1975, $21.30; January 1, 1976, $22.60 for seven and one-half 
(7lf:t) hours or less, plus $1.50 where meals are not provided. 
The minimubm rates of pay for all other employees shall be that of seven and one-
half (7lh) hours straight shift as provided herein under each classification. 
PRIVATE PARTIES, BUFFETS, RECEPTIONS, 
COCKTIAL PARTIES, ETC. 
5 hours or less .............................................. $18.95 $19.60 $19.60 $20.70 $21.95 









(Where Banquet is involved, the Banquet Rules and Wage Scale shall prevail.) 
OUT-OF-TOWN WORK 
All work performed by waiters or waitresses at out-of-town parties shall be for six 
(6) hours of work or less. The time shall be computed as of leaving the city. Employers 
shall furnish transportation both ways and meals. If the waiter or waitress cannot get 
back to town the same night, the Employers shall furnish sleeping accommodations. If 
the waiters or waitresses use their own cars for transportation they shall receive the 
cost of transportation plus the transportation for each additional passenger they carry. f The rate of pay shall be per day: 
$20.25 $20.95 $22.10 $23.30 $24.70 




Banquet Waiters and Waitresses: 
1/lfl4 1/1/75 
Breakfast, luncheon, tea, beginning 
before 4 p.m., 3 hours or less 
minimum ···········--········-············-··-·-··· $10.80 $11.15 $11.15 $11.75 
Over 20 persons, SOc extra per 
additional person. 
Dinner, 4 hours or less, minimum ...... 13.70 14.15 14.15 14.95 
Over 15 persons, 60c per additional 
person. 
Supper parties beginning at 9 p.m. 
15.65 16.20 16.20 17.10 or later, 4 hours or less ........................ 
(her 16 persons, 60c per additional 
person. 
DAIRY LUNCHES, SODA FOUNTAINS, CANTEENS 
AND DOUGHNUT SHOPS 
HOUSE MANAGERS WORKING AT THE 
TRADE AND ASSISTANTS 
PEl DAY - EFFECTIVE 
9/1/72 1/1/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 
House Manager working at the Trade, 
or men or women in charge of de-
partments: 
7~ hours within 8 hours, minimum 
scale ........................................................ $31.35 $32.40 $34.20 $36.10 
Assistant, Afternoon Managers, or 
Head Fountain Men or Women: 
7~ hours within 8 hours ...................... 27.50 28.45 30.00 31.65 
Night Managers and Assistant Man-
agers whose shift commences at 
4 p.m. or later: 
7~ hours within 8 hours ...................... 28.05 29.10 30.70 32.40 
















CARVERS, SALAD OR SANDWICH 
MEN OR WOMEN: 
(When they serve the public directly) 
PER DAY- EFFECTIVE 
Carvers: 
9/l/72 1/l/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 1/1/76 
71J:! hours within 8 hours ..................... $25.10 $25.95 $27.40 $28.90 $30.65 Extra \Vork: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 26.85 27 75 29.30 30.90 32.75 
Salad or Sandwich Men or Women: J, Steady \Vork: 
26.50 27.4{) j 71J:! hours within 12 hours ................... 28.90 3o.:;o 32.35 
71J:! hours within 8 hours ..................... 25.10 25.95 27.40 28.90 30.65 
6 hours straight .................................. 21.35 22.05 23.25 24.S5 26.00 
3 hours or less, straight .................... 12.75 13.20 13.20 13.95 14.80 
Extra \Vork: 
7Y:! hours or less within 8 hours ........ 26.85 27.75 29.30 30.90 32.75 
COUNTER, FOUNTAIN, CANTEEN, DOUGHNUT SHOPS 
AND SUPPLY MEN OR WOMEN ' 
PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
Steady Work: 
9/1/72 1/l/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 1/1/76 







7% hours within 8 hours ................... 21.65 22.4{) 23.65 24.95 2MS 
6 hours straight ... --------· ········ 18.25 18.85 19.90 21.00 22.25 
6 hours within 9 hours .................. 19.50 20.15 21.25 22.40 23.75 
4 l!nur' 't raight .... -............•. 13.15 13.60 13.60 14.35 15.20 
3 "''"~"' ,r less, strail(ht ................ 10.70 1105 11.05 11.65 12.35 
Extra \\ork· 
7% h .. u r~ '" I('SS within 8 hours ........ 23.70 24.50 25.85 27.25 28.90 
b 
FAST FOOD OPERATIONS 
BUS PERSON 
I PER DAY - EfFECTIVE 9/l/72 1/l/73 1/1/74 1/1/75 1/1/76 
Steady Work: 
71;2 hours within 12 hours .................... $21.35 $22.05 $23.25 $24.55 $26.00 
71;2 hours within 8 hours ...................... 19.70 20.4{) 21.50 22.70 24.05 
6 hours straight .................................. 17.00 17.65 18.60 19.60 20.80 
6 hours within 9 hours ...................... 18.25 18.85 19.90 21.00 22.25 
4 hours straight .................................. 12.75 13.20 13.20 13.95 14.80 
3 hours or less, straight .................... 10.15 10.50 10.50 11.10 11.75 




7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 21.75 22.50 23.75 25.05 
Doughnut Shop Counter Attendant: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 21.65 22.40 23.65 24.95 
(This classification shall apply to 
bona fide doughnut shops such as 
Jim's Doughnuts and Hunt's 
Doughnut Operations.) 
SERVICE FOUNTAIN 
PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
9/1/72 1/1/73 1/l/74 1/1/75 f ~~~f:Krl~t~~n}7i0i:P;;;6:········ $27.8o $28.75 $30.35 $32.00 
AND DISHWASHER: 
7~ hours within 8 hours ...................... 22.05 22.80 24.05 25.35 
STORE ROOM MEN OR WOMEN: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 23.40 24.20 25.55 26.95 
CRAB OR OUTSIDE STAND MEN 
OR WOMEN: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 26.40 
VENDING MACHINE 
27.30 28.80 30.40 
ATTENDANT: 
7% hours within 8 hours ...................... 23.65 24.45 25.80 27.20 
OFFICE CLERICAL EMPLOYEES 
The rate to remain open and be subject to prior written agreement. 
CAFETERIAS 
Steady Work 
7~ hours witlnn 12 hours 
7% hour' within 8 hours ..................... . 
6 hours straight 
6 hours within 9 hours 
f 
3 hours or 'less, straight 
SALAD AND SANDWICH 
ASSEMBLER: 
(Cafeterias ONLY) 
Where dish-up boys and girls are 
employed: 
7% hours within 12 hours 
7% hours within 8 hours 
6 hours straight ................................. . 
6 hours within 9 hours ..................... . 













PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
l/1/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 
$22.40 $23.65 $24.95 
20.95 22.10 23.30 
17.85 18.85 19.90 
19.15 20.20 21.30 
11.05 11.05 11.65 
PER DAY - EfFECTIVE 
1/l/73 1/1/74 1/1/75 
$24.00 $25.30 $26.70 
22.40 23.65 24.95 
18.90 19.95 21.05 
20.15 21.25 22.40 















































CRAFT RUlES, JOB CLASSIFICATIONS 
AND WAGE SCHEDULES 
GOVERNING EMPLOYEES UNDER THE 
JUIUSDICTION Of 
IARTENDEIS UNION, LOCAL No. 41 
CRAFT RULES 
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be considered 
Basic Rules, 
· Section l. BUTTONS: 
The Bartenders' working button shall ue worn 
on the job at all times. 
Section 2. BUSINESS AGENTS' INTER-
VIEWS: 
Business Agents of the Union shall be permitted 
to investigate the standing of employees or job 
conditions at any time, provided, however, that no 
interviews shall be held during the rush hours. 
Section 3. EMPLOYMENT AND 
SEVERANCE: 
No worker shall be discharged without "suffi-
cient cause." 
(a) The trial periofl for newly engaged workers 
shall be twenty-two (22) working days. 
(b) Employees discharged without "sufficient 
cause" who have been in the employ of the Em-
ployer at least twenty-two (22) working days, 
but not more than forty-four (44) working days 
shall receive one ( 1} day's pay in lieu of reinstate-
•nent. 
(c) Employees discharged without "sufficient 
cause" who have been in the employ of the 
Employer forty-four ( 44) worktng days, but not 
n10re than sixty-four ( 64) working days, shall re-





(d) Newly engaged workers who have been in 
~he employ of the Employer sixty-four (64) work· 
mg days shall be considered "steady employees." 
(e) Before a "steady employee" may be dis-
charged, the Employer shall give notice to the 
Umon of his intention to discharge and the cause. 
~n opportunity shall be given for joint investiga-
tion by the Employer and the Union. No employee 
shall be discharged unless a mutual agreement be-
tween the Employer and the Union shall have been 
reached. 
Section 4. WAIVER OF DUTIES: 
No employees coming under the jurisdiction of 
the Bartenders Union Local 41 shall be required 
!O per_fo~m any duties other than coming under the 
JUnsdtctton of the Bartenders Union unless the 
unions involved are first notified and approve such 
other work. 
There shall be n? discrimination ?gainst any 
~mplo,rees · for refusmg to work outstde of their 
JUnsdtctton. 
Section 5. PICKET LINES: 
The observance of any bona fide picket line by 
an. employee shall not be considered a violation of 
thts Agreement. 
Section 6. MILITARY SERVICE: 
Member~ of the Union entering the military or 
naval servtce, Red Cross or other combat relief 
service of the U.S.A. during the life of this Agree-
ment, shall be considered on leave of absence and 
shall retain their seniority while in such service and 
b~ returned to their former position upon honorable 
d_tscharge from the service, provided they are phy-
stcally and mentally capable of working and make 
application within the period specified i~ the Selec-
tive Service Regulations. 
Section 7. NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT: 
Any employee who is to be laid off or discharged 
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must be·notified lilt the end of the shift. If this is 
not tl,one he shall receive a full day's pay. 
8ectic:m 8. WORK DAY: 
(a) Seven and •e-half (7~) hours within eight 
(8) hours shaH ecftstitute a day's work or one (1) 
shtft, except a1 hereinafter provided for. 
(b) Any work performed between 6:00A.M. and 
6:00 P.M. in ex.:ess of four (4) hours shall consti-
tute a full shift. 
(c) Employee• working any portion of the time 
between 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. shall receive at 
least one full day's pay. 
Section g, OVERTIME: 
AU work periormed in excess of a day's work 
or a week's work, or the spread of a week's work, 
shall constitute overtime and shall be computed at 
the rate of time and one-half of the regular hourly 
rate per hour or fraction thereof. Any fraction of 
an hour overtime shall be computed as a full hour. 
Section 10. REPORTING PAY: 
When the Emplo;rer orders an employee to re-
port to work and satd employee is not put to work, 
he shall receive at least one (1) full day's pay. 
Section 11. SALARIES 
All salaries shall be paid weekly, or every two (2) 
weeks with the appmval of the Local Joint Execu-
tive Board, ~xet·pt for extra employees who shall be 
paid at the completion of their shift. In the event 
that an extra employee is not paid on completion of 
his work he shall be compensated for one (1) hour 
at the overtime rate. 
Section 12. TllANSPORTATION: 
Transportation shall be paid by the Employer to 
and from all jobe out~ide of city limits. 
Section 13. UNIFORMS AND LINENS: 
The Employer shall furnish, launder and main-
tain at no cost to the employee, all uniforms and 
linens, which untlorm shall consist of a jacket or 
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special uniform If the Employer does not furnish 
an employe<' with such uniform, the employee so 
affecte<l shall receive fifl\· cents (SOc) for each day 
for which a uniform is not furnished. 
Section 14. ACCIDENTAL BREAKAGE: 
l 'navoidable or accidental breakage or destruc-
t ion of merchandise or equipment shall not be 
charged against an etnpl<lY<'C'. 
Section 15. DEDUCTIONS AND 
DONATIONS: 
There shall he tW fines levied by the Employer 
nt· atlY deductions fur an1· reason whatsoever from 
an eniployec's pay check: except as required b'y law. 
There shall he no cash deductions from an em-
ploy<'<!,; pay for any cash shortage where the cash 
register has not been officially checked by the 
Employer or hi-; authorized representative in the 
presence "f t ltc ctnployee. 
Section 16. HEAD BARTENDER: 
H cad Bartt:nders arc subject to all work rules 
governing regular bar men. 
Section 17. MEALS: 
(a) Any Bartender working a full shift shall 
receive tlm:e (3) nJeals of food comparable to that 
served to the customers, or one dollar and one-half 
($1.50) in lieu thereof in establishments where no 
food is served <'mployees by the management. 
(h) Employ<'es working in establishments where 
bona fide hot meals are not served shall receive 
an allowance of fifty cents (SOc) per meal or one 
dollar and fiitv cents ($1.50) for three (3) meals in 
addition to their wages. 
(c) Employees working a full shift shall be 
given an opportunity to eat within five (5) hours 
from the commencement of the shift, provided, 
however, that no employee shall be required to eat 
before three (3) hours from the commencement of 
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thl" shift. Should ~,n Employer require or permit 
an emplu\·ce tn \l'«l·k so that it is impossible for 
the employe,· I<) tak,· time off for meals as. pro-
vided, the < m~.J,,y. ,. so affected shall be patd 1ll 
addition to 1 .• - ca,;, wages the sum of fifty cents 
()()c) for'''" It tnc . .!. plus one (1) hour at the over-
titne rate'"~ lilt: ''"·al period worked. 
Section 18. REGULATIONS & JOB 
DEFINITION: 
No persons but members of the Bartenders Un-
ion Local 41 shall be allowed to perform any or 
all parts of th'e dut1es coming under the jurisdiction 
of the Bartender~ Union, Local No. 41, and this 
Agreement and Wage Scale, notwithstanding by 
what title designated. 
Excepted from the provisions of this section: 
(a) Those persons whose names appear on the 
ON SALE LIQUOR LICENSE and are reported 
at the A.B.C. Board to own more than 20% of the 
business, and limited to three (3) persons. 
(b) Principal officers of the Corporate Licensee 
who are reported at the A.B.C. Board a":d Cor-
poration Commission of the Corporate Ltcensee, 
to own more than 20% of the business, and limited 
to three (3) persons. 
Section 19. ROSTER: 
The Enq<lmn. upon request, shall furnish .a 
complete rostn , ·i employees currently workmg_ m 
the capacit\ ,,, H.1rtender and for the precedmg 
thirty (30). da~ '· provided, however •. such roster 
may not he n •tucs!t'd more than once many tl1lrty-
day (30) peri<>d. 
JOB CLASSIFICATIONS & WAGE SCHEDULES 
TAVERNS: The Tavern Scale is applicable only 
ro bars operatmg under a public premises license; 
"o public servtcc personnel other than bar~enders 
ere empluycd; n•, i""" is served to the publtc ?r to 




PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
9/1/72 l/1/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 1/1/76 
·3%% 31,4% 
Tavern Bartenders: 
5%% 51,4% 6% 
7~ hours within 8 hours ........................ $28.10 $29.05 
All Other Bartenders: 
$30.65 $32.35 $34.30 
7~ hours within 8 hours ........................ 32.15 33.25 35.10 37.05 39.25 I 
..,. Cagemen: 
j 7~ hours within 8 hours ........................ 
i 
i 
33.70 34.85 36.75 38.75 41.10 
Head Bartenders: 
7~ hours within 8 hours ....................... 37.25 38.50 40.60 42.85 45.40 
SHORT SHIFT: 
All men working a shift of four (4) hours or less per day between the hours of 6:00 
a.m. and 6:00 p.m., provided no shift of four ( 4) hours or less shall finish later than 6:00 
p.m., shall receive not less than: $23.35 $24.15 $24.15 $25.50 $27.05 
New Year's Eve: Extra Bartenders 
starting any shift after 4:00p.m. and 9/1/72 
working seven and one-half (7~) 
hours or less shall be paid not less 
than ...... .. .... ... . ... ...... ................ $36.05 
Banqueb, Spec1al Occa,inns, Dances, 
Operii. Hous~. «"tc: 
ia) (Jne (l) man shall be provided 
fc.r every fifteen (15) feet of bar 
length. 
(b) At no time shall a bartender in 
this classification receive less 
than the minimum rate of pay 
per shift of four (4) hours or 
less. 
(c) For any shift starting after 
8:00 p.m. the minimum rate of 
pay shall apply until 12 mid-
night; overtime thereafter, plus 
SOc per shift if Employer does 
not furnish linen. 
(d) All bartenders in this classifi-
cation working four ( 4) hours or 
less shall be paid not less than: $25.45 
PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
l/1/73 1/1/74 1/1/75 1/1{11 
$37.30 $39.35 $41.50 $44.00 
$26.35 $26.35 $27.80 $29.50 
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CRAFT RULES, JOB CLASSIFICATIONS 
AND WAGE SCHEDULES 
GOVERNING EMPLOYEES UNDER THE 
JURISDICTION OF 
MISCELLANEOUS CULINARY EMPLOYEES' 
UNION, LOCAL No. 110 
CRAFT RULES 
Section 1. WORK WEEK (Short Hour 
Employees): 
Employees working five (5) hours or less per 
day may work stx (6) days per week. 
Section 2. SHIFTS: 
(a) Seven and one-half (7Y,) hours within eight 
hours shall constitute a shift. 
(b) All work performed up to five (5) hours per 
day shall constttute a short shift. 
(c) No employee shall be allowed to work more 
!han one ( 1) shtft m any calendar day if said shift 
ts four ( 4) hours or more and is performed in the 
same house. 
Section 3. UNIFORMS LINENS AND 
TOOLS: ' 
(a) The Employer agrees to furnish, clean. laun-
der and mamtam for all employees all uniforms 
lmens, or to:>ls that are used in his service by a~ 
empl?yee. Such unrfonns, linens or tools shall 
rematn the property of the Employer at all times. 
(b) Al_l elllployccs arc entitled to at least one (l) 
clean umfonn and apron each day. 
. (c) Definitior; of Uniforn,1s: Men-an apron and 
jacket or cooks shrrt. Vvomen- an apron and 
smock. 
(d) I~ for any reason the uniforms or linens are 
not furnrshed by the Employer, the Employer shall 
-74-
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pay to the employee in addition to his regular com 
pensation, the sum of SOc daily. 
Section 4. COMBINATION JOBS: 
Any employee working any combination of Dish 
washer, Vegetableman, or Porter, shall be paid as 
follows: 
Per Day 
Full Shift...... . .. ...... . .......... Extra $1.50 
2 and 3 Hour Shift... ................................... Extra .50 
4 and 5 Hour Shift... ................................... Extra .75 
Section 5. ALL OTHER COMBINATION 
JOBS: 
(a) When an employee occupies a position com-
bining two or more classifications in any day he 
shall be paid for that day at the rate of pay for 
the highest classification. 
(b) Any dishwasher, vegetableman or porter re-
quired to do storeroom or supply work for more 
than one (1) hour per day, shall be paid according 
. to the highest classification. 
Section 6. NIGHT SHIFT PREMIUM: 
Night shifts starting between the hours of 7:00 
P.M. and up to 12 midnight, 75 cents extra. No 
shifts shall start after 12 midnight or before 4:00 
A.M. 
Section 7. SPECIAL OCCASIONS: 
New Year's Eve: Shifts starting 2:00 P.M. or 
thereafter: 
FULL SHIFT: Time and one-half the hourly 
straight time rate of a full or short shift, whichever 
the case may be. All overtime shall be paid for at 
time and one-half per hour or fraction thereof 
hased on the actual hourly rate received . 
Extra Men: Full Shift-$1.00 in addition to the 
regular scale as specified above. Short Shift-2 or 
3 hours, SOc in addition to the regular scale as 
specified above; 4 to 5 hours, 75c in addition to 
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JOB CLASSIFICATIONS&: WAGE SCHEDULES 
RESTAURANTS 
Dishwasher, \'egetablemen and 
Porters: 
Full Shift 
Five ( 5) hours 
Four (4) hours 
Three (3) hours 








P£R DAY - EfFECTIVE 
1/1/73 1/1/74 1/1/75 
31h% 5'/i% 5%% 
$21.10 $22.25 $23.45 
15.40 15.40 16.25 
13.20 13.20 13.95 
10.50 10.50 11.10 








J COMBINATION BUS PERSON 
~ DISHWASHER: . 
1 7lh hours within 8 hours ........................ 22.05 22.80 24.05 25.35 26.85 
PENALTY COMBINATION DISHWASHER & BUS PERSON 
Full Shift ........................................................................................................................ Extra $1.50 
2 and 3 hours .................................................................................................................. Extra $0.50 
4 and 5 hours .................................................................................................................. Extra $0.75 
The Unions involved must be notified and approve use of this combination shift. 
EXTRAS: 
Extra .Men, full shift 
DOORMAN (not regularly parking 
cars): 
7% hours within 8 hours ................. . 
21.55 
22.20 
22.30 23.55 24.85 
22.95 24.20 25.55 
26.35 
27.10 
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CRAFT RULES, JOB CLASSIFICATIONS AND 
WAGE SCHEDULES GOVERNING EMPLOYEES 
UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF 
HOTEL, MOTEL & CLUB SERVICE WORKERS 
UNION, LOCAL NO. 283 
CRAFT RULES 
Section 1. 
All Hat Check employees for Auditoriums, Night 
Clubs, Restaurants, Race Tracks, Dance Halls, 
Banquets, etc., must be obtained from Local 
No. 283. 
Section 2. OVERTIME: 
Any work performed in excess of the regular 
shift shall be paid at the rate of time and one-
half of the hourly rate per hour or fraction thereof. 
Any fraction of an hour overtime shall be computed 
as a full hour. 
Section 3. COMBINATION JOBS: 
(a) A checker supplying checks shall be paid 
$1.00 for each shift in addition to the regular rate 
of pay. 
(b) Any checker required to act as cashier in 
conjunction to checking must be paid $1.70 in ad-
dition to the regular rate of pay. 
Section 4. 
Employees shall keep all tips· unless a sign at 
least six (6) by twelve ( 12) inches is posted in a 
conspicuous place stating that tips are not retained 
by the attendant. 
Section S ... MEALS: 
One meal shall be provided for all classifications. 
-79-
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JOB CLASSIFICATION & WAGE SCHEDULES 
PER DAY - EFFECTIVE 
9/1/72 1/l/73 l/1/74 1/1/75 1/1/76 
3%% 3%% 5%% 5%% 6% 
Hat Checkers, Cloak Room 
Attendants and Cigarette Girls 
f 
7~ hours within 8 hours ........................ $25.40 $26.25 $27.70 $29.20 $30.95 -....! 
6 hours straight .................................... 20.45 21.15 22.30 23.55 24.95 00 
3 hours or less (Restaurant Only) .... 10.30 10.65 10.65 11.25 11.95 I 
N 
Parlour Maids and ..... 
Rest Room Attendants: ..... 
4 hours .................................................... 11.75 12.15 12.15 12.80 13.60 
5 hours .................................................. 14.65 15.15 15.15 16.00 16.95 
6 hours .................................................. 17.40 18.00 19.00 20.05 21.25 




RFS 1 "' ~ANT -HOTEL EMPLOYERS' COUNCIL 
1> SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC. 
608 South Hill Street. Suite 1010 
Los Angeles, California 90014 
(213) 624-7761 
and 
HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 
AND BARTENDERS' UNION. 
LOCAL 11, AFL-CIO 
321 South Bixel Street 
Los Angeles. California 90017 
(213) 481-8530 
March 16, 1975 Through March 15, 1980 
(As Amended October 4, 1976 
and July 13, 1977) 
• 
78-213 
~I ~ V.. 
1
( ~ -~ I ~ 
"tV' 1 f\. I .rr'-~ 
SCHEDULE "A" 
Hotels, Motels, Restaurants, 
Clubs and Night Clubs 




Clwl r lfll'n . . ,\1mimum /0''/t, per day above the 
htKhnt . ,,,,,/icatwn rate a/par 
Sou\ ( h,: .. Open . .. ,\11/11/IIU/If /0';1, per day above 
the h1gh. ' , la\SI/ication rate ojpay 
Second t ·• ,~-, Saucier 
N1ght < 1"1 
J';l'.,!fl ( 11<.:1 





Roa't ( ,;o!-. 
*Car,cr 
Bruilcr ( ·o,,J.. 
Head I " Cool-. 
f ry < •" 1-. 
D1'h I 1 '\Lr n 
lledd '. udc '\bngcr 
Scun• ( • .~rdc \Ianger 
Other t ,,,rdc \Ltngcr. 
llcad I J,·lrc;ltc"cn Man 
lkli,,l" ,,,.n Man 
DcliL;ilv'''ll Caf\Cr 
Cumhrn,ilttl!l Dclil·atc,-;<.:n t\bn-l·rvcook 


































Head 1'.1ntr1man $34.77 
l'a111r' m,tn · 32.54 
\ii \"l't,tnh & !Ieiper~ 27.09 
\ q!,,Lihlc Coo~ 32.54 
ltr-,1 Rel1d Cot>k 39.32 
'>econd Relict Cook 34.77 
Fxtr.t Cook, S hour-. or lc-,, 39.32 
*F\h1h1uon Gtf\lllg from carh t .. r a majority of the 
~11111 
The Emplo1er may h.tvl' the oplton of etlher fur-
111'>hlng Cool..,' untfornh or paytng 50¢ per day 111 
lieU lhcrclll' nut '>Ul'h linen-, -,hall he laundered hv 
the I mpl<>\l't · 
Lxtra Cook-, '>h;ill he a '>eparate l'ia'>'>tftcallon wtth a 
lbt r;tlc ol pav for ctght hour'> or lc'>'> 
Reltcl Coo~' 'hall he a '>eparate da-.'>lftcJtton 
wtlh ;t lltt r<~tc '" pay. for e1ght hour' or le'>s. 
Chcl and '-.ou' Chel l'ia'>'>tftcatton-., wh1ch are 
now open, -,hall he patd <~ mmtmum of 10% per day 
above the htghe">l classtrtralton rate of pay 
Ne.,.. Year·, Eve Extra Work. 45.45 
DINING ROOM EMPLOYEES 
Headwaiter or Headwaitress 
~ hou•' llf leS'> 
8 hour' .,..l,htn II -.pill 
4 hour' 111 il'" 
Captain 
H hour' or h.:-,, 
8 hour' w1thtn II ,pitt 







Wine Steward or Semollier 
;" ,,, ~u 1"' ilr k:"'' 
'" •u •, "11 ht n II 'Pitt 
Hl~~i.'lit,:'" 
SERVICE FOUNTAIN 
X h.".: 1, or lc" 
~ h· · ,, 1 ' .,.. 11t11n ,} ,pitt 
4 lltlll f I'( lt''"-
FRONT FOUNTAIN 
Xhou1-...11' ~t:"'" 
X hout' '"'hln II 'l'llt 
4 lllllll' Ill k,, 
HEAD BUS BOY AND GIRL 













8 !tour' "tlhtn II '>Pill 





Lunch & D1nnct 
4 htllll' II[ lc\' 
BUS BOY OR GIRL 
~ t1 { ll1 r"' t Jf IL' .... ' 
Hr,-.thl ,ht ,\ I ,.,1, :· 
i '• '' 11 & I )II·' c'l 
~ IJ.', ' .... : hill I I 'Jllil 
B•' It' ·"i & I lllll'll 
I tl'l· 11 ,\.. Dtllllc'r 
-+hot~ --.(If k''-~"' 
17 .. 1~. ~ 
17.38 
, ).IS.''> ~ 
:t_L,.~v .. 
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WAITERS OR WAITRESSES- HOTELS 
AND RESTAURANTS 
X hllUI'> '>lt.ll(hl '>litlt 
Hrc>.,~t...,r k lunrh 
llliHI1 S: l)lllllcr 
1.1, 1l.. ~ 
17.38 
S hour, V.lthm II 'Pill 
Brl·.,~>.fa,t & Lunch 
I UJ'' h & Dmncr 
6 h(ILI'' \lr,llght '>hlfl 
Lun, 11 
Dtnn<:r 
h hour, v. 1th111 II '>Plit 
Brl',tlda-.t & Lunch 
I unch & D1nner 
Dmner 
4 hour~ or ~c,,. 
Lunch 
3 hour' or lc" 
Brcakfa,t, 3 hOLH\ or lcs~ 
Room Servtce WaIter . 
•'f. ' 
f.. .. • 
f5,'i". 
Extra Work S2.00 per day above scale. 
On all ~pitt ~h1fts, mintmum call for 
I\ 3 hours 
Waiters or Waitresses - Night Club & 
Cocktail lounges - All Straight Shifts 
8 hour' or le'' 
Breakl'a~t & Lunch 
Lunch & D1nncr. 
A hour~ or lc~' 
Lunch 
IJ1nner 
4 hnu r' or le" 
Nev. \c,tr', Eve Extra\\,,~ 
'1/,1~ 
mu:nn 















Sholl·,htll cmplo1ce'> v.or> n~ ,,, the ~ixth dav 
under the prm"ion' of Sell. ,, 'I 'I l (2) shall be 
tl<lld at the r.ttc ol S2.50 pc1 •JI 





8 hours withtn II split ... 
4 hours or less ... 
Hostess or Host 
8 hours or less .. 
8 hours within I I split ... 
4 hours or less .. 
Cashier 
8 hours or less .. 
8 hours within I I split .. 
4 hours or less. 
Food Checker 
8 hours or less ........ . 
8 hours within II split .. 
4 hours or less ... 
Combination Cashier and Food Checker 
8 hours or less. 
8 hours within II split .. 
4 hours or less . 


















8 hours or less.. . . . . . . 21.85 
• Applies to employees who sell or deliver food or 
beverages from a portable cart to areas outside 
the lhning room such as to offices in an office 
bUIIdtng. 
House Officers, Male or Femal& 
8 hours or less ... 23.94 
DOOR ATTENDANTS 
8 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.40 
6 hours or less.. 16.00 
Exrra Work: $2.00 per day above scale. Short-
57 
\1 l[ ;, 1\CL'-.., \\[)(1 \\1 •i "' \11, 
L11 '·'t.lil h~· p.tiJ ,. i.tlc 
···n 'l I 
~cv. '!c·ar "Fve l·\lr" \'. ()!!.. 
~~~~: '>lull Dd!crentt.tl $2 I" 
'>ctk ' \II cmplovcc-; c'Xcept c\tr 
WAITERS OR WAITRESSES 
BUS GIRLS - BANQUETS 
\c'illh clli1'>CCU-
,!<JUhit: 11111e <I'> 
$33.65 
"l'l dav above 
'ook'l · 
BUS BOYS OR 
EFFHTIYE 
4 I Jl 
PEl lAY 
Hre.tkfa.,L I uncheon "r l c.l Bel'·' <1g bet ore 
.+. ()() P 1\1 . 3 hou I\ <ll k". 
m1mmum $ 9.65 
Dmncr, 4 hours or less 
min1mum . 12.24 
Dinner-Dance, 
S hours or lc~~- 17.89 
ComtX'I1'>.tliOll lor :til hour'> worked 111 e\CC'>'> ol 
the :~bo\L' dc'>lgnated 1111n1mum '>hill hour-, '>hall be 
.tl the r:tl<: ol $2 50 per hour nccpl that v.orl-. llCI-
I()IfliCd 111 c'\Ce'>'> ol ctght hour' pet day '>hall be 
p:11d at the r.ttc ol one :tnd one h;tll (I'··) lt111C'> the 
rq•ul:tr r:tle ol J'll\ 
I \c\'PI l111 I rench '>c'l\lll'. \\llllc'l'> llf \\.illf'c''>'>e'> 
lc'ljlll!ed Ill '>c'f\L' r11lliC th.lll l\h'lll\ 120) !(Ue\h 
'>h,!ll he· p:IILJ 21,( pel l'ehllll 111 l'\c'c''>'> of lhi'> ltmll 
lor hrc.tkl:t'>l, lunchc'llll llf tea .. !lld 32<:- per per\on 
111 c \cev-. of till'> limtl lt•l dil111c'l 
Whc·n B:111quct \\':utcl'> or \\.ttlre,,, . ., .1re ullcd 
upon I<• .. erH· 11nothcr hanljueL the) ,tJ;ill be p.ud 
the !ulli.tle "' .tll!Jther p:trt\ . .~, p~.:r \\.tiC·~ 'cheuuk 
l'ht'> p!<l\I'>IPI.l ,tpplte' t" .tllc."l'' '-'hcr-: the t\\!l 
h;1114UCh .trc neld du1111f' dill< :1 ttllllt'>. hut doc' 
1111t ;tprh ¥\ht:!! the' 1\t\(i ~ ~~~~..:·,-., .. trc "Cf\L'd 
,llllUILII'c·,.u,l\ duttllg II•, !lljUc'l '>111ft B:tn-
quet \\,<.!c'f' ,tnd \\ltttrc"' "the rcljutrcd to 
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\et up more than the numlx=r a-,,tgncd to them to 
'iCrve, nor shall they be requireu to clear oiT more 
than the number gtvcn them to serve 
On French SerH.:e at banquch, the limll on 
number of guests serveJ shall he 15 and waiters 
.tnu wanrc~scs required to serve more than 1 '\ 
guests shall receive the above contract execs~ 
allowance rates per g~est The precedmg paragraph 
l'i al..,o appltcablc to f·rench Sen1ce 
On all banquet., the Employer shall mamtam a 
record and requ1rc supervisory or executive 
employes to mamtam a record of the total gratuities 
paid and rece1vcdby the employer or by any SUIX'r-
vtsory or execullve employee and '>Uch records 
'hall be made available to the Unwn on rCLJucst. 
1 hts docs not apply where the cu\tomer gives the 
gratu1ty 111 cash and the Employer has no 
knowledge thereof 
On Banquet - Scrip parties, or ban4ucts where 
no gratultiC\ arc prov1dcd for in the charge, and 
where no lood "served, pay shall he $3 00 per day 
ahovc the ban4uct scale and the Employer will be 





Working llcad Bartender h1ghe'>t cl:t'i'>lfication 
rate (mtnlmum !()',;, ahovc the rate of pay) 
duttes mcludc asstgnmg bartender to 
'>tatlon'i. . ........... Open 
B1trtcnder . . $1S 30 
*Scrv1cc Bartenucr . 37 ·9'\ 
Bar Boy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l4 17 
lxtra Work tBartcndcr) $2 00 per day abov~. 
bartenders' scale. 
Nev. Year\ t:ve Extra Work. 45.45 
Bartender, 4 hours or less... . . . . . 26.61 
*Scrv1cc Bartcnucr, 4 hour., or lc-,s. · 28.60 
59 
No ~h .rt '>hift bartemkr '>hali tx· pcrmilted to 
""rk" -.pitt shift or tv.o .-.tuft, ,, the \ame da) 
*"l'f ',,e Hartender ''a Hartend~ · v. h"'e regul<tr 
dultc' exclude dtrect senile to tU'itomer'i 
C\Cti•: during on:a'iional relrcl tx·r .. •ds. The 
tJ.,,,:trration ~1lso rovers any Hartcndcr who i'i 
rc4u 1t:d to perform <tnY clerical "'''' ~ beyond 
th,tt ~h1ch is ne<:e'isary to balan. the cash 
rcg_htc:r at the end of the shift. 

























Vegetable Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.96 
Miscellaneous Kitchen Employee . . . . 22.96 
Extra Work ......... $2.00 per day above scale 
New Year's Eve Extra Work.. . . . . . . 27.98 
Night Shift Differential $2.00 per day above scale 
DRIVE-INS, DAIRY LUNCHES 
AND CAFETERIAS 
Cooks 
Dinner Cooks . 
Pantry Chef .... 
Second Pastry Chef .. 










Roast Cook ......................... $ 36.41 
•carver ............. ,............... 36.41 
Fry Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.28 
Dish-Up Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.84 
Head Garde Manger ....... ,......... 37.52 
Second Garde Manger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.05 
Other Garde Manger .... , . . . . . . . . . . . 30.84 
Head Butcher ................. ,..... 37.52 
Butcher.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.05 
Poultry and Fish Butcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.84 
Head Pantryman.................... 33.05 
Pantryman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.84 







5 Second Relief Cook ................ . 
Vegetable Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.84 
Wheel Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.05 
Cook's Helper......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.44 
Extra Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.52 
*Exhibition carving from carts for majority of shift. 
The Employer may have the option of either fur-
nishing Cooks' uniforms or paymg 50¢ per day in 
lieu thereof; but such linens shall be laundered by 
the Employer. 
MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEES 
All Miscellaneous Kitchen 
Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.33 
Extra Work ......... $2.00 oer da~ above scale 
CAFETERIAS - WAITERS AND WAITRESSES 
CAFETERIA UNE SERVERS 
8 hours or less ...................... . 
8 hours within II split 
Breakfast & Lunch . . . . .. ..;2./iS.) 
Lunch & Dtnner .................. . 







8 hours or less . . . . . . . ...... . 
R hours within II split. 







. . 25.74 
16.17 
8 hours or less............... 26.33 
8 hours within II split. . . . . . . . . 27.98 
4 hours or less.................. 17.74 
COMBINATION CASHIER AND CHECKER 
8 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.33 
8 hours within II spill.... . . . . . . . . . . . 27.98 
4 hours or less... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 17.74 
SERVICE FOUNTAIN MAN OR WOMAN 
8 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.96 
8 hours within II split... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.79 
4 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.57 
BUS BOY OR GIRL 
17.89 8 hours or less . . . . . . 
8 hours within II split 
Breakfast & Lunch.. . .... ;._~,;:->.. ~ 
Lunch & Umner .......... ~~~o. ~ 
4 hours or less.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.17 
SUPPLY BOY OR GIRL 
8 hours or less . . . . . . . . . 18.87 
8 hours wnh 1n II split 
Breakfast & Lunch ~ .... ,.t,_s"(. ~ 
Lunch & Dinner.. . .,;...A-.1-:).. ~ 
4hour~,>rless ..................... 12.!12 
Extra work... . $2.00 per day above seth: 
62 
DAIRY WNCHES- WAITERS 
AND WAITRESS 




8 hours or less ....................... $21.05 
8 hours within 11 split.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.07 
4 hours or less....................... 14.34 
BUS BOY OR GIRL 
8 hours or less ....................... 17.89 
8 hours with II split C"'r""' 
Breakfast & Lunch ........ ~J,.;>. . .;> •• ~ 
Lunch & Dinner .......... ;lo •. iQ. ~ 
4 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12. 17 
SUPPLY BOY OR GIRL 
8 hours or less.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.87 
8 hours within II split 
Breakfast & Lunch ........ ..ll .S}f'.. ~ 
Lunch & Dinner .......... .a.c.~ 11.t... ~ 
4 hours or less.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.82 
Extra Work ....... $2.00 per day above scale 
DRIVE-INS- WAITERS AND WAITRESSES 
SERVICE FOUNTAIN MAN OR WOMAN 
8 hours or less. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.96 
8 hours within 11 split................ 24.79 
4 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.57 
FRONT FOUNTAIN MAN .OR WOMAN 
8 hours or less....................... 18.71 
8 hours within II split S" 
Breakfast & Lunch ........ . ~~~5:... ~ 
Lunch & Dinner .......... ...1tL.!C.. ~ 
4 hours or less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.SS 
COMBINATION WAITRESS AND FOUNTAIN 




R hours ~1thin II split 
Breakfa-;t & Lunch 
Lunch & Dmner 
4 hours or less. 
BUS BOY OR GIRl 
8 hours or less.. . . . 
8 hours w1thrn II split 
Breakfast & Lunch .. 
Lunch & Dinner . 




. ~.LSf.'" .. ~ 
.. ..2.1a .ro .. ~ 
12.17 
8 hours or less 
Breakfast & Lunch 
Lunch & Dinner ... 
8 hours Within II split 
Breakfast & Lunch. ~b)..$'":' ~ 
Lunch & Dinner . . . . ..;:u>.-.1'0. . ~ 
4 hours or less....................... 10.73 
Extra Work ....... $2.00 per day above scale 
PASTRY AND CONFECTIONERY 
COUNTER EMPLOYEES 
Head Pastry and 
Confectionery Counter Employees. 24.79 
Pastry & Confectionery Counter 
Employees . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 21.71 
Trainee Pastry and Confectionery Counter 
Employee'............ . . . . . . . . . 19.62 
Extra Work ..... $2.00 per day above scale 
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OFF-THE-PREMISES CATERING, 
OUT -OF-TOWN BANQUETS, BARBECUES, 





No short shifts. 
No split shifts. 
Minimum call, eight (8) hours . 
The Minimum Scale of pay for catering work 
shall be as follows: 
caf':~~~r 0~~~/~.o.st~~ ............... . 
Waiter or Waitress 
8 hours or less ...................... . 
Miscellaneous Kitchen Employees ...... . 
No short shifts. No split shifts. 
Minimum call eight (8) hours. 
Bartenders ........................... . 
Service Bartenders .................... . 
No short shifts. No split shifts. 
Minimum call, eight (8) hours. 
HOTEL AND MOTEL SERVICE WORKERS 






Working Bell Captain . . .l.f.'ir1 ~ 
Stationary Desk Captain 
(male or female). . . 1':f.-.f.7 ~ 
•Bellman . . .. .. ............. 1,,~.7 ~ 
Bell-Garage Runner Combination /'~In I~ 
Bell-Elevator Combination ...... Jl,1s'7 ~ 
Bell-Package or Page Combination fl/nl~ 
Page Boy or Girl ................ 11 •. tPJ~ 
Package Boy or Girl ............ t1iS'71~ 
Bell-Baggage Porter Combination .l'i·.t1~ 
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• Dut11:~ norm<ilil , '''t(tll.:d ~1th111 the hotel 
1 nd u -..t rv. Com ht"·' 111 •n toh~ ., ha II he paid 
appropi·tate Clllllhtrlallon rate 't't forth ahovc 
lkllm;m -,hall not he rclJUtrnl '"perform m,ud 
dUties. 
All Bell Scnt1c Dcpartmen· 
he provtded at least two untl 
pant-.., or Jacket and panh, "' 
type 'htrt <tnd panh per '>'Cd. 
HOUSEKEEPING DEPARTMENT 
111ployecs shall 





Assi'itant Housekeeper $23.42 
(n<.;pectress <lr floor llousekeeper 21.85 
Linen Room Worlo.cr 21.32 
Seamstrc->ses-Mcnder-.. 21.32 
Drapery Seam•mcss 22.62 
Powder Room Matd 20.96 
*Maids. 20.96 
II cad Houseman. 24.31 
**llou<>cman . . . . . 22.96 
Banquet Houseman 22.96 
llamlyman. 25.53 
Patrolman. 23.51 
Storeroom Man-Recet\ ing Clerk. 24.31 
Combination Bcllman-llousenun 22.96 
Comhmatton L111en Room-Clerical 23 13 
Ctppltcahlt.: to employees '>'ho spend four or 
mort' hours domg linen fltom work l 
*Matti'> perform gener.tl room cleantng and hed-
maktng and other dulte' as usually performt'd 111 
the h<>itl tndustry 
••llou,emen perform gener.tl cleantng and 
other duttes as u-;uall\ performed tn the hotel 
mdu'itrv Housemen sh.tll not he requested to 
pcrlorni other JUfl~dlclt ·n craft work. such "" 
painters. plumhcrs :md <~per.tttng engtncers 
6h 
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When employees are requested to work on their 
regular days off, they shall be notified by the. 
Employer the day before except tn cases ot 
emergency. Should employees be unable to work 
on such days off because of maktng other plans 
they shall not be terminated, suspended or 
penalized in any manner. 
Housekeeping Department females, excluding 
Assistant Housekeepmg and Secretary to House-
keeper, shall be provided a minimum of at least two 
uniforms per week. Houseman shall be provtded 
with at least two uniforms, smocks or slacks or 
overalls, or jackets and pants per week. 
HOTEL FRONT OFACE DEPARTMENT 
(Including Telephone Department) 
Group 1 
Key, Mail and Information Clerk -






Koom Clerk, Reservatton ClerK, 
Room-Reservation Clerk. Front Office Cashier. 
Ntght Auditor Btlltng and Voucher Clerk 
Room Clerk-Telephone PBX' 
(Combination). . ...... $31.74 
Group Ill 
Accounting Clerk, Food and Beverage Clerk, 
Bookkeeping Machine Operator, 





Telephone-PBX Operator .. . 
Circuit or Message ....... . 
Working Chief PBX Operator 
Working Chief Supervisor. .. 
(If works 2 or more hours 
in shift as PBX Operator) ... 







A Telephone Operator who does not receive her 
lunch perioo away from her board because of the 
nature of her shift shall receive a balanced meal 
plus $2.00 per day above scale; if no meal is availa-
ble, $2.50 shall be paid 
I. Front Desk classifications required to handle 
and do busmcss that involves receiving and dis-
bursing funds, such as room rent, room service 
charges and other normal hotel charges shall not be 
held responsi hie for shorta~tes of funds unle.;s it can 
be shown that such loss or shortage IS caused by a 
dishonest or w1llful act or by gross negligence of the 
employee. 
2. Employees authonzed by management to 
accept checks will not be held responsible for 
checks honored m the normal course of business or 
if such checks represent insufficient funds, etc., 
unle.,;s it can be shown that said loss or shortages is 
caused by a dishonest or willful act or by gross neg-
ligence of the employee. 
3. Pursuant to the provisiOn'> of Section II of the 
Agreement, m the case of all Hotel and Motel Ser-
vice Workers' Classifications, all uniforms and 
linen;, shall be furnished and laundered by the 
Employer without cost to the employee; at the 
option of the Employer, he m&\ pay 50¢ per day or 
$2.50 per week in lieu of laundering or cleaning. In 
applying these provision~ to llutel and Motel Ser-
68 
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vice Workers' Classificallons, "uniforms and 
linens" mean any apparel specified by the 
Employer to be worn by employees in the service of 
the Employer; also note above specifu.: provisions 
under Bell Service and Housekeeping Depart-
ments. 
4. For purpose of applying Paragraph E of Sec-
tion 9 of the Agreement to Hotel and Motel Serv1ce 
Workers' Classifications, all hotels shall be deemed 
to be seven day operations entitling such 
employees to two (2) consecutive days off in each 
perioo of seven (7) consecutive days or else the 
penalty on overtime provisions of said Paragraph E 
shall be applied, except where a department IS 
operating six (6) days as defined in Section 9 E. 
No split shifts. 
No short shifts. 
Night shift Differential 
(Work starting at or after 
8:00 P.M. in all 
classifications) ....... $2.00 per day above scale 
Extra Work 
(in all classifications). $2.00 per day above scale 
New Year's Eve Extra 
Work . . . . . . . ..... $3.00 above scale 
Extra work differential is applicable to all extra 
employees hired to work less than four days per 
calendar week, and to all Maids assigned to work 







REST AU RANT -HOTEL EMPLOYERS' 
COUNCIL OF SAN DIEGO, INC. 
233 A Street, No. 405 
Son Diego, California 92101 
Telephone 234-3443 
and 
LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD 
OF SAN DIEGO 
Comprising 
WAITERS AND BARTENDERS UNION 
LOCAL NO. 500 
3911 Pacific Highway 
Son Diego, California 9211 0 
Telephone 297-0353 
and 
CULINARY AlliANCE AND HOTEl 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL NO. 402 
1020 Eighth Avenue 
Son Diego, California 921 01 
Telephone 239-9201 
2~0 
11/1/75 - 10% increase 
6/1/77 7% increase 
1/1/79 7% increase 
• 
RESTAURANT-HOTEL EMI'LOYEJIS' COUNCIL 
01" SAN DIEGO, I:NC. AND LOCAL JOIN'T malC'U· 
TIVE BOARD OF SAN DIEGO oompnafDS WAIT· 
EBS AND BABTE:NDEBS UNION LOCAL NO. ite 
and CULINARY ALLIA.NCE AND HOTEL I!IEB-
VICE EMPLOYEES lJ'NlON LOCAL NO • .U. 
SCHEDULE"A111 




KITCHEN AND STOCKROOM EMPLOYEES 
Executive Chef ...................................... .$0-pen 'Open 
sous Chet or Night Chef ...................... 29.29 80.83 
Dinner or Second Cook .......................... 77.62 29.06 
~~;:.~y~~ ~~~~ ·<·se-e-.. seci.!oii=;:c:r-ar't' ... 29.29 80.sa 
Relief and Working Chef Rules") 
Night Cook--
alter s p.m. or before 4 a.m ........... 25.97 
Garde-Mangcr .......................................... 24.30 
!toast or Broiler Cook .......................... 25.97 Frr eook ................... _ ............................... :w.so 
A1se~~l\~ ~~t df!I~~~t uue ................. 24.30 
Meat Butcher ............................................ 24.73 
Fish and/or Poultry Butcher .............. 24.30 
Pastry Che! .............................................. 77.62 
Second Pastry Cook ................................ 24.30 
Head Baker .............................................. 77.62 
Second Baker ........................................... 24.30 
Head Pantry ........................................... 28.07 














Helpers to all types of Cooks, 
BakPrs, Butchers and Pantry ......... 19.~ 20.85 
Head Vegetable Preparation ................ 21.50 22.62 
Vegetable Preparation ............................ 18.18 19.18 
KltchPn Steward ...................................... 21.50 22.62 
Head Storeroom ...................................... 19.43 20.44 
Combination Receiving Clerk 
and. or Backdoor ................................ 17.76 18.88 
Storeroom-Straight Shift ................... 16.98 17.81 
Storeroom--Split Shltt ............................ 18.58 19.46 
Head Dishwasher--straight Shl!t ...... 19.19 20.69 
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Ll/./7'7- 7 ~ Jfd'((Ce.S 
"'f ''I "' Etfeetlve Date 
//J/ f ..,.. o/ H-I- n-t-
'tJ{&? - r /0 73 n 
Pot w-:~pllt S tt - -------------------- 19.27 2019 
Potwu
11
ei'-Stra1ght Shirt ·-·····-······-··· 18.40 19.36 
PorZ~tral P~it Jlh!tt .......... ···-··-····· 20.05 21:05 
S!l ......gt I~ S hltt ·······-·············-····· 17.76 18 69 ver ra g t hltt ................... - ....... 17.76 18:69 
LUNCH AND DI:NI:NO BOOM EJIPLOYEES 
Headwaiter/Maitre d'......gtralght Shltt 2."1.07 
Headwaiter/Maitre d'......gpllt Shift 24 72 
Captaln!Headwaltreas--stralght Shift 21' 41 
Captaln/Headwaltress---s~llt Shift 22.06 









ess......gpl!t Shirt ...................... 19.41 
ea u~ or Head 
H 
Budsllirl bo tratght Shift ...................... 18.91 
ea l3u~ or Head 
su~~~"~r ~J~~~~~u=ai"-iii ... siii'i(·:::: ?-f:gg 
~~~~L:r u~?tr~-:spllt ~hlft ............ 18.98 
Hotel Service F~ntai_ii.nfii)eii'&er:·:::::: ~:~~ 
Combination Fountain Dispenser and 




1]!r or Ww'!~tress......gput Shltt .......... 15.24 












6lthrll. Strwaight or less ...................... 11.11 
a er or altress-
11.69 






t tralght Shift .................... 18.59 
unc a er or Waltress-
14.80 
DI~n~~~vJ>~t~~ssor-·waii:reiiS::.:.:."'.............. 6.41 6.74 
Dl~n~~-~~.~~/~;s riaiice··waiter................ 7·98 8.34 
c or J'attrer• ... -.......... ............................. 16.72 
\~!lrlt op...._g ralght Shirt ........... _ .. -....... 18.59 .va er or Waltresii--AA Hotel Night· 






tungea--Sw tratght Shirt ... _ ............... 18.59 
a er or altres11--Banquets In 
Hotel and AA. Reataurant-4 hrs. 
14.30 
w~lte~e~;:-~::Jr:-ss=aa·iiiii.ie.tii.iii......... 9'72 10.24 
Hotel or AA Restaurant-S hnl 
or Ies11--Lunch and Breakfast :_____ 7JS7 
Head Dishwasher--spilt Shift ............ 20.84 21.84 















Cashier (Food or Bar)---Stralght Shift 18.18 19.13 
Cashier (Food or Bar)--Spllt Shift .... 19.92 20.78 
Food Chi'Ckf'r· -Str alght Shift .. ..... 18.18 19.13 
Food ChN'k!'r Split Shirt . .. 19.92 20.78 
Combination Food Ch!'cker and 
Cashier- ..Straight Shift ............. . . 18.18 19.13 
J.D. Checker Doorman-Doorglrl-
H~i[Nfo~i"~~-~~~hi.er~Chec.ker.::::·· 18.18 19.13 
4 hrs. or less ···································-··· 10.44 11.00 
FOl~NTAIN AND STAND EMPLOYE£8 
Fountain Olspenser-,Stralght Shift .... 18.61 19.58 
Comhlnatlon Fountain Dispenser 
and Fountain Walt~>r or Waltresa--





HetHI Straight Shirt .... 21.10 22~ 
Combination Cashll'r-Checker-
stralght Shift ....... ..... .... 18.18 
CA>mblnatlon Cashler-Checker--6 hrs ... 14.07 
Combination CashiE>r-Checker---4 hrs... 9.61 
Cafl'terla CRrV(•r- Straight Shift ···-··· 20.37 
Cafeteria Carver- --6 hrs. 15.76 
Cafetl'rla Carver- -4 hrs. 10.78 
Dlsh-UJ}-Stralght Shirt 16.tl2 
Dtsh-UJ}- 6 hrs. 12.77 
Dlsh-Up--4 hrs. . .. .................................. 8.71 
Busboy or Busglri---Stralght Shift .... 17.88 
Busboy or Busglrl- <> hrs. ....... .. 13.38 
Busboy or Busglrl--4 hrs. ......... 9.13 
supply---Straight Shift 16.93 
Supply-6 hrs. . ..... ................. . 13.07 
Supply- -4 hrs. . ... ............................ 8.94 
Vegeta bll' Peel!'r-.Stralght Shift 16.98 
BARTE:!'o'llERS AND 

















H!'ad Bart!'nd~>r---Stralght Shirt .......... 31.36 33.00 
Bartender--Straight Shltt ···-··········-··· 26.81 28.21 
Bart~>n<ler- -ServicE' Bar, Bl'rvlng one 
or more Walters or Waltreaaes-
Stralght Shift ...................................... 28.07 29.53 
Barboy or Barglri-Stralght ShUt .... 19.15 :10.1!1 




BARTENDERS: SPECIAl, SHORT 8HJJI'T8 
(Older Bartenders arE> to be used where ava11able) 
Cocktail Barten<lers---4 hrs. or leas .... 18.45 19.41 
Service Bartt>ndera 4 hrs. or less 20.13 21.18 
IIOlJSEKEEI'INO AND 
SERVICE DEPARTMENT .EMPLOYEES 
Head Desk Clerk and/or 
Night Auditor-Room Clerk ·····-······· Open Open 
Front Office and Room Clerk-
Straight Shift ···············-· .................... 21.39 22.50 
Front Office Cashier, Mall, Information 
and Key Clerk-Straight Shift ........ :10.19 21.:il4 
Ch·lef Telephone o~rator-
Stra~ht Shift ······--···················-··-··-· 18.11 19.06 
Ch~~~tt ~~fr~one.~~~~t-~:~.~---········-····· 
Tel~>phone Operator-Stral&ht Shift.. .. 
Telephone O~rator- Split Shift ......... . 
All front office personnel shall re-
ceive one meR! or $1.00 In !leu 
thereof. 
TE>Iephor.e Op••rators who do not 
receive their lunch period away 
from their board because or the 
nature or lht- shtrt shall receive a 
balanced meal plus $1.00 per day 
above scale. It no meal Is avall-





Stralght Shift ......... ···················-········· 12.47 18.11 
12.30 
13.85 
Bells-Straight Shirt ............................. 11.69 
Night Bells--Straight Shift ···········-····· 13.16 
Housekeeper (Worklng)-
Stralght Shift ........ .... ··············-··· 18.57 19.54 
Maid---Straight Shift ............................. 16.88 17.76 
Inspector or Assistant Housekeeper-
Straight Shift ..................................... . 
Llnenroom-Stralght Shirt ................... . 
Sewing-Straight Shift ·······-···· 




H~J~!ILhin ~~'U,offiiir1~iriiliiiiisii1ii iU~ ?flr 
Vacuum Man or Woman-
Straight Shift .... . . ................ . 
Porter--Straight Shift ........................... . 


















CQmblnatlon Bell and Elevator 
Operator-straight Shift ···-····--······· 18.64 
Combination Bell and Driver--
Straight Shift ···············-··········-······-· Open 
MOTELS 
Head Maintenance-Straight Shift ·-· 28.04 
Assistant Maintenance-Straight Shttt 22.60 
Gardener-straight Shift ···-··-············· 22.60 
Pool Attendant-Straight Shift -·-··-· 19.'78 
Outside utlUty-strallht Shift ·····-·· 19.78 
Pitch and Putt Golf CoUrse Employees: 
Grass Maintenance-Stral#ht Shift 28.04 
Assistant Grass Maintenance--











H work Is performed on the seventh (7th) day, lt 
shall be paid at the overtime rate of time and 
one-half the regular rate ot pay tn accordance 
with the provisions ot seeuon 10 of thia A~­
ment. 
PENSION PLAN: 
Contribution• (now 3c per hour) shall be seven 
centa (7c) effective November l, 19'73.. (8ee-
tlon 25). 
AFJI'IRM:ATIVE ACTION/TRAJNING PBOOILUI: 
CQntrlbutlon by Employer (8eetlon a. l and k) 
shall be one cent (lc) per hour effectlve Novem-
ber l, 1974 . 
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BERNHARD v. HARRAH'S CLUB (1976) 16 C. 3d 313 
Plaintiff: Richard A. Bernhard 
Defendant: Harrah's Club, a Nevada Corporation; 
Fern Myers and Philip Myers, not named as defendants, 
but patrons of defendant club and the persons who 
were involved in the accident with plaintiff . 
The Issue on Appeal: 
The issue is the civil liability of defendant tavern 
keeper to plaintiff, a third person, for injuries allegedly caused 
by defendant's selling and furnishing alcoholic beverages in the 
State of Nevada to an intoxicated person who subsequently injured 
plaintiff in the State of California. (There are two states 
involved, California and Nevada. California is plaintiff's 
residence and domicile, the place of injury, and the place of 
forum. Nevada is the place of defendant's residence and the place 
of the wrong, i.e., defendant's conduct.) 
Proceeding ln the Trial Court: 
Plaintiff filed a case consisting of one count alleging: 
1. Defendant's owning and operating a gambling 
establishment in the State of Nevada in which 
intoxicating liquors were sold or furnished 
for consumption on the premises; 
2. Defendant's advertising and soliciting in 
California for the business of California 
residents; 
3. Defendant's knowledge and expectation that 
many California residents would use the 
public highways going to and from defendant's 
drinking establishment; 
4. In response to defendant's advertising and 
solicitations, Fern and Philip Myers drove 
from their California residence to defendant's 
gambling and drinking club; 
5. During their stay at defendant's club, the 
Myers were served numerous alcoholic beverages 
by defendant's employees, to a point of 
obvious intoxication, rendering them incapable 
78-228 
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of safely driving a car. Defendant's 
employees continued to serve and furnish 
the Myers alcohol beverages beyond this 
point; 
6. While intoxicated, Fern Myers drove the 
Myers' car from Nevada into California; 
7. Fern Myers, while still intoxicated, drifted 
across the center·line and collided head-on 
with plaintiff, a resident of California, 
who was driving his motorcycle along a 
California highway; 
8. As a result of the collision, plaintiff 
suffered severe injuries; 
9. Defendant's sale and furnishing of alcoholic 
beverages to the Myers, who Pere intoxicated 
to the point of being unable to drive safely, 
was negligent and the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries. 
To thi complaint, defendant filed a general demurrer 
based upon the following contentions: 
l. Nevada law denies recovery against tavern 
keeper by third persons for injuries which 
result from the furnishing of alcoholic 
beverages to an intoxicated person who 
inflicts such injuries; 
2. Nevada law governed the case since the 
alleged tort was committed by defendant ln 
Nevada; 
3. Section 25602 of the California Business and 
Professions Code, which established the duty 
necessary for liability pursuant to Vesely 
v. S r (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 153, was inappllcable 
a vada tavern. The statute does not have 
extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appealed from 
the judgment of dismissal. 
Facts: 
l. On July 24, 1971, Fern and Philip Myers were 
guests of defendant establishment, remaining 




During the stay at defendant's establishment, 
the Myers became intoxicated as a result of 
consuming alcoholic beverages provided by 
defendant. These alcoholic beverages were 
given to the Myers even after they were 
obviously intoxicated; 
2. While in an intoxicated state, the Myers 
returned to the State of California proceeding 
northeasterly on Highway 49, near Nevada City; 
3. The automobile was driven by Fern Myers and 
drifted across the center line into the lane 
of oncoming traffic, colliding head-on with 
plaintiff's motorcycle. 
Conclusions of the Court: 
The issue is the choice of law between the States of 
Nevada and California. The Court concluded: 
" . [U]pon reexamining the policy underlying 
California's rule of decision and giving such 
policy a more restrained interpretation for the 
purpose of this case pursuant to the principles 
of the law of choice of law discussed above, we 
conclude that California has an important and 
abiding interest in applying its rule of decision 
to the case at bench, that the policy of this 
state would be more significantly impaired if 
such rule were not applied and that the trial 
court erred in not applying California law." 
(Bernhard, supra. p. 323.) 
Therefore, the Court chose California law. 
The Court then discussed the imposition of liability 
outside of statute, determining that the Business and Professions 
Code Section 25602 is not applicable to the Nevada defendant. The 
Court further concluded: 
"Although we chose to impose liability on the 
Vesely defendant on the basis of his violating 
the applicable statute, the clear import of our 
decision was that there was no bar to civil 
liability under modern negligence law. Certainly, 
we said nothing in Vesely indicative of an inten-
tion to retain the former rule that an action at 
common law does not lie." (Bernhard, supra. p. 325.) 
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The Court lo~ked to Civil Code Section 1714, which lS 
the general statement of negligence law, and stated: 
"It bears repetition that the basic policy of 
this state set forth by the Legislature in 
section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone 
is responsible for an injury caused to another 
by his want of ordinary care or skill in the 
management of his property." (Bernhard, 
supra. p. 325.) 
Pursuant to Bernhard, there is liability to injured 
third persons on the part of a provider of liquor to the person 
causing the injury apart from Business and Professions Code 
section 25602, i.e., under common law negligence principles. 
Although Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 C. 3d 153 looked to Business and 
Professions Code section 25602 to establish the 11 duty" element in 
that case, Bernhard makes it clear that there is a duty apart from 
statute. This dlstinction also influences the parties' burdens 
of proof. Under Vesely, and pursuant to Evidence Code Section 669, 
once plaintiff establishes the existence of the elements set forth 
in such statute, the defendant has the burden of proof of the 
non-existence of the presumed fact, whereas in Bernhard, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof of the elements supporting a 
cause of action in negligence. 
6/13/78 
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COULTER, ET AL. v. SUPERIOR COURT (1978) 21 C. 3d 144 
Petitioner: 
Respondent: 
James Stewart Coulter, Deborah Coulter (husband 
and wife) 
Superior Court of San Mateo County 
Real Parties in Interest: 
Schwartz & Reynolds & Co., apartment complex owner 
and operator; 
Monte Montgomery, apartment manager 
Matter on Appeal: 
Whether noncommercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages 
may be liable to third persons injured by reason of the intoxica-
tion of the consumer of those beverages. 
The matter is not appealed from the trial court; 
rather, the petitioners are seeking a writ of mandate from the 
Supreme Court to the trial court compelling the trial court to 
overrule the demurrers to petitioner's complaint and proceed with 
the trial on all causes of action. 
Proceed ln the Trial Court: 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint. 
A. First Cause of Action 
l. Plaintiff was injured when the car ln 
which he was riding as a passenger 
collided with roadway abutments in 
San Mateo County. (The plaintiff's 
wife joined in the action claiming 
as damages the loss of consortium and 
the value of nursing services.) 
2. At the time of the accident, the auto-
mobile was being driven by Janice 
Williams, whose intoxication caused 
the accident and the injuries to the 
plaintiff; 
3. Before the accident, the defendant 
(real party in interest) Schwartz & 
Reynolds was the owner and operator 
of an apartment complex and defendant 
(and real party in interest) Monte 




4. Defendants (real parties in interest) 
negligently and carelessly served to 
Janice Williams extremely large 
quantities of alcoholic beverages 1n 
defendants' recreation room; 
5. Defendants knew or should have known 
Williams was becoming excessively 
intoxicated; 
6. Defendants knew or should have known 
that Williams customarily drank to 
excess and was incapable of exercising 
the same degree of volitional control 
over her consumption as the average 
reasonable person; 
7. Defendants knew that Williams intended 
to drive a motor vehicle following 
consumption of alcoholic beverages 
furnished by defendants; 
8. Defendants knew or should have known 
that their conduct would expose third 
persons such as plaintiffs to foreseeable 
serious risk of harm; 
B. Second Cause of Action 
The second cause of action was substantially 
ident al to the first, except that defendants 
were not charged with furnishing of the 
alcoholic beverage, but rather that defendant 
(Schwartz & Reynolds & Co.) permitted Williams 
to be served alcoholic beverages on its 
premises, and that defendant (Montgomery) 
aided, abetted, participated, and encouraged 
Williams to drink to excess. 
The third and fourth causes of action need not be 
To the first ancl second causes of action, defendant 
demurred and such demurrers were sustained without leave to amend. 
Petitioners seek mandate compelling the trial court to overrule 
the demur•rers and to proceed with trial on the issues. 
Facts: 
l. Defendant apartment complex had a recreation 
room in which alcoholic beverages were being 





2. Janice Williams consumed alcoholic beverages 
furnished by defendant Monte Montgomery 
and became drunk; 
3. Janice Williams operated a motor vehicle 
in which James Coulter, plaintiff, was a 
passenger. The vehicle collided with a 
roadway abutment. 
Conclusions of the Court: 
1. 11 [A] social host who furnishes alcoholic 
2 • 
beverages to an obviously intoxicated person, 
under circumstances which create a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm to others, may be held 
legally accountable to those third persons who 
are injured when that harm occurs " 
(Coulter v. Superior Court [1978] 21 C. 3d 144, 
at ) . 
Business and Professions Code "section 
is not limited by its terms to persons 
furnish liquor to others for profit." 




3. " . [W]ell established general negligence 
principles lead us to conclude, independently 
of statute, that a social host or other non-
commercial provider of alcoholic beverages owes 
to the general public a duty to refuse to furnish 
such beverages to an obviously intoxicated person 
if, under the circumstances, such person thereby 
constitutes a reasonably foreseeable danger or 
risk to third persons . " (Coulter, supra. 
p. ) . 
4. " . Since all commercial vendors of alcoholic 
beverages in the state must be licensed (see 
section 23300 et seq.), the use of the broader 
term 'person' in section 25602 strongly suggests 
that the latter section must have been intended 
to apply whether or not the supplier of such 
beverages was engaged in commercial, and there-
fore licensed, activities." (Coulter, supra. 
p. ) . 
5. " [T]he term 'person 1 within the meanlng 
of section 25602 is not limited to those who are 
commercial suppliers, but includes those who are 
social hosts as well." (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
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6. ff • [W]e conclude that section 25602 affords 
7. 
a sufficient statutory basis upon which civil 
liability may be imposed upon a noncommercial 
supplier who provides alcoholic beverages to 
an obviously intoxicated person, thereby 
creating a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
harm to third persons." (Coulter, supra. 
p. ) . 
"Wholly apart from the provisions of section 
25602, imposition of civil liability in the 
present case is fully compatible with general 
negligence principles." (Coulter, supra. p. 
8. " . We think it evident that the service 
) . 
of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated 
person by one who knows that such intoxicated 
person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates 
a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those 
on the highway." (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
Discussion: 
The Court discussed the evolution of liability of one 
who furnishes alcoholic beverages to another person. Originally, 
the furnisher of the alcoholic beverage was not liable for damages 
re ult from the latter's intoxication based upon the rationale 
that it Waf; not the sale or p;i ft of the liquor that was the proxi-
mate c,wse of the injury, but it:; use. However, as is po ed out 
in Ve:;ely v. Sager, supra., the Court reconsidered s earlier 
position and found that commerc l vendors would be liable for 
injuries to th ies by the consumer of liquor. Utilizing 
the doctrine of negligence per se, the Vesely Court found "duty" 
on the part of the furnisher of the alcoholic beverage as a result 
of Business and fessions Code section 25602 and Evidence Code 
section 669. Evidence Code section 669 is the codification of 
negligence per se establishing a presumption of negligence there 
is a violation of a statute and the injury that occurs is the type 
to be avoided, and the person injured is a member of the class of 
persons sought to be protected by this statute. In Coulter, the 
Court found that section 25602 also applied to the gratultous 
provision of alcoholic beverages by noting that the section refers 
to "every person" as contrasted with the preceding Business and 
Profe:~sion~; Code (section 25601) which refers to "licensee". 
Applying Bu iness and Profes ions Code ect 23008, the Court 
defined "person" a any indiviclual, firm, co-partnership, et cetera. 
"Licensee" was defined by Bu;; ss and Professions section 23009 
a:; any pcr:~;on hold i np a 1 i cen~;e i::; ued by the department. The 
Court thc~n pointed out that :;incc all of the commercial vendors of 
alcoholic beverages must be licensed, the term "person" as used 
in section 25602 suggests that the latter section must be intended 
to apply to any furnisher of liquor whether commercial or non-






Bus ss and fessions code sect s. Ult e , the Court 
concluded that sect 25602 appl to noncommerc supplying 
of alcoholic beverages. The Court also stated "We think it of 
some, but not controlling, s ificance that, following Vesely, 
the Le islature has led to amend section 25602 to exclude 
such 1 1 " (Coulter, s p. ) . The Court stated 
further, 11 • tat o section 25602 in author-
iz s il liabili is ent ly consistent with 
these broad le polic s, and may well further induce 
soc 1 hosts to take those reasonable preventive measures calcu-
lated to reduce the sk of alcohol-related accidents." (Citations 
omitted.) (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
After determining that Business and Professions Code 
sect 25602 was applicable to the noncommercial suppl of 
alcoholic beverages, the Court looked to the common law to see 
would also se liabil on the noncommercial vendor . 
"Wholly apart from the provisions of section 25602, impos ion of 
civil liabil the present case is ful compatible with general 
negligence pr iples. It is true that in Vesely we based the 
requisite duty to the plaintiff upon the provis1ons of section 
25602 alone. (C ations omitted.) However, as we recently explained 
in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 313, although we 
the Vesel defendant on the basis of 
applicable s e, clear import of our 
there was no bar to civil liability under modern 
( C ions omitted.) (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
c 
relative to alcohol-related 
conclusion with statistical information 
automob e accidents, the Court con-
cl uded 11 • • We ' the policy of preventing 
future harm entified us Rowland (Rowland v. Christian [1968] 
69 C. 2d 108) is served by 
restraint by the soc l host under the 
presented." (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
e 
circumstances herein 
The term "obviously intoxicated", it was argued, is 
too broad and subjective to serve as a satisfactory measure for the 
osition of c il liability. (Bus ess and Professions Code 
sect n 25602 re rs to the "obviously intoxicated" person.) 
Answering the argument, the court said, "The use of intoxicating 
liquor by the average person in such quantity as to produce intoxi-
cation causes many commonly known outward manifestations which are 
'plain' and 'easi seen or d covered'. If such outward mani-
festations exist and the seller still serves the customer so 
cted, he has v lated the law, whether this was because he 
failed to observe what was pl n and eas seen or scovered, 
or because, having observed, he ignored that which was apparent." 
(Citations omitted.) (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
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Completing the historical and social analysis, the 
Court issued the peremptory writ of mandate directing the lower 
court to overrule the demurrers to the first cause of action of 
plaintiff's complaint. The majority opinion was written by 
Justice Richardson and concurred in by Justices Tobriner and 
Manuel. Justice Mosk concurred in a separate opinion stating 
that the application of Business and Professions Code section 
2 56 0 2 was too rigid. 11 • [ I]n order to hold liable the social 
provider of liquor, it is not enough to rely upon the provisions 
of section 25602. The plaintiff should be compelled to prove 
either (l) that the social host furnished the liquor knowing that 
it was likely to, and that it did, produce the original intoxica-
tion, or (2) that the additional liquor served to one already 
'obviously intoxicated' increased or prolonged the existing state 
of intoxication and to that extent was a proximate cause of the 
injury. 11 (Coulter, supra. p. ) . 
Justice Newman, concurring and dissenting, said that 
he agreed as to the first cause of action, but dissented as to 
the holding regarding the second cause of action failing to survive 
a demurrer because he felt that encouraging and participating in 
an obviously intoxicated person's drinking should result in the 
same liability as furnishing alcoholic beverages. 
Justice Clark dissenting would like to return to the 
old law of no liability for the furnisher of alcoholic beverages. 
In summary, the state of the law as to liability of 
the furnisher of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated 
person is: the furnisher, whether corrunercial or noncommercial, 
can be liable to third parties injured by the intoxicated person. 
The Coulter decision d not specifically address the noncommercial 
furn1sher's liability to the consumer. I would anticipate that 
under the same facts as Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 






EWING v. CLOVERLEAF BOWL (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 389 
Plaintiffs: 
Defendant: 
Robert Ewing and Anthony Ewing (sons of decedent 
Christopher Ewing) by Catherine Ewing (their 
mother and former wife of decedent Christopher 
Ewing) 
Cloverleaf Bowl, a California Corporation (a 
bowling alley located in Fremont, California) 
Issue Before the Court on Appeal: 
The appeal was based upon the trial court's granting 
defendant's motion for a non-suit. At the close of the plain-
tiffs' presentation of evidence, the trial court granted such 
motion, dismissed the jury, and entered a judgment for defendant. 
The question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in taking 
the factual determination from the jury. The answer to the 
central issue depends upon the answers to some subordinate issues. 
l. Whether a jury, if it could conclude that 
the defendant bartender's conduct breached 
its duty of care to decedent, could also 
conclude that such conduct amounted not 
only to negligence but willful misconduct; 
2. Whether a jury, ln assessing decedent's 
conduct, could: 
a. Reasonably conclude that decedent's 
conduct amounted to no more than 
contributory negligence, or 
b. Whether they must conclude that 
decedent's conduct amounted to 
willful misconduct. 
Proceedings in the Trial Court: 
After plaintiffs presented their evidence, the 
defendant moved for a non-suit. The trial court granted such 
non-suit and a judgment based upon such non-suit. Defendant 
appeals from such judgment. The granting of the non-suit was 
based on the determination by the trial court that, as a matter 
of law, the decedent's conduct amounted to contributory negli-
gence and the bartender defendant's employee's conduct did not 
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constitute willful misconduct. (Aside: Although this case was 
decided after Li v. Yellow Cab, the trial took place before the 
Supreme Court declslon ln Ll became final. Li was applicable 
only to cases in which trial had not begun before that final 
date. Had Li been applicable, the court would have been dis-
cussing the-conduct of the parties in terms of comparative 
negligence.) 
Facts: 
l. Date and Time -- early evenlng, April 13, 1971; 
2. Location a bowling alley located in Fremont, 
California, called Cloverleaf Bowl; 
3. Decedent Christopher Ewing was celebrating 
his 21st birthday on that date; 
4. Prior to going to Cloverleaf Bowl, decedent 
and friends left decedent's parents' house 
for defendant Cloverleaf Bowl to celebrate 
decedent's birthday; 
5. Decedent with others arrived at the Cloverleaf 
Bowl sometime between 8:30p.m. and 9:00p.m. 
on April 13, 1971; 
6. There were two bars in the Cloverleaf Bowl. 
One was a large cocktail lounge and the other 
a service bar near the bowling lanes; 
7. Defendant's bartender had eleven and one-half 
years experience as a bartender; 
8. When decedent arrived at the bar, defendant 
bartender requested identification and upon 
discovering that was decedent's birthday, 
gave decedent a vodka collins on the house. 
Decedent allegedly said, "I'm 21 and I'm not 
even drunk.n A friend stated, "I'll give you 
something that will make you drunk" and at that 
point such friend requested the defendant's 
bartender to give decedent the strongest drink 
in the house; 
9. The drink was 151 proof rum. Most other 
liquors served at the bar were either 86 proof 
or 100 proof; 
10. It was necessary for the bartender to leave 
the service bar and go to the larger bar in 




11. The bartender served decedent a shot glass of 
straight rum (151 proof). The glasses 
which the rum was served are marked with a 
wh e line indicating 7/8 of an ounce. The 
bartender lled such glass to the brim. 
Before decedent consumed the liquor, he was 
warned by a nd that was a very strong 
drink. In spite of such warning, decedent 
consumed the ll shot immediately. After 
the third round, defendant's bartender warned 
decedent to "take it easy on this stuff, it's 
going to catch up with you and knock you for 
a loop." 
12. Decedent was also warned by his female com-
panion and decedent replied, "I'll be alright." 
13. Decedent was served four additional shots of 
rum (seven thus far) and was manifesting glassy 
eyes and slurred speech and redness of face. 
Again, decedent was warned by his female com-
panion and decedent stated, "I'll be alright." 
14. When decedent returned to the bar, he was 
again served three more glasses of rum. 
15. The bartender was required to remove the bottle 
of rum from the shelf each time he poured 
decedent a drink. 
16. At 10:00 p.m., decedent's older brother and 
such brother's wi arrived at the defendant bar 
and saw the cond ion of decedent. Decedent 
requested an additional drink for himself and 
his brother. However, his brother interrupted 
and stated that decedent had had enough, walked 
decedent to a table where decedent passed out. 
17. Decedent's brother and friend dragged him from 
defendant establishment, and broupht him to the 
home of his mother and stepfather. The following 
morning his mother discovered decedent dead. 
18. At the time of autopsy, a physician, Dr. Allen 
MeN , sampled the decedent's blood and found 
it to have a blood alcohol content of .47 percent. 
According to said doctor, at .20 percent a casual 
observer will be able to detect signs that a 
person is drunk. Between .30 and .40 percent, 
a person will begin to become comatose and the 
level of the blood alcohol exceeds .42 percent, 
the person will die as a result of paralysis of 
the centers of the brain controlling heart rhythm 
and respiration. The analysis of decedent's 
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blood indicated that his blood alcohol was 
.47 percent, and that decedent died of acute 
<~ I ('oho -, poi ~;on i np. 
19. Taking into account the decedent's weight, 
the amount of food he had eaten, and other 
factors, Dr. McNie determined that decedent 
must have drunk 21.6 ounces of 86 proof 
liquor, 18.6 ounces of 100 proof liquor, or 
11.2 ounces of 151 proof liquor. 
Issues ln the Trial Court: 
In order for the non-suit to be sustained, the trial 
court may grant such motion only if the plaintiff's evidence would 
not support a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor. In making its 
determination, the Court must view plaintiff's evidence in its 
most favorable light insofar as plaintiff's case is concerned, 
and must view defendant's representative's conduct as unfavorably 
as the evidence will permit. 
Since willful misconduct is alleged, that term must 
be defined. The Court stated that willful misconduct "implies 
the intentional doing of something either with knowledge, express 
or implied, that serious injury is a probable, as distinguished 
from a possible, result, or the intentional doing of an act with 
a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences." (Ewing, 
supra. p. 402.) 
"If conduct is sufficiently lacking in consideration 
for the rights of others, reckless, heedless to an extreme, and 
indifferent to the consequences it may impose, then, regardless 
of the actual state of the mind of the actor and his actual concern 
for the rights of others, we call it willful misconduct . " 
(Ewing, supra. p. 402.) 
In Vlew of the foregoing, the Court concluded: 
l. The bartender plainly acted intentionally 
in serving the liquor to decedent; 
2. The bartender knew the significance of 
the differences in proof. He knew the 
specific drink he was serving, and probably 
knew that the decedent was an inexperienced 
drinker; 
3. The bartender knew that decedent intended 
to get drunk and that decedent probably 
did not fully comprehend the implication 
of the high potency liquor he was drinking. 
78-241 
PAGE 5 
The bartender ld have concluded that 
decedent might consume an amount of liquor 
hazardous to his health. 
4. The bartender acted in violation of two 
rules of ice at defendant's bar and 
continued to serve decedent after he was 
manifestly intoxicated. In view of this, 
the bartender acted intentionally, aware 
of the health hazard created by decedent. 
The Court then analyzed the conduct of decedent. The 
decedent intended to get drunk, but he did not intend to consume 
a fatal overdose of alcohol. Although a prudent man may have 
inquired into the consequences of differences of proof, decedent's 
failure to do so did not rise to the level of recklessness. 
In summary, the reasonable jury could conclude that 
the decedent was merely negligent. Thus, if the plaintiffs were 
to establish willful misconduct by the defendant, contributory 
negligence would not be a bar unless the decedent assumed the risk 
of alcohol poisoning. The Court concluded that decedent did not 
assume the risk of acute alcohol poisoning. 
The Court concluded "even assuming the negligence of 
the young patron, a jury could very well find willful misconduct 
on the part of the bartender; such conduct would remove the bar 
of contributory ne igence. A jury could also very well conclude 
that, wh e contributorily negligent, the youthful patron did not 
assume the risk of acute alcohol poisoning, the risk of his own 
death." (Ewing, supra. p. 407.) 
Discussion: 
The Court discussed the former law with regard to 
the liability of bartenders for injuries caused by the sale of 
liquor to intoxicated customers. As the Court points out, this 
was not treated as a question of fact; rather, under the doctrine 
of Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 345, bartenders were not liable 
as a matter of law since the decisions maintained as a matter of 
law consumption of alcoholic beverages and not the provision was 
the proximate cause of an injury to an intoXICated customer or 
to third parties who are injured by intoxicated customers. The 
Court pointed out that in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 153, 
"under the . . princ les of proximate cause, is clear that 
the furnish of an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person 
e cause of injuries . 11 The Court explained 
how liability could be found under various theories. "In Vesely, 
which carne before us on the pleadings, we held , if defendant 
had violated Business and Professions Code Section 25602, which 
classifies as a misdemeanor the sale of alcoholic beverages to 
'any obviously intoxicated person', plaintiff, under Evidence Code 
Section 669, could rely upon Section 25602 as the source of 
defendant's duty of care." (Ewing, supra. p. 400.) 
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(Aside: Evidence Code Section 669 provides for the 
establishment of a presumption of negligence if the conditions 
set forth in the statute are established. As stated in the 
statute, the presumption is that a person failed to exercise due 
care. The conditions are: 
1. Violation of a statute or other regulation 
of a public entity; 
2. Such violation proximately caused the 
lnJury; 
3. Such injury was a result of an occurrence 
the statute or regulation was designed 
to prevent; 
4. The injured person was one of a class of 
persons for whose protection the statute 
or regulation was adopted. 
The Court stated that in Vesely liability was imposed 
on a basis of Ev ence Code Section 669 and Business and Professions 
Code Section 25602, that is, violation of an applicable statute. 
However, the Court points out that they did not intend to limit 
liability to a violation of a statute and there was no bar to civil 
liability under modern negligence law. The Court held "that Vesely 
and Bernhard govern regardless of whether a third party injured by 
an intoxlcated customer or a customer himself sues a bartender: 
the bartender's liability in both circumstances depends upon the 
application of the principle that an individual is liable for 
foreseeable injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable 
care. As we noted at the outset, the application of this principle 
turns on the facts of each case." (Ewing, supra. pp. 400-401.) 
The Bernhard case to which the Court refers is 
Bernhard v. flarrah 1 s Club (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 313. 
Because the pleadings in the case alleged willful 
misconduct, the Court was required to define willful misconduct. 
(See page 402 of the opinion.) The Court also discussed assumption 
of risk and stated that "to determine whether there is a 'voluntary 
acceptance of the risk', we must identify the specific 'danger 
involved', and judge the individual's 'knowledge and appreciation' 
of that danger . . Before the doctrine is applicable, the victim 
must have not only general knowledge of a danger, but must have 
knowledge of the particular danger, that is, knowledge of the 
magnitude of the risk involved . . Under ordinary circumstances 
the plaintiff will not be taken to assume any risk of either 






The Court in Ewing disapproved of three other 
appellate court decisions insofar as they were in conflict with 
the decision in Ewing. On page 401, footnote 8, the Court states 
"two courts have declared, even after Vesely, that the drinking 
of alcoholic beverages and not the servlng lS the proximate cause 
of any injury that results to the drinker from his own intoxica-
tion . " (Citing Rose v. International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers [1976] 58 Cal. App. 3d 276, 279; accord, Cooper v. Natlonal 
Railroad Passenger Corp. [1975] 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 393.) To the 
extent that the decisions in Rose and Cooper rest on the obsolete 
proximate cause fiction, we diSaPprove of them. We also disapprove 
of Kindt v. Kauffman (1976) 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, insofar as dicta 
in the maJorlty oplnion in that case (citations omitted) suggest 
that bartenders ewe no duty of care to their patrons." 
Therefore, the state of the law after Ewing appears 
to be that the liability of the bartender or the owner of the 
drinking establishment can be established under general negligence 
principles or pursuant to negligence per se for violation of 25602 
of the Business and Professions Code. Using negligence per se, 
there is a presumption that arises once the elements of Evidence 
Code Section 669 are established. That presumption is a presumption 
affecting the burden of proof and therefore imposes upon the defen-
dant the burden of proof as to the non-existence of the presumed 
fact. (See Evidence Code Section 606.) However, under ordinary 
negligence, the plaintiff still has the burden of proof to show 
the duty, the breach of the duty, actual cause, proximate cause, 
and injuries or damages . 
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VESELY v. SAGER (1971) 5 C. 3d 153 
Plaintiff: Miles A. Vesely 
Defendants: William A. Sager and William A. Sager doing 
business as the Buckhorn Lodge; 
James G. O'Connell, and Earl Dirks 
(Note: The only defendants involved in the 
appeal are William A. Sager and William A. Sager 
doing business as the Buckhorn Lodge.) 
Whether civil liability may be imposed upon a vendor 
of alcoholic beverages for providing alcoholic drinks to a customer 
who, as a result of intoxication, injures a third person? 
Proceed ln the Trial Court: 
Plaintiff's complaint alleged: 
1. Defendant Sager's ownership and operation 
of Buckhorn Lodge; 
2. The location of the Lodge near the top of 
Mount Baldy ln San Bernardino County; 
3. The serving of defendant O'Connell by 
defendant Sager of alcoholic beverages 
in large amounts; 
4. The knowledge of defendant Sager that 
defendant O'Connell was becoming excessively 
intoxicated; 
5. Knowledge by Sager that defendant O'Connell 
was incapable of exercising volitional 
control over his consumption of alcoholic 
beverages in the same manner as an average 
reasonable person; 
6. Sager's knowledge that the only route 
leaving the Buckhorn Lodge was a steep, 
winding narrow road that defendant O'Connell 





7. With such knowledge, defendant Sager 
continued serving defendant O'Connell 
alcoholic beverages past the normal closing 
time of 2:00a.m. until 5:15a.m.; 
8. After leav g the Lodge, defendant O'Connell 
drove down the road, veered into the opposite 
lane and struck plaintiff's vehicle. 
To this complaint, defendant Sager demurred on the 
ground "the seller of intoxicating liquor is not liable for 
injuries resulting from intoxication of a buyer thereof." The 
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and 
granted defendant's motion to strike and dismiss the complaint as 
to defendant Sager. The plaintiff appealed stating that the appeal 
was from the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend 
and the order granting the motion to strike. As the Court points 
out, both of these are not appealable orders. Subsequent to the 
notice of appeal, the court entered an order dismissing the 
act as to defendant Sager. The Supreme Court treated the notice 
of appeal as applying to the order dismissing the action. 
Facts: 
l. Date and time -- approximately 10:00 p.m. 
on April 8, 1968, until 5:15 a.m. on April 9, 
1968; 
2. Location -- the accident occurred on a windy, 
mountain road leading from the top of Mount 
Baldy San Bernardino County; 
3. Defendant Sager served defendant O'Connell 
large quantities of alcoholic beverages; 
4. Sager's knowledge: 
a. Defendant O'Connell was becoming 
excessively intoxicated; 
b. O'Connell was incapable of exercising 
volitional control over his consumption 
of intoxicants as an average reasonable 
person; 
5. 0 1 Connell drove dow~ the road leading from 
the Buckhorn Lodge and after veering into 
the opposite lane, struck plaintiff's 
vehicle; 
6. Plaintiff was injured. 
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Conclusions of the Court: 
" . The traditional common law rule would deny 
recovery on the ground that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages 
is not the proximate cause of the injury suffered by a third 
person. We have determined that this rule is patently unsound 
and that civil liability results when a vendor who furnishes 
alcoholic beverages to a customer in violation of Business and 
Professions Code Section 25602 and each of the conditions set 
forth in Evidence Code Section 669(a) is established.'' (Vesely 
v. Sager (1971) 5 C. 3d 153-157.) 
Discussion: 
The Court pointed out that the rationale for the 
common law rule denying recovery was that the consumption and not 
the provirling of liquor was the proximate cause of the injury 
~;u;:;tained a~; a result of intoxication. The rationale was based 
upon what was determineci to be the obvious fact that one cannot 
be intoxicated by reason of liquor furnished if he does not drink 
it. 
The Court pointed out that the common law rule has 
been substantially abrogated in many states by statutes which 
specifically impose civil liability on the furnisher of intoxi-
cating liquor. The Court reviewed the case law of California 
relative to historical treatment of this matter, looked at other 
jurisdictions and stated "a substantial number, if not a majority, 
have decided that the sale of alcoholic beverages may be the 
proximate cause of such injuries and that liability may be imposed 
upon the vendor in favor of the injured third person.'' (Vesely 
v. Sager, supra. p. 161.) The Court cited a New Jersey Supreme 
Court case where it was stated, "where a tavern keeper sells 
alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly intoxicated or a 
person he knows or should know from the circumstances to be a 
minor, he ought to recognize and foresee the unreasonable risk of 
harm to others throup,h action of the intoxicated person or the 
minor." (Ve~;e , suprc1. pp. 167-163.) 
Looking at the matter in terms of negligence principles 
and conce s of proximate cause, the Court stated "insofar as 
proximate cause is concerned, we find no basis for a distinction 
ed solely on the fact that the consumption of an alcoholic 
beverage is a voluntary act of the consumer and is a link in the 
chain of causation from the furnishing of the beverage to the 
injury resulting from intoxication. Under the above principles 
of proximate cause, it is clear that the furnishing of an alcoholic 
beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate cause of 
injur s inflicted by that individual upon a third person. If such 
furnishing is a proximate cause, it is so because the consumption, 
resulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are foreseeable 
intervening causes, or at least the injury-producing conduct is one 
of the hazards which makes such furnishing negligent.'' (Vese 
upra. p. 164.) However, the Court suid that the centr,al question 
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is not one of proximate cause, but rather one of "duty" and whether 
defendant Sager owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or a class 
of persons of which he is a member. The opinion said that duty 
may be found in a legislative enactment which does not provide 
for civil liability. " . In this state a presumption of 
negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was 
enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff 
suffered as a result of the violation of the statute" (Vesely, 
supra. p. 164.)
1 
c ing Evidence Code Section 669 in support of 
the proposition. Looking to Business and Professions Code Section 
25602, the Court found that a duty of care is imposed upon the 
defendant Sager by that section, through Section 23001 stating 
"one of the purposes of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is to 
protect the safety of the people of this state. Moreover, our 
interpretation of Section 25602 finds support in the decisions 
of those jurisd ions in which similar statutes, and statutes 
prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors, have been 
found to have been enacted for the purpose of protecting members of 
the general publ against injuries resulting from intoxication." 
(Vese , supra. p. 165.) 
Lastly, the Court discussed an issue concerning a motion 
to str scussion of that issue is omitted since it is not 
pertinent. Ultimate the Court found liability on the basis of 
ne lgence per se through Evidence Code Section 669 and Business 
and ssions Code Section 25602. The finding related to a vendor's 
liability to a person injured as a result of the intoxication 
of a customer. The Court found proximate cause because the consump-
tion, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are 
seeable ervening causes. 
Duty of care and standard conduct required of a 
reasonable man were in Business and Professions Code section 
25602. 
Since the issues were not before the Court, the members 
decl ed to determine whether a noncommercial furnisher of alcoholic 
beverages (i.e., social host) may be subject to civil liability or 
whether the customer served in violation of Business and Professions 
Code Section 25602 may recover for injuries. 
As of this case, the state of the law was that a 
commercial furnisher of alcoholic beverages could be civilly 
liable to a third person under the doctrine of negligence per se. 
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HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS 
OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 
torically, no was allowed against federal or state 
governments without consent (Cohens v. Virginia, 50 U. S. 
386, 389 [1821] ). This rule was based on the English common law 
precept that "the kind can do no wrong" (Prosser, Law of Torts, 
[1971] 4th Ed., at 971). This precept turn was based on the 
metaphysical notion that kind was the fountain and head of 
jus e and equity could not presume him to be defective in either. 1 
The divine right of kings' rationale was obviously outmoded 
when the colonies formed a union to be governed by and for the 
people, reassessment of the rule came slowly. It was not until 
1946 t the federal government eliminated the general rule of 
governmental immunity by enacting the Federal Government Tort Claims 
2 Act. 
In Cal was first scrutinized when in 1961 
cour-ts dec Muskopf v. Corning Hospital, (1961) 55 Cal.2d 
21 ision sta what was then probably a growing view 
of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, 
wi rational bas , and has existed only by the force of 
inertia" (Id. at 216). 
v. Attorney , (1668) Hadres 465, 468, 145 Eng. 
Dyson v. Attorney General, (1912) 1 K.B. 410, 415. 
2~8 u.s.c.A. Sections 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 
2411, 2 12, 2671-2680. 
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The California Legislature in 1963 enacted the California 
Tort Claims Act (see, Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, §1). That Act 
cuts from the immunity rule seven bases for liability: 1) liability 
for torts of employees (Calif. Government Code §815.2); 2) liability 
for acts of independent contractors (Calif. Government Code §815.4); 
3) liability for breach of mandatory duty (Calif. Government Code 
§815.6); 4) liability for dangerous conditions of public property 
(Calif. Government Code ~835); 5) liability for negligent operation 
of motor vehicles (Calif. Vehicle Code ~17001); 6) liability for 
creation or maintenance of a nuisance (Civil Code ~3479, and 
7) liability for taking or damaging private property for public 
use (Art. I, Al9, California Constitution). 
The enactment of the California Tort Claims Act, however, 
did not end the debate of immunity versus liability or, even if it 
were agreed that liability should exist, the scope of that liability 
remains in dispute. 3 Those in favor of immunity argue that govern-
mental funding and decision making needs protection and they add 
that with the passing of Proposition 13, there is even greater need 
to protect government's limited resources. 4 Those against immunity 
and in favor of government liability advocate the need for deterrence 
3 G. Schwartz, "Report to the California Commission on Tort 
Reform," (unpublished paper on file with the Joint Committee on 
Tort Liability office). 
4Joint Committee on Tort Liability, "Government Liability 
Transcript of Hearing," October 31, 1977; Advisory Committee on 
Government Liability "Minutes and Materials from July 31, 1978, 





Thus, from a philosophical standpoint, controversy can 
be characterized as a question of who should bear the burden for 
injuries caused by a governmental entity and, if it is decided 
the government should, then the question becomes one of the scope 
of that burden. 
What follows is an attempt to find an answer to the question 
through analyses of the presently available risk management pro-
cedures, the existing substantive rules of liability and immunity 
and also the existing procedural rules, the damages available, 
problems arising when multiple parties are involved, and 
finally, the funding available to the governmental entities to 
compensate for government tort losses. 
II 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
A. Definition. Risk management may be defined as the 
logical and deliberate analysis of exposure to risk in order to 
identify those sks of operations, and to reduce the following to 
e , d ish and manage those risks: 1) risk avoidance; 
2 risk transfer; 3) loss prevention; 4) loss management, and 
5) risk funding. 
B. Standards. Presently, there are several entities and 
private agencies which have risk management programs. These 
agencies have formed the Public Agency Risk Managers Association. 
The Joint Committee on Tort Liability requests authorization to 
ask these entities and agencies to present model standards for 
risk management for development and implementation by the public 
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It is the opinion of the staff of the Joint Committee on 
Tort Liability that no such program should be mandated because of 
the limitation of public financial resources due to Proposition 13. 
C. Effective Implementation of a Risk Management Program. 
Instead of mandating any risk manqgement program, the staff of the 
Joint Committee feels that implementation of such a system should 
be entirely optional. However, to encourage the implementation 
of such a program, it is suggested that the following procedural 
benefits be given. Under Government Code Section 946.6, in order 
to file a late claim, a plaintiff must not only show due diligence 
in pursuit of the claim but also must show prejudice on the govern-
mental entity. It is the recommendation of the Committee staff 
that those entities that adopt a risk management program be entitled 
to the late claims statute as it is exists in current law. For 
those entities which do not implement a risk management program, 
a claims statute based merely on the showing of prejudice to the 
entity, and not due diligence on the part of plaintiff, should be 
required. Case authority in California requires only substantial 
compliance with the claims procedure. It is suggested that strict 
iance be required where a risk management program is ongoing, 
and merely substantial compliance where there is no such program. 
The reason supporting such benefits with regard to a risk 
management program is that such a program provides early notice 
of an accident. If a risk management program involves prevention 
as well as control of the loss, the link between the risk manage-
ment program and the claims statute is obvious. 
• 
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D. Reporting Requirements. Under Government Code Section 
6663 and Insurance Code Sections 12389 and 12958, the local govern-
ment section of the insurance commissioners office shall collect 
loss data from insurers of public entities and each insurer shall 
report the following information: 
l. The total number of insureds written during the 
immediately preceding calendar year; 
2. The total amount of premiums received from insureds, 
both written and earned, during the immediately preceding calendar 
year; 
3. The number of claims reported to the insurer for the 
first time, separately by the year the claim occurred, and the 
number of claims reported closed during the previous calendar year 
which were reopened separately by the year claim occurred; 
4. The total number of claims outstanding, together 
with the monetary amount reserved for loss and allocated loss ex-
pense, the annual statement as of December 31 of the calendar 
next preceding, separately stated by the year the claim 
occurred; 
5. (a) The number of claims closed with payment to the 
claimant during the calendar year next preceding, to be reported by 
the year the claim occurred; 
(b) The total monetary amount paid thereon, reported 
by the year claim occurred, and 
(c) The total allocated loss expense paid therein, 
reported by the year the claim occurred; 
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6. The monetary amount paid on claims during the calen-
dar year next preceding, to be reported separately by the year the 
claim occurred, with allocated loss expense paid to be reported 
separately by the year the claim occurred; 
7. The number of claims closed without payment to the 
claimant during the calendar year next preceding, by the year the 
claim occurred, and the allocated loss expense paid thereon separ-
ately by the year the claim occurred; 
8. The monetary amount reserved in the annual state-
ment for the calendar year next preceding on claims incurred but 
not reported to the insurer; 
9. The number of lawsuits filed against the insureds 
during the calendar year next preceding, to be separately reported 
by the year the claim occurred; 
10. A distribution by size of payment from those claims 
closed during the calendar year next preceding, showing the number 
claims and total amount paid for each monetary category as 
determined by the Commissioner. 
A check with the Commissioner's office reveals that these 
reports are on file as of July 1 of each year. However, they are 
merely available for perusal in the office and not for copying 
(except at a cost of $1.00 per page). There are approximately 1,000 
insurers of public entities. 
These reporting requirements do not apply to self-insured 
enti s. 
The most significant impact of a reporting system is 





and thus hopefully inducing the entities to remove these dangers. 
Under the present reporting system, there is no indication of the 
kind of dangers. Therefore, it is recommended by the staff of the 
Joint Committee that paragraph number 11 be added to Section 6663, 
as follows: 
(11) The kind of loss occurring--workers' compen-
sation, automobile liability, and a general liability, 
personal injury, or property damage. The frequency 
of loss in each of these categories should be reported. 
It is also staff's opinion that this section be extended to include 
self-insured entities. In this way the reporting system should more 
adequately serve the significant preventative function. 
III 
SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY 
A. Discretionary Immunity. 
1. Existing Law. Government Code Section 820.2 provides 
that a public employee not liable for an injury resulting from 
s act or omission where the act or omission was the result of 
the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such 
scretion be abused • 
As explained in Litman v. Brisbane Elementary School 
Distr (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, the purposes of such immunity are 
to prevent officials from having their decisions subjected to the 
second-guessing of a jury and to avoid diminishing their zeal in 
the performance of their functions. Discretionary immunity is not 
a favored concept in that courts generally dislike immunity and 
favor 1 ity. To determine what are discretionary versus mini-
ster , the courts often make ad hoc decisions which are 
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disadvantageous to the governmental entity. 5 For example, the 
police decision to stop a car is discretionary. However, the 
policeman's conduct in making the stop is ministerial. Such dis-
tinctions are more subtle than obvious. 
The staff of the Joint Committee believes it would be 
difficult to legislatively categorize all of the situations in 
which an act could be discretionary rather than ministerial. It 
is staff's recommendation that the Legislature show its intent 
concerning Government Code Section 820.2 by including within the 
comments to that section that the burden of proof should be placed 
upon the plaintiff to show that the government entity was not 
immune if discretionary immunity is raised as a defense. 
that: 
B. Design Immunity. Government Code Section 830.6 provides 
"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is 
liable . . for an injury caused by the plan or 
design of a construction of, or an improvement 
to, public property where such plan or design has 
been approved in advance of the construction or 
improvement by the legislative body of the public 
entity or by some other body or employee exer-
cising discretionary authority to give such 
approval or where such plan or design is prepared 
in conformity with standards previously so 
approved . " 
This is the administrative law test, i.e., if there is a rational 
basis for the design, and there is authority to adopt such design, 
there shall be no liability. Subsequent to the enactment of this 
section, case law carved out several exceptions. In Baldwin v. 
5see, Advisory Committee on Government Liability "Minutes 
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of the dangerous condition, the government entity may not have the 
resources to redesign and reconstruct the condition. Furthermore, 
there may be cases, such as the Golden Gate Bridge, where the 
entity knows of a dangerous condition and an entity knows and may 
have the money to change the design, but it is not feasible to 
correct. 
C. Dangerous Conditions of Public Property. An entity may 
be liable for dangerous conditions of public property or adjacent 
property which create a substantial risk of injury, when the 
property is used with due care and in a foreseeable manner, if the 
condition proximately caused the injury and created a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm (Government Code Sections 830 and 835). 
It is generally felt that liability for dangerous conditions 
is an important deterrent function to make public property safe. 
However, much of the concern with the liability in this area stems 
from the problem of constructive notice, i.e., notice which imputes 
to the entity based upon a showing of circumstantial facts. Govern-
ment Code Section 835.2(b) provides a public entity has construc-
tive notjce of a dangerous condition if plaintiff establishes the 
condition was obvious and existed for a period of time. 
Staff recommends that constructive notice be eliminated as 
a basis for liability under the dangerous condition of public property 
liability. 
In addition to the practical problem and cost of inspection, 
there are many circumstances where a government entity has no way 
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E. Nuisance Liability. Civil Code Section 3479 defines a 
nuisance as anything which is injurious to health or is indecent 
or offensive or an obstruction to the free use of property so as 
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property or 
unlawfully obstructing the free passage or use in the customary 
manner of any navigable lake or river, bay, stream, canal or basin 
or any public park, square, street or highway. 
In Phillips v. Pasadena, (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, and in Granone 
v. Los Angeles County, (1965) 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, it was held 
that a municipality may be held liable for creating and maintaining 
a nuisance notwithstanding the fact that governmental activity is 
involved. Thus, both before and after the enactment of the Govern-
ment 1brt Claims Act, public entities have been liable for creating 
a nuisance. This was not a problem until Nestle v. City of Santa 
Monica, (1973) 6 Cal.3d 920, which involved injuries alleged to have 
been suffered by the plaintiffs by virtue of defendant's operation 
of an airport near plaintiffs' property. The problem was not so 
much that there was liability for nuisance, but it seemed the 
opinion held that even though there was immunity for a design or 
plan, there could still be liability on the basis of another statu-
tory section. It would appear that where there are overlapping 
liabilities and immunities, liability prevails. 
Therefore, it is staff's recommendation that nuisance liability 
be retained, but that where there are overlappmg theories of lia-
bility and immunity, a dominant purpose test be applied. In other 
words, after analyzing the facts and the theories of immunity and 
liability, the theory that predominates should prevail. 
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that a ic is not 1 le for jury caused by 
to make an or reason of making an inadequate 
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river height forecasts did not come within the immunity provided 
by Section 818.8. 
According to the legislative committee comment, the mis-
representation immunity was that public entities should be provided 
with an absolute immunity from li~bility for negligent or inten-
tional misrepresentation with no limitation that it be required 
to be in financial matters versus other areas. 
It is the recommendation of the staff of the Joint Committee 
on Tort Liability that Section 818.8 be reenacted with the stated 
intent that the holdings in the Johnson and Connelly decisions are 
to be nullified. 
IV 
CLAIMS STATUTES 
Under existing law, a plaintiff must file a claim with the 
public entity within 100 days from the date of injury. Failure 
to do so may bar the claim unless plaintiff can show due dili-
gence and no prejudice to the public entity. The denial of a claim 
must come within 45 days from the filing of the claim and if no 
formal denial, it is deemed denied. Denial is a condition prece-
dent to filing suit (see, Government Code Sections 905, 910, 911.6, 
915 and 945.6). 
It is staff's recommendation that the Claims Statute be 
retained, but that it be modified as described above. Furthermore, 
staff recommends that the benefit of the Claims Statute and risk 
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the state; 
2. Upon determination of the seismic risk areas, the 
state geologist shall notify all entities wholly or partially 
located within seismic risk areas that they are so located; 
3. Local government wholly or partially within seismic 
risk areas would be immune from liability at the time of notice 
and would retain immunity upon satisfaction of the following 
conditions: 
a. Within a period of time commensurate with the 
size of the entity, inspect all publicly owned properties to ascer-
tain if such property constitutes a potential hazard to life or 
other property in the event of a moderate earthquake; 
b. Within one year of completion of the inspection 
described above, adopt a plan and establish a time period for 
mitigation of the hazards discovered; 
c. Reasonably comply with the inspection, plan 
formulation and plan execution. 
If liability should be found against a public entity 
for damages arising from adjacent private property, such liability 
would be limited to the percent of fault of the public entity. 
B. Dangerous Conditions of Private Property. In order 
to encourage voluntary rehabilitation of those buildings constructed 
prior to practical earthquake standards, local entities should be 
authorized to adopt structural earthquake life-safety standards 
less rigorous than applicable building code. The object of the 
legislation is to promote life safety rather than minimize property 
I 
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damage. The local entity would immune from 1 ity for any 
of any kind allegedly caused by the adoption and/or enforce-
ment of such legislation. This legislation is to assure that 
' does not create liabil 
Actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition of 
private property cannot be a basis liability for any damage 
caused by an earthquake unless: 
1. The entity failed to comply with a mandatory duty, 
assuming all other elements a cause of action are satisfied; or 
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C. Immunity for Earthquake Prediction or Warning. Legis-
should be adopted immunizing any public entity, having a 
s f population and acceptable seismic activity prediction 
capacity, from any liability which might arise as a result of any 
earthquake or ; acts or omissions in inspection 
or fact gathering; evaluation or any other activity done for the 
purpose of predicting or warning. 
would be immunized from liability for prediction 
or warning in the same manner as provided in Government Code 
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Sections 8550, et. seq., and Civil Code Section 1714.5. 
D. Other. Staff recommends that the Attorney General be 
requested to render opinions on 1) whether a local government's 
enactments can impose a mandatory duty upon such entity or other 
entity's within its jurisdictionr and 2) whether information 
received concerning hazards constitutes changed conditions within 
the holding of Baldwin v. State of California, (1972) 6 C.3d 424. 
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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
The Advisory Committee on Government Liability held its 
last meeting in Los Angeles on December 6, 1978. 
I 
ATTENDANCE 
In attendance at the meeting were: 
Robert G. Walters 
County of San Diego 
Roy Pederson 
City of Montebello 
Gordon Baca 
State Dept. of Transportation 
Jerry Roberts 
County of Fresno 
Ben C. Francis 
Public Agency Risk Managers Assn. 
Lloyd C. Fowler 
Santa Clara Valley Water District 
William L. Berry, Jr. 
County Supervisors Assn. of Calif. 
Robert C. Lynch 
L. A. County Counsel Office 
II 
Robert K. Booth, Jr. 
League of California Cities 
Robert S. Thompson, Assoc. Justice 
Court of Appeal 
William C. George, Counsel 
Joint Committee on Tort Liability 
Marie Gibson Myll 
Citizen, Long Beach 
Michael M. Berger 
Radems, Berger & Norton 
Richard Pucci 
City of Temple City 
Gordon R. Lindeen 
Rancho Simi Recreation and 
Park District 
OPENING COMMENTS 
Justice Robert S. Thompson, Committee Chairman, opened the 
meeting with a general statement of the purpose of the meeting to 
include all relevant topics and exclude the irrelevant ones. For 
this purpose, an outline for discussion was presented. The agenda 
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BACA: Mr. Baca disagrees with the purpose of liability as a 
deterrent. He uses the Ford Pinto case. as an example. He feels, 
further, that the compensatory aspect of liability is speculative 
and mentioned the alternative of a government fund from which 
injured victims could recover. 
THOMPSON: Responding to Mr. Baca's comments, Justice Thompson 
pointed out the problems which arise when a non-government tort-
feasor is involved. 
MYLL: Concerning the discussion of the philosophical bases of 
tort law, Mrs. Myll felt the fo1lowing quote from John Sturat Mills 
was appropriate: 
"Not the violent conflicts between parts of the 
truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it 
is the formidable end; there is always hope when 
people are forced to listen to both sides: it is 
when they tend only to one that error hardens 
into prejudice and truth itself ceases to have 
the effect of truth by being exaggerated into 
falsehood." 
A discussion of the government orientation of the Advisory 
Committee ensued. Some members felt this was planned. However, 
it was pointed out that any weighting of the Committee in favor 
of government was unintentional. 
BERRY: Mr. Berry was confused as to the purpose of the Advisory 
Committee. 
GEORGE: Committee Counsel, Bill George, explained that the purpose 
of the Advisory Committee w&s to obtain practical alternatives 
to resolve problem areas in government liability. He explained 
that since each member has his own representation with a disparate 
interest that no consensus should be reached. On the government 
• 
7 - 71 
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s of l 3 on the lity government 
to re considered. On the victim's s 
the need s injuries should be considered. 
of the cons made by the Advisory Committee, 
the on Tort lity will be more a position 













The following definition of risk manage-
members: 
of sk 
analysis of exposure to 
se risks of operations, 
s ines to eliminate, 
1) sk avoidance; 
prevention; 4) loss manage-
included the follow-
of risk management encompasses 
ludes claims management. 
agrees that the above def ion is a good classical and 
one. He also corr~ented that such practice is also called 
" that s latter term is not as comprehen-
sive as sk programs. 
s Is part of sk management? 
ROBERTS & FRANC S: Both would include in risk manage-
c: . 
.~.1nanc of loss. 
Pederson is t state control of risk management 
an for negligent operation of a 
sk program would be desi le. 
78-272 
-5-
THOMPSON: Asked if rather than a state-mandated program for risk 
management if a procedural benefit to agencies having such pro-
grams would be satisfactory. 
LINDEEN: At a meeting with an insurer, Mr. Lindeen discovered 
that the insurer was against the use of a risk manager, at least 
in name, since having inspections is another basis for liability 
which can cause an increase in premium rates. 
PEDERSON: Mr. Pederson's insurer encourages risk management. 
BOOTH: A risk manager is a prerequisite to obtaining insurance 
with his insurer. 
THOMPSON: The problem under existing law is that those not having 
inspectors will not be charged with constructive notice, whereas 
those that do can be held for negligence in not preventing the 
injury (See, Morris v. County of Marin; Elson v. P.U.C.). 
BERRY: If the inducement to implementation of a risk management 
program is in the form of a procedural benefit, does this mean 
the state will set the standards for risk management? 
THOMPSON: Yes, but these can be borrowed from standards already 
in use, perhaps from P.A.R.M.A. (Public Agency Risk Managers 
Association) . 
WALTERS: The cities would prefer this approach. 
THOMPSON: Is there an issue of illegal delegation there? 
BERGER: Mr. Berger commented that if the purpose of risk manage-
ment is loss prevention, then risk management should be its own 
benefit. He would disagree with giving additional benefits. 
78-273 
-6-
THOMPSON: Justice Thompson sted the following benefits: use 
of Cali a Claims Statute for late claims for those enti s 
sk management and the New York Claims Statute for those 
not sk management. He feels such legislation would with-
protection challenge on a rational basis test since 
WALTERS: With regard to a state program, Bob Walters felt it was 
le but probab would be more bureaucratic. 
2. Impact of Proposition 13 on Risk Management. There 
has a re to money to hire new. people now in 
order to save money down the l 
PEDERSON: Mr Pederson said that if entities are given state aid 
isk may be an inducement. 
WALTERS: Every dollar you invest would save $8.00. But still he 
not sell the to San Diego county. 
• BERRY: He sa that smaller, rural counties might not be able ---
af s; have to share. In setting standards, 
1 1 ty may have to be considered. 
PUCC He has had a sional risk manager for 30 cities and 
out fair simply. 
THOMPSON the JUA pooling, problems are now solved. 
3. Statutory Reporting Requirements. 
He s are onerous and costly. They should have 
an SB 90 re 
THOMPSON is a tendency to require more in reporting than 
le. One of the problems of loss prevention management 
is a sses to become known in general. 
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PEDERSON: Mr. Pederson anticipates compilation by P.A.R.M.A. 
WALTERS: In the areas of workers' compensation, automobile liabil-
ity, general liability, personal injury and security, there are 
requirements of reporting for the City of San Diego. 
THOMPSON: Can this be standardized? Could this be part of the 
reporting requirements? 
WALTERS: Yes, yes. 
BOOTH: Another model could be that used by R. L. Couts. 
THOMPSON: To serve the purposes of risk management, while preserv-
ing confidentiality, all we need to know is the class frequency, 
i.e., identification of the cause of injury and the number of 
accidents in that group. 
LINDEEN: Clerical expense could be reduced by use of a simplified 
form, especially in view of Proposition 13. 
(Recommendation: Give to P.A.R.M.A. to come up with a plan 
and estimate of cost.) 
WALTERS: On state reporting, Mr. Walters believes that is the first 
step to state control. 
THOMPSON: Could P.A.R.M.A. standards for risk management require 
extra communication regarding loss frequency between entities' 
risk managers? 
WALTERS: This is being done by telephone now. 
MYLL: That's haphazard. 
PEDERSON: Should publicity be a part of risk management programs 
when the entity is so small that statistics won't preserve confi-
dentiality? 
BACA: Gave an 
78-275 
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when pub c 
injury and loss: bicycles with thin 
could prevent 
in drainage 
Cal-Trans is disseminating this information, but is unsure if 
county/city entities got the word. is a need 
nation of loss frequency at modest cost. 
WALTERS: The League of Cities articles are helpful. Another 
advantage of risk management statistics is proof to insurers 
that risk is less than they say, so premiums should be less. 
THOMPSON: Summaris reporting requirements problems: 1) avo 
ance of reporting and onerous expense; 2) should not 
interfere with confidentiality of entity; 3) should serve 
of disseminating information. 
BERRY: He commented that there were two kinds of reporting: 
1) ace and c s: proper subject report 
through P.A.R.M.A., 2) claims losses: the of 
of reporting is for insurance. This is a regulatory kind 
reporting. It come under the wing of the insurance 
commissioner. 
THOMPSON: In government 1 lity, one area ch is 
important as to control on premiums is loss 
the self-insured. He uses this as a basis for showing the manage-
ment deficiency of mutual companies. And he wondered whether 
reporting by self- surers is cost-effective and, if so, should 
others benefit therefrom. 
A suggested further work-up is to prepare standards for 




Tort Cla Act. He stated 
gave rise to 1 was 
acts of 
cy matters. Case 
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is worse than 
out 
WALTERS: From a r standpoint, San Diego is 
to get away from hot pursuit situations. Both Mr. Lynch and 
Mr. Booth disagree. 
BOOTH: He feels there 
between the immuni 
for acts of 
























If it is met, 
litigation 
j won't 
review the dec this area dealt 
with the presence or absence of rational basis. Litigation since 
then has dealt wi continuity of immunity once it attached; 
that is, changed 
the immunity is 
tions. Where there are changed conditions, 
The failure to warn of defect is also 
a basis to abrogate the immunity. The first issue discussed under 
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AMA are a 
For example, a 
a li e 
ide. The 
to every tree is just too onerous to 







an appropriate inquiry 
of Prop. 13, certa government services will cut 
BOOTH: Mr. Booth suggests a limitation on changed conditions 
the assertion of an absolute bar if plaintiff 
misusing the public property. Also, he be 
at fault in 
they should 
expand private design--for example, through lding 
codes for design of private builder s is really discretionary 
and also involves an inverse condemnation situation). 
3. Nuisance Liability: Justice Thompsou asked, 
it a problem? Nuisance liability is defined as a tort. 
There is a Civil Code definition existing. Justice 
stated that general sance liability misuse public 
property to the harm of a third person. The case in 
area is the case of Nest This is an airport case 
Santa Mon It a good inverse condemnation case. He asked 
whether or not nuisance covers personal ury, whereas inverse 
condemnation covers property? It is the understanding Justice 
Thompson that there is a new appellate court case on 
assumption of the ri can be appl by moving to a 
PEDERSON: He s problem of f balls to an 
land owner built subsequent to the golf couxse should be covered 
by assumption of the risk. 
LYNCH: To the extent that liability for nuisance allowed, the 
logical result is to limit or close down the service creating the 














group was sance 1 li is 
versus proprietary, Prop. 13 cause 
more proprietary order to 
that makes s alternative less 
Emergency immunity is particu-
However, also 
test could , "was emergency 
II 













and not a felony 
cases. If an 
But, 
comes to the theory 
cause only 
be considered as the 
statutes which provide 
Mr. 
over 





BOOTH: He is against the concept of gross igence be 
back into the law. He feels this concept is no longer extant. 
5. Dangerous Conditions of Public Property: Justice 
Thompson explained that dangerous condi 
is the basis for liability when it is proper 
the danger is not apparent to the user and the entity has actual 
or constructive notice. 
WALTERS: He gave the example of San Diego where there are 57 
of cliffs. Some of these cliffs are on county property and they 
are inherently dangerous and it is a recognized fact. Since it 
is a natural condition, San Diego will not touch the iffs to 
them safer because they do, they will abrogate the immunity. 
BOOTH: He notes the problem of growth of vegetation. He feels 
this is an unfair burden to be cast on the public entity. The 
second area of liability is for lack of lighting--public parking 
lots are an example. It is also an example of criminal acts. 
The Santa Barbara case held no liability, but there is an L.A. 
airport case going contra. 
THOMPSON: Jus Thompson summarized the cussion of the 
as one involving government responsibility limitation on 
government by Prop. 13. 
BOOTH: He said to look to the notice provision in the dangerous 
condition of public property. By requiring actual notice, 
would eliminate many problems. It would eliminate constructive 
notice and as a trade-off, there could be the requirement of periodic 






scuss regarding a no-fault system ensued. 
~----~~~ case in its infancy now. The mandatory duty 
cases may generate many cases and perhaps an immunity in this 
area appropriate. 
6. OverlapEing Causes of Action: 




specific immunity always yields where there is another 
lity. He bel another test the 
purpose which would put the case law back to where it 
7. Miscellaneous: 
LYNCH: Concerning forecasting, he feels one the scellaneous 
is the Sacramento River case is illustrative of 
the srepresentation-forecasting problem. There is an immunity 
, but none for negligent forecasting. 









1. Claims Statute: 
Commission 
The purpose was 
for the purpose 
they did 
on an employee's part to 
BOOTH: An alternative not mentioned in the outline is to eliminate 
the claims statute. The late claim defense has virtually been wiped 
out the recent Kern County case. If you admit that the purpose 





it would serve a meritorious purpose. However, most entities deny 
claims perfunctorily. He recommends that as part of the claims 
statute contact with the claimant be required. 
WALTERS: He does not feel that 45 days is sufficient time to 
satisfy discovery in a serious case. Thus, many claims are denied 
on that basis. The purpose of the claims statute is the effort 
to make the whole procedure timely. He thinks the statute of 
limitations should go to one year from the date of loss, rather 
than nine months. 
LYNCH: The difference in the 100-day statute is the ability to 
obtain discovery in a timely manner. This is seen in federal cases. 
BOOTH: He suggested the penalty for perfunctorily rejecting claims 
would be a bad faith administration case analogous to the bad 
faith insurance case. 
PUCCI: He does not feel 45 days is enough time to relay to the 
adjuster, get back and settle the claim. 
THOMPSON: If the entity does not act within 45 days, suit can be 
brought. A rejection of the claim is superfluous and an additional 
administrative hassle lengthening the statute. Why not have the 
statute of limitations for one year from date of loss? Usually 
the 100-day period can be waived. His recommendation is thus to 
eliminate rejection as part of the claims statute, the penalty 
merely being that suit is then permissible. The test for 
suit due to a failure to file a timely claim is one of prejudice, 
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t after five days, regardless 




2. Statute of Limitations: The consensus on the 
statute of limitations was one year from the date 
six months from the date of denial usually isn't a problem, 
according to Mr. Baca. 
The 
3. furcation: The consensus was that bifurcation 
is not needed, nor desired. 
ROBERTS: He believes sympathy makes bad case law and doesn t 
understand the reason for not bifurcating. 
BOOTH: He believes bifurcation is too expensive, too time-consuming 
and is a good defense tactic because he has nothing to lose. It 
costs plaintiff lots of money. 
LYNCH: He doesn't believe there is any problem getting bifurcation 
if it is desired under existing law. 
ROBERTS, BOOTH, THOMPSON: They are contra to the last comment by 
Mr. Lynch. They believe that only in cases where are 
defenses bifurcation permitted. 
BACA: He does not believe bifurcation solves the problem. This 
is because plainti will sit through the trial in his wheelchair. 
4. Justice Thompson cost-shi 
as a British concept assessing the costs of trial. The er 
pays witness fees, expert fees and counsel fees according to the 
discretion of the court. The options under this device would be 
1) to retain the current rule, each party bearing their own expense; 
2) adopt the British rule; 3) use the model of AB lXX enacted in 
Civil Code 1362; 4) expense-shifting--parties brought into the 
suit if additional party prevails--this is the Calabresi concept 










deep pocket. The way to add 
the suit would be that plaintiff gets 
defendant thereafter is entitled to 
s liability is found. A defendant under AMA 
sk. The policy is to decrease multiple party 
especi ly now if the Supreme Court reverses 
sion in Jess v. Hermann. A question was posited as 
si method whether costs are t 






OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION AT 
December 6, 1978 MEETING 
OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Purpose._of Meeting -- As at the t meeting, no effort 
will be made to reach consensus or to record votes on 
positions on the items discussed. The purpose is to 
illuminate the options available to the Legislature in 
dealing with perceived problems in the various areas of 
government tort liability. Those will be reported with 
the request that the Joint Committee inform the Advisory 
Committee of those options which should be eliminated and 
those which should be explored further. 
II. Broad Categories of Issues: 
A. Definition of the philosophical basis for 
Governmental liability or immunity. 
B. Risk Management. 
C. Substantive rules of liability and immunity. 
D. Procedural rules. 
E. Damages. 



























of p. asP ·1.ta-
c tute tc ·~ 1 
? 
es th adequate 





speci stant ect 
for le, some on some 
types of 1 to ent es 
effective management)? 
By statutory r t irements: 
i. Are current requirements for 
of c im potentials against govern-
mental entit adequate? 
ii. Requiring only insurance companies 
to report? 
iii. Requiring reports by insurance 
companies to sent or seminated 
to en tit ? 
v. self-insurers to report 
A. Discretionary Immunity: 
1. Is statutory clarification necessary or 
desirable? 
so? 
2. Should the administrative review test (abuse of 
discretion for lack of a rational basis for the 
action) be adopted? 
78-290 4. 
3. d a co t of areas where ere-
t tituted for 
the current case law ca of 11policy11 
dec ions (immune) "ministerial" dec ions 
immune)? 
4. Should former 1" vs. "proprietary" 
dichotomy a i s 
f a t " to which 
disc ret 1 e? 
B. Des Immunity: 
1. d present of immunity be 
? 
1 
the same test as or 
i.e., no 1 
as a rna ter of t 
s il to accom-
des to changed condit ? 
3. return to "governmental-
tary" ect to 
immunity? 






2. Should it 





3. Should "governmental-propr tary" dichotomy 
be applied? 
D. Emergency/Emergency Vehicle Liability: 
1. Retain rules of current case law? 
2. Absolute immunity? 
3. Liability only for gross negligence? 
Ec Liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property: 
F. 
1. Is the current distinction between ity 
for natural and artificial conditions adequate? 
2. Should "minor" modificat in property be 
treated as not changing the "natural" condit 
If so, t is the definition of "minor"? 
es of Action -- where immunity 
to one or more theories of liability but not to 
1. Retention of current case law - no immunity 
if governmental conduct falls within a non-
immune theory? 





3. e" of 
the governmental activity? 
4. Appl of the !-proprietary" 
v. 
A. Statutes: 
1. current law? 
2. ten ? 
3. Lengthen ? ? 
4. test of i to file a 




f a t meet 
es s ? 
B. Statute of 
1. current tute of 1 tions? 
2~ ? ? 
c. of Liabil Phases of Trial: 
1. present rule b ion the exception? 
2. so b e and trial 
0 
, at same time ... 
exceo " :
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D. Cost Shi ing: 
1. Reta present rule winner bears his 
own expenses of litigation except for "costs"? 
2. Adopt British system of shi ing the winner's 
expenses of litigation to the losing party? 
;;......;.....;...;... the historical difference between suits 
against governmental entities and ordinary 
lawsuits. At one time, a bond was required 
as a prelude to suits against the government. 
3. Expense shifting if on pretrial motion the court 
determines that a party's probability of success 
is "X" and the party does not better "X" at trial? 
VI. Damages. 
A. Retain present rules? 
B. Expand for periodic payments? Who 
entitl to undisbursed sum upon the death of the 
recovering plaintiff? 
C. Limit or deny recovery for pain and suffering? 
Combine with expense shifting? 
VII. Joint Liabiliti of Concurrent Tortfeasors: 









only plaintiff not 
of 
rule of joint liability 
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s e ens 
brings 
add party 
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he runs 
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? 
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(70%) of business. 
or loss on'the difference between 
the premit~s they and the claims and expenses they 
("underwriting experience") their gains or losses on the 
components of investment income, in the last three columns, shows 
that their profit position is more by 
ment results than by their straight insuring operations . 
Clearly, as interest rates and stock market performances 
change, so will the return insurers can expect from investing the 
premiums they collect. In economic theory, a good 
or service in a competitive market is the additional cost of 
production created by the last unit of the good or service pro-
duced, i.e., the "marginal cost" of that unit. This assumes 
any additional units would cost more to the firm involved than 
they would bring into the firm in revenue. In the case of 
liability insurance, the marginal cost to an insurer of the 
policy worth is the expected payouts on claims the 
is expected to expenses which are expected to 
arise in administrating those claims. However, since those claims 
are expected to occur sometime after the premium is collected, 
true cost of those claims to the insurer is not the final cost, 
but rather the amount of money that would have to be set as 
at prevail interest rates that, with compound interest, would 
equal the final costs at the time they are expected to occur. This 
is the "present value" of the final costs. 
The difference between the final costs and its present value 
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are wrong: insurance rates do s 
ment income of the ~nsurers. 
profit margins almost never 
ref 
storically, actual underwri 
those by the 
s 
companies and differences are re to investment s i-
ties. There are two simple demonstrations of this. First, the 
longer the "tail" of a given 1 of insurance, the greater time 
to invest the premium, the less underwriting profit, more 
underwriting loss. Underwriting experience to vary 
measures of interest return, with losses going up down 
interest rates. As a simple example of this phenomenon, II 
lists loss ratios for all stock companies next to rates 
(The loss for 90-day treasury lls for the years s 1950. 
ratio of an insurance company is the 
adjustment expenses," or payouts 
associated with 
You will note 





"losses and loss 
the expenses directly 
the year in 
did s 
and 1 s were in 
be more to 
twenties, as 
. ) 
does with other measures of investment return. We are confident 
that more in-depth analyses would show the same trend. ~yn:---6rder to 
collect a greater premium volume and the investment income that 
would result, as interest rates rise insurers are willing to take 
on greater risks with lower rates than they might otherwise use. 
It is interesting to observe how loss ratios increased and 





ars , ined 
t rates the 
rates e by-product 
Carter's recent po t rates will be 
surance rates and r ses we would 
return 
are wrong. critics 
rates can 
ss- tment 
some rates The 
rates be 
a 
rea sue of an 
a 
rate of return on investment? 
are usual j the rate 
The .s. Court 
rate of return standard: 
return 
corre 




Natural Gas Co., 
320 u.s. 591, 603 [1944]) 
• 
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The ifornia Department of Insurance does not set rates, 
but it is charged with considering the adequacy or excess s 
of rates. Our Insurance Department does not use any explicit 
rate of return criterion in judging rate legitimacy; , under-
writing losses may accepted as justification of large rate 
increases when an examination of the total profitability of a line 
shows it to be doing quite well. 
With the rate of return standard in mind, most the major 
issues in the traditional investment income controversy fall away. 
Does investment income "belong" to the policyholder or the 
company" Which part of investment income is from reserves; 
unearned premiums, or from the policyholder's surplus? These 
issues are meaningless when the real issue is seen as rate 
return, not redistribution of funds. The industry claims that 
investment income is not so great that inclusion would allow rate 
reductions. If so, then only with a clear rate of return analysis 
would any critic be convinced of it. Are mutuals outside the 
argument? No--by filling up the surplus, a mutual could still 
have excessive rates without its policyholders ever seeing the 
excess. 
But some problems do not disappear, and here is where we 
get into the issue of method. First, why punish the companies 
with better than average portfolio returns by using the actual asset 
investment performance of each company. Not only would it be 
unfair, but why should companies bother to improve their portfolio 
performance if none of the return accrues to them? These are the 
most volatile and unpredictable parts of the insurance bus 
78-303 
shows how these made up the of both the gains 
ses the companies in recent years. The industry 
the years 1973 and 1974, yet it is clear that 
of ir total losses was the result of 
market blunders (see, Forbes, April 15, 1976, 






reflected in rates. Final , how can any insur-
more a us in-depth 
? 
In recent years, of applying return on 
to 
to a 1 
have been produced (see Bibliography) . 
the Massachusetts Insurance Commis-





state's rating others, 
asset pric 1" whi has become 
s s in the last ten years. This 
s over the incomes individual 
a 
le assets ri 
insurance company 
federal bonds. 
the stock market would demand from that 
the actual "tails" of each line, 
underwr and rate each one would 
Most companies would do better than this hypo-
investing riskier investments that could be 




\<JOuld not suf 
themselves to blame 
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Under our wishfully named "open competition" system, actual 
rates which grossly and inexplicably deviate either above or below 
the calculated rates, would be considered more fully by the Insur-
ance Department. If the rates still appear unjustified, the 
Department could exercise its legal option of declaring the rates 
inadequate or excessive. 
The necessary changes in California law would be a simple 
matter. Chapter 8, Article 2, of the California Insurance Code 
"Making and Use of Rates," sets standards for the rating practices 
of casualty and liability insurers. The relevant part is Section 
1852(b) which begins: 
"Consideration shall be given [in ratemaking] to the 
extent applicable, to past and prospective loss 
experience within and outside this state, to conflaga-
ration and catastrophic hazards, to a reasonable 
margin for underwriting profit and contingencies ... " 
The term "underwriting profit" has been interpreted by some 
courts in other states as including income from investment; such 
an interpretation would serve our purpose. But many courts have 
ruled differently, and the California Insurance Department certainly 
.. 
doesn't interpret that way (see, testimony of Angele Khachadour, 
General Counsel, Department of Insurance, at Insurance Company 
Practices interim hearing, July 22, 1977). The wording is too 
ambiguous in any case. Simply striking the word "underwriting" 
from that sentence might suffice, but it would be better to be 
more specific: 
" .•• to conflagaration and catastrophic hazards, to a 
reasonable return on equity after consideration of under-
writing and investment income and contingenci~~ .•. " 
The practical application of these standards should be left to 
78-305 
Commissioner. 
Much more study is needed in the insurance area. There 
11 more forthcoming in our Series 1979 Report. At that 
t we will offer further conclusions and legislative recommen-
78-306 






ALL u. s. STOCK COMPANIES 
(1) ( 2) (3) ( 4) (5) 
% Return Underwriting Net Realized Unrealized 
on Interest Capital Capital 
Year Net Worth Experience Income Gains Gains 
1976 22.2 855* 3,629* 249* 2,993* 
197 5 19.1 -2,598* 3,143* 127* 3,299* 
1974 -14.9 -1,571* 2,891* -101* -6,040* 
1973 - 2.7 490* 2,491* 429* -4,366* 
1972 22.7 1,190* 2,068* 265* 2,391* 
1971 19.8 928* 1,785* 192* 1,439* 
1970 7.0 104* 1,439* 177* 365* 
1969 - 2.4 164* 1,238* 651* -2,381* 
1968 11.1 32* 1,100* 336* 842* 
1967 13.5 147* 987* 225* 1,089* 
(*All dollar amounts in millions) 
1967-76 9.5% without 1974 12.3% 
1970-76 10.5% without 1974 14.7% 
1971-76 11.0% without 1974 16.2% 
Source: Calculated "Best's Aggregates and Averages," (1968-77 
). Column 2, "Underwriting Experience," is the sum of 
premiums through the , but before federal taxes and 
dividends to policyholders. Column 5, "Unrealized Capital Gains," 
are discounted for taxes. Column 1, "Return on Net Worth," {or 
stockholder's equity) is calculated as net income divided by net 





and unrealized capital gains (Col. 5), less 20% for taxes (16% is 
the average effective capital gains rate for the United States) and 
underwriting experience, minus federal taxes and dividends to policy-
holders. Net worth is the statutory policyholder's surplus on 
January 1 of the year in question, plus the equity in unearned 
premiums on that date. The equity multiplier for each year is 
based upon commissions and brokerage fees plus 80% of other under-





90-DAY TREASURY BONDS-LOSS RATIO 
Year 90-day Treasurx Bonds Loss Ratio 
1976 5.0 74.6 
1975 5.8 78.8 
1974 7.9 75.3 
1973 2.0 68.6 
I 
1972 4.1 66.0 
1971 4.3 66.7 
1970 6.5 69.7 
1969 6.7 70.3 
1968 5.3 68.8 
1967 4.3 67.2 
1966 4.9 66.2 
1965 4.0 69.2 
1964 3.5 68.0 • 1963 3.2 66.3 
1962 2.8 64.5 
1961 2.4 64.4 
1960 2.9 63.6 
1959 3.4 62.5 
1958 1.8 63.7 
1957 3.3 66.2 
1956 2.7 63.4 
1955 1.8 58.2 
1954 1.0 56.9 
1953 1.9 57.2 
1952 1.8 58.4 
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Source: For "Loss Ratio" "Best's Aggregates and Averages;" for 
"90 Bonds," "Historical Statistics of the United 
States" (1975 Ed.) and "Economic Indicators" (Nov. 1977 Ed.), 
Published by Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Senate. 
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int for a discussion 
is the perceived 
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medical is 1973-19741 which was i 
by premiums for health care providers and 
as in health care costs for consumers. The 
crisis has been attributed to several causes: 2 1) a profit-
oriented industry, 2) negligent health care providers; 
3) litigious consumers, and 4) over zealous attorneys • 
• Ever since the cost professional liabil 
insurance premiums began to escalate first doubling, then tripling, 
the insurance industry been considered one the major 
prits of II sis." It been alleged that stock 
losses incurred the industry during the 1970's 
insurers to malpractice premiums as a means of making 
their ses. Insurers on the other hand, 
the escalation in rates to the unantic 
the number f 
The profession so accused of being a 
contributor to is. 11 Several 
attesting to health care sion's involvement 
"cris increased availabil 
experts to another practitioner malpractice 
litigation; an increase in advanced medical technology high risk 
1some profess no real cr occured, was 
instead concocted the insurance industry to justify its 
unprecedented increase in medical malpractice premiums. 
2For ed history of the evolution of medical· 
malpractice , refer to the Report of the California 
Citizens' on Tort Reform entitled, Righting the 










control. Pointing to a 
license 
the ranks ly 
s 
"res emer-










In short, whoever 
7 316 
contingency fees are all 
malpractice problem. 
whether contrived or 
not, the medical malpractice problem epidemic 
by 1975. All segments of California soc were Con-
sumers suffered astronomical health care costs 
passed on by th care providers to compensate for their increased 
malpractice premiums. Health care practitioners were plagued by 
300% plus s 1 lity premiums 
which in turn resulted an increase in the number 
tioners going "bare" (without insurance)i a reluctance of phys 
to accept both new patients patients; 




sustained damage when 
tive from a 
coverage which demanded one 
been al even the 
to as the imary villain of the II , 
malpractice insurance became unattrac-
II 
AB lXX -- CALIFORNIA'S RESPONSE TO THE "CRISIS" 
The Medical ury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, also 
known as AB lXX or MICRA, constituted California's response to the 
"crisis." What follows is a brief summary of the of 
AB lXX. 










and the acquisition 
of any claim for subro-
Limit on recovery of 





340.5. Shortening of -----------------------------------------
t. 
malpractice actions to 






365 provides sanctions 
















The medical plagued 
California in 75 was not unique to State. In 
to crises epidemic proportions, several states enacted legis-
lation. The is a summary the various forms of state 
legislative responses to a medical malpractice dilemma. 5 
A. states 
have enacted 1 
of damages a p1ainti 
ceiling on the amount 
case may recover. 6 








No. 1, May 1977. 
states, place 
ing 11 awards and 
an restriction on 
example, a $500,000 limitation on 
enacted in various from 1975 through December, 
1 
summary lects material and includes the citation and 
the text of various states' statutes alluded to in the AMA report. 
6state Health Legislative Report, Vol. 5, No. 1, May, 1977 
lists: California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin as states 
who have enacted some form. 






s a 500 0 
not 
et 
's Insurance 40-11. 
• 
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trend, F f Ill New enacted statutes 
that j cases di sh e 
the award ing to several statutori defined categories. 10 
c. California is among a 
states who rec of medical 
awards receive ir in periodic payments. 
have enacted various forms of payment schedules include: 
1) Alabama; 2) Alaska; 3) Cal 4) Delaware; 5) Florida; 
6) Kansas; 7) ; 8) New Mexico; 9) Utah; 10) Washington, 
and 11) Wisconsin. 
D. Punitive damages, those 
damages to penalize the defendant rather than 
compensate the awarded only in those 
instances is to have acted mal 
or wanton sconduct. Consequently, punitive damages 
are seldom malpractice cases which usually 
involve mal or wanton conduct. Despite the 
limited e damages in malpractice , several 
1 1 Law 
(CPLR) Section 
malpractice action the 
jury finds a verdict 
, relevant part, "In 
court shall truct the jury 
damages it shall in 
of special and specify the 





the 1976 amendment 
11cali 
is based and the amount ass to each 
but not limited to medical expenses, loss of 
of earning ability, and pain and 
is imposed only in jury-tried cases, 
applicable to trial by judge can be found in 
CPLR 4213 (b) . 








damages are to be 
the defendant's medical malpractice 
provided for by state's patient 





not cons an 
14 Where some 
, in rele-
punitive damages may be 
complained of was 
lful or wanton mis-




patient or wrong organ 
, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Mexico, Nevada, 



















upon which a 








of advance payments 
use as admissions liability. 
s f judgment or 
those statutes. 
Medical malpractice litiga-
relaxed recent years. Under 
to he liable medical 
of care an 
to II 
attempting to define the "locality" 
of care" 11 based. Some statutes go 
, for some malpractice proceedings, the 
defined according to general practices 





















various states have passed legislation abrogating or alter 
collateral source California is among several states 
enacting statutes providing for introduction of evidence of 
plaintiff's payments from sources than the defendant. 17 
This approach s the jury to cons total amounts of 
compensation the pla will receive pursuant to its verdict. 
Other states have enacted provisions that compensation 
plaintiff receives from collateral sources shall be offset against 
any jury award. 18 The crucial difference between this type of 
approach and California practice is that the jury is unaware 
of any collateral source payments made to the plaintiff until it 
reaches its final determination. 
H. Requirement of Notice of Intent To Sue. A few states, 
including California, require plaintiff to notify defendant of 
his intention to sue to filing an action for medical mal-
practice. 19 For a specified time, usually 60 to 90 days subsequent 
is tolled. In some states which allow tolling of limitation 
period, when notice of intention to sue is given, there also 
a statute allowing a for filing suits beyond the running of 
the statute of limitations. 
17Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Washington are among the other states who have enacted legislation 
simifar.to California s relating to the collateral source rule. 
18Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have all altered their collateral 
source provisions in accordance with and offset against final 
judgment. 













J. It common 
tiffs' attorneys to their on a contingent fee 
arrangement. A typical agreement provides that the attorney 
is to receive a percentage, often 30-50%, of the final judgment 
or settlement receives. Usually 
excludes other costs including expert s, filing fees, 
incidental expenses. It is to note, however, if the 
plaintiff loses in court, the attorney receives no compensation. 
To regulate the contingent fee arrangement, about 50% of 
the states enacted legislation characterized by several 
approaches. One approach empowers the court to review 
attorney's proposed and approve that which it deems reason-
able. A second, and more popular, is to provide for a sliding 
scale for fees the ze of the award. California 
among those states following the course. 21 
K. 
As a means 
states have 
such a suit may 
and expert 
malpractice suits, a few 
lation providing that a party pursuing 
1 to the opposing party 
, as well as court costs. 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Illinois and Nebraska have 1 
enacted statutes permitting fee sanctions against the unsuccessful 
party in frivolous litigation. Nebraska and Rhode Island low 
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees according to the court's 
2lcalifornia Business and Professions Code Section 6146. 
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i 22 In I a phys is found liable 
IS a appellate 
court s to 
action by defendant, 
cos mediation panel and reasonable attorneys' 
In 75, a statute s lar to 
's SB 62 743 Laws 1975, CCP Sec. 41 10, 
one a 
1 e and 










supra., a party, unhappy with the arbitration award, who 
to proceed to tr not obtain a more result, 
is responsible 's costs together with .all costs 
accruing after the tr , including expert witness 
fees. 
III 
A Questionna was sent to 114 attorneys and law 
California specializing in medical malpractice. The attorneys or 
firms were selected from names provided by the Cal Trial 
Lawyers Association, Association of Counsel, and 
counsel knowledgeab medical malpractice litigation. Fifty-one 
percent of the and forty-four the defense 
attorneys responded 
percent. The survey questions relevant to current 
medical malpractice concerns in California. 
A. 




non-binding no penalties 
c. Voluntary and non-binding (with 
attached--court costs and attorneys fees to 
be paid by the party who, dissatisfied with 
an arbitration proceeding result, goes into 
court and suffers a judgment equal to or 
less than the arbitration award) i 
d. Mandatory and non-binding (with no penalties 
attached); 
e. Mandatory and binding. 
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TOTAL PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
a. 32% 42%* 26% 
11% 26% 3% 
c. 43%* 21% 56%* 
d. 
e. 9% 11% 9% 
**f. 5% 6% 
Comments: a) The major problem with tration is 
of , experienced One 
re conditions be placed on the selection of 
to excef's cost itration, 
the 
of a j 
2. a prayer of $15,000 or more, 
a. 13% 16% 12% 
83%* 79%* 85%* 
c None 4% 5% 3% 
B. 
3. with of 
62 100%* 41% 
38 0 59%* 
4. Should so punitive 
a ? 
a. Yes 51%* 84%* 31% 
b. No 49% 16% 69%* 
5. If all of punitive 
damages, ld in a fund for 
persons who 
conduct s 
a. Yes 37% 48%* 32% 
b. No 53%* 29% 65%* 




Comment: The idea of a fund is appealing, but cost 
of administering a program would outweigh its benefit. 
c. 
6. If favor punitive damages, would 
you alter your opinion if the damages went into a 
fund as opposed to the plaintiff? 
TOTAL PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
a. Yes 18% 0 29% 
b. No 47%* 24% 61%* 
**c. N/A 35% 76%* 10% 
CorEorate ResEonsibilitx. 
7. Would you favor a statewide program of corporate 
responsibility where a single encompassing 
policy covered a hospital and all the s , includ-
ing physicians with staff privileges, negligent 










the respondents commenting favorably on 
Question #7, all attorneys gave the following reasons: 
a) This is one method protecting and assisting in 
minimizing negligence peer pressure and hospital staff pressure 
in order to keep premiums down, and b) by making the hospital 
responsible for the actions of its staff, more careful selection 
and review 11 result. 
Respondents who disagreed with this concept both defen-
dant and plaintiff attorneys, cited the following reasons: a) unwork-
able; b) creates possible conflicts of interest; c) provides a 
fertile environment for cover-up; d) causes an increase in cost of 
daily hospital care, and 3) causes a deterioration in quality of 
medical care. 




































nature not an admission 





02 the Bus s and 
as to 
Assurance 
b A 00 of nuisance 
not even cover t of defense most medical 
cases. If a even 




consideration on of the insurance company avoiding a 
costly and lengthy medical malpractice trial. 
c) The $3,000 reporting requirement prevents settle-
ments of cases which should be settled. Unfortunately, the 
reporting statutes cause litigation rather than limit , and it 
is probably the major drawback to the average medical malpractice 
case being disposed of amicably. This is particularly true of 
the smaller case. There is no question but that the larger case 
will be settled whether there is a reporting statute or not. How-
ever, all cases worth between $10,000 and $30,000 are not settled 
because of the reporting statute. 
d) A much more sensible approach to this problem would 
be to require a doctor to report judgments in excess $10,000. 
At least in a case where a jury has returned a verdict against 
the doctor, there is a finding of the trier of fact that there 
has been negligence. Contrast this with a settlement where there 
is no admission of liability or negligence. Coupled with such 
an act could also be a provision that if a doctor settles more 
than five cases within a three-year period (similar to automobi 
insurance company practices in raising rates with three settle-
ments within a three year period), then this would be something 
that should be reported to the BMQA. Certainly one or two isolated 
settlements is not an admission of any negligence or any guilt 
on the part of the doctor. However, if a doctor has to settle as 
many as five cases within a three year period, this may be an 
indication of a negligent doctor and something that should be 
ance 
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$25,000, is more just a nuis-
s ze a 
to trial on the issue 







Comments: a) One respondent favored no reporting 
amount; b) suggestion that only awards and judgments should be 
reported; c) respondents favored a $30,000-$50,000 reporting 
amount and claimed a higher limit would reduce trials and still 
allow for inquiry; d) most respondents favored a higher reporting 
amount, if one is to exist. 
E. No-Fault. 












Comments: a) "Hell, no!"; b) "No-fault is idiotic!"; 
c) fault concept enhances personal responsibility; d) no-fault 
eliminates compensation for pain and suffering; 3) no-fault program 
for medical malpractice would dangerously increase the number of 
malpractice claims, rather than decrease them, by accepting cases 
that are currently considered non-meritorious. Studies indicate 
it would be economically disastrous . 
F. 90-Day Notice. 
13. Do feel that CCP Sections 364 and 365, requiring 
a plaintiff and his attorney to give the defendant 
in a medical malpractice suit 90 days notice that 
a complaint is being filed against him/her, are 



















a. Less than 
5 














































across the regardless percentage at which is set; 
b) it is contrary to the concept of free enterprise; c) there are 
allegations that many plaintiffs' attorneys avoid taking an other-
wise meritorious case due to the fact that logical and 
limits on his fees are set by statute. It furthermore illogical 
to place contingent fees in medical malpractice cases at 
statutory limits when no other area tort law is so regulated. 
17. Do you feel plaintiffs' attorneys are complying 
















into law restricting defense attorneys' fees? 
a. Yes 14% 
b. No 84%* 




19. opinion, does marketplace 
16% 
84%* 
medical malpractice defense 
satisfactorily to assure that defense 









Comment: answering yes, one defense attorney 
commented, "however, I may be biased." 
G. Quality of Health Care. 
20. Do you agree that AB lXX has improved the quality 


































b) It's a 
are 
AB 1XX; 
" . . ' 
is to create an 
; e 
care to 
AMA is ion encouraged 
TOTAL PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
Yes 20% 21% 19% 
No 8%* 7 * 81%* 
No s % 
%* 5% 88%* 







































of the threat due process is not compl 
25 . 
a. Ye 74%* 59%* 2%* 
b. No 2 29% 5% 
**c. No 6% 12% 3% 
Comment: sent adequately to assure 
due process. 
26. an set 
members of 
to report to BMQA to 
Bus ss Professions Code Section 805 and 
impose sanctions on failure to report, 
s amending 1 43.7 and 43.8 
may the committee s 













*--Most i * 
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received a consensus 
They are: 













# 8 -- On 
(Bus 
s; 




(75%-100%) of 9 mature into 




a res pons 
s ician staff within 
is favored; 
fee a 
can col medical malpractice cases 
ss Profes Code Section 6146); 
# 9 -- Whether plaintiffs' attorneys are complying with 







awards should be 
Based upon staff research, contacts with plaintiff 
defense counsel, meetings with doctors, advisory committee meetings 
and contact with other states, the of the Joint Committee 
on Tort Liability: identified issues and possible solutions; 
attempted to test the solutions, and arrived at tentative recommen-
dations. Staff would appreciate thoughtful comments, criticisms 
or suggestions relative to the recommendations. In arriving at 
the recommendations, staff sought to: 
A. Encourage settlements and the use of pretrial devices 
such as arbitration as cost- measures; 
B. Assure a quality of medical care predicated on 
the premise that will limit malpractice; 
C. Amend existing legislation to promote its intent and 
effectiveness. 
Recommendation No. 1: CONSOLIDATING C.C.P. 364 
(REQUIRING 9 NOTICE TO BE GIVEN TO A DEFENDANT IN 
A MALPRACTICE SUIT PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE SUIT) 
WITH AB 3670 CERTIFICATE OF MERIT WHICH REQUIRES THAT 
A PLAINTIFF'S MALPRACTICE CLAIM BE CERTIFIED BY 
PHYSICIANS (COPIES OF BOTH PIECES OF LEGISLATION ARE 
ENCLOSED} . 
The language in AB 3670 and the 90-day notice provision of 
AB lXX in the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 364, reveals that 









to an AB 3670 
to mean the 
connotes 
A 









No. 2: RECOMMEND THAT TORT SUITS 
--~------------------
IN WITH THE FIRST PERTAINING TO LIABILITY AND 
THE SECOND ADDRESSING DAMAGES. 
The establi of liability is a condition precedent to 
presentation of evidence for damages. In the event no liability 
is found, the tort litigation need never progress to the damages 
stage. While California law permits bifurcated trials, the 
mechanism is seldom employed. Instead, the issues of liability, 
damages, appropriateness of punitive damages, and extent of~ injury 
are all simultaneously presented to the jury. By implementing a 
system of bifurcation, the disadvantages flowing from presenting 
all the above issues within one suit could be alleviated. 
Where a defendant is found not liable the f t stage 
of a bifurcated tri 
wasted in demonstrating 
severity of the injury, 
view of the 
suit is dropped and no manpower is 
litigating the issues of damages, 
the need for punitive damages. In 
high litigation costs, bifurcation could 
represent a substant savings . 
A benefit of furcated proceedings inherent 
incentive s In the unitary , parties may be 
reluctant to settle due to uncertainty about liability. In a 
bifurcated proceeding, if liability is ascertained, the parties 
may be more receptive to settlement since their positions are 
clarified. 
The third advantage of bifurcation is the preservation of 






3 TO BUT TO 





3, 0, 0 are 
to 
resources 
to , 00, or some lesser 
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~~~~~~~~N2o~._!4: AMEND CCP CHAPTER 2.5, SECTION 
1141.10, TO PROVIDE FOR MANDATORY NON-BINDING ARBI-
TRATION (WITH SANCTIONS--AT THE DISCRETION OF THE 
COURT--FOR COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED 
FROM THE TIME OF ELECTION OF THE TRIAL DE NOVO TO BE 
PAID BY THE PARTY REQUESTING TRIAL BUT SUFFERING A 
JUDGMENT EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN THE ARBITRATION AWARD). 
Under CCP Section 1141.10 (SB 1362) and within Superior 
Courts of a certain size, civil actions where the damages, in 
the opinion of the court, do not exceed $15,000 for each plain-
tiff must be arbitrated. The law provides for mandatory, non-
binding arbitration with limited penalties attached should a 
party proceed to trial and not improve his position. enacted 
penalties do not attorneys' fees. Inclus such 
would further es from pursuing a court trial and 
be more fair to the opposing party who 1 
additional legal fees 
Recommendation No. 5: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 
POLICIES SHOULD STATE WHETHER COVERAGE 
EXTENDS TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The staff of the Committee recommends that medical profes-
sional liability insurers be required to state on the fact of 
their malpractice policies in bold print and express language 
whether the insurer will be responsible for any punitive damages 
assessed against an insuree in a malpractice action. Policies 
expressly covering punitive damages should also indicate the 




HOSPITALS ARE AS TO WHETHER THE 
OF 








to an action 26 and 
reluctance of a 11 on reduce communi-
cations concerning physicians between staff members of 
hospitals. 
To avoid the of defamation actions and the 
requirement for hospital staff members to "tell 11 on another, the 
staff of the Committee recommends that the communications between 
Several problems cou be circumvented and benefits derived from 
employing the BMQA s manner. 27 
of Medical Quality Assurance. Therefore, this recommendation 
does not impose any new reporting duties. 28 
26Goodley v. Sullivant, (1973) 32 C.A.3d 619, 108 Cal.Rptr.451. 
27Business 
of hospitals to 
staff privileges 
year. Consequently, 
only those censored 
restrictions in 
hospital. 
805 imposes a 
denied or 
any 
recommendation stated above, 
ing a minimum of 45 days 
would be reported to the inquiring 
28Business and Professions Code Section 805 provides, in 
relevant part: "The chief administrator or executive officer of 
any county hospital or county medical facility or any clinic, 
health facility . . . shall report to the agency which issued the 
license when any person who holds a license . . . is denied staff 
privileges, removed from the medical staff or his staff privileges 
are restricted for a cumulative total of 45 days in any calendar 














SB 1362, as 
1141.11 {a) . In 
judges, all c.t-
filed after 
be submitted to 
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, states in 
10 or more 
1141.16(a). The determination of amount in 
controversy . . . shall made by the court and 
the case submitted to arbitration • . • No deter-
mination pursuant to this Section shall be made if 
all defendants stipulate in writing that the amount 
exceeds fifteen thousa:n:d dollars 
asJ.s added • 
1141.16(b). The determination of the amount in 
controversy shall be thout prejudice to any 
finding on the value the case by an arbitrator 
or in a subsequent trial de novo. 
1 
In its , the law favors defendants in their 
ability to avoid Since determination of the amount 
in controversy is "wi prejudice," there is no deterrent 
for defense counsel who elects to avoid arbitration. In 
jurisdictions juries favor defendants, is to the defense's 
advantage to a court trial. Such unilateral avoid-
ance obviates the the law. Therefore, the staff of the 
Committee recommends amending CCP Section 1141.16 to provide that 
no determination of the amount in controversy shall occur if all 
parties stipulate in writing that the amount is in excess of $15,000. 
--
Recommendation No. 8: ESTABLISH A PATIENTS' COMPEN-
SATION FUND COUPLED WITH A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
FOR PARTICIPATING HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS TO $100,000 
























on a a 
liability 1 constitutional 
several states scons , Indiana, Nebraska, 
Florida and New 
In Flor in patients' compensation 
fund is mandatory s, voluntary for physicians. 
Regardless of 
in, physicians who are required to pay $1000 initially 
and $500 in subsequent Participation the fund 
entitles contributors to liabil to $100,000 per 
medical malprac e ac Enacted in 1975, the Florida 
tion has lenges. Nebraska and 
Wisconsin also voluntary par 
a patients' coupled a limitation on 1 
ities for contributing care providers. Recently, Nebraska's 
I Supreme Court upheld a provision contributors to the fund 
to demonstrate re s on the s that 
requirement was advantage afforded by a limita-
I tion on I S 
The texts IS f scons 's Indi-
ana's existing law appear below for your study. All three have 
survived constitutional attacks. 
A. Pennsylvania. Article VII, Medical Professional Liability 
Catastrophe Loss Fund, Section 1301.701 states in pertinent part: 
"(a) Every care provider as defined act, 
practic med or podiatry or otherwise providing 
health care services the Commonwealth shall insure 
his ity or provide proof of self-
accordance with this section. 
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$15,000,000 at the 
all claims 
operation of the 
1 reduce the 
in to maintain 
15,000,000. All 
31 the year in 
ims shall be 
would be 
allowed 
amount paid to each 






by investment or reinvestment shall constitute the 
sole and exclusive sources of funding for the fund. 
No claims or expenses against the fund shall be 
deemed to constitute a debt of the Commonwealth or 
a charge against the General Fund of the Commonwealth. 
The director shall issue rules and regulations consis-
tent with this section regarding the establishment and 
operation of the fund including all procedures and the 
levying, payment and collection of the surcharges. A 
fee shall be charged by the catastrophe loss fund 
director to all self-insurers for examination and 
approval of their plans." 
B. Wisconsin. Subchapter III, Insurance Provisions, Section 
655.23, states in pertinent part: 
"(1) All health care providers permanently practicing 
or operating in this state shall pay the yearly assess-
ment into the patients' compensation fund under section 
655.27. 
(2) Every health care provider permanently practicing 
or operating in this state shall, once in each year as 
prescribed by the commissioner, file with the commis-
sioner in a form prescribed by the commissioner, proof 
of financial responsibility as provided in this section. 
No health care provider who retires or ceases operation 
after the effective date of this act (1975) shall be 
eligible for the protection provided under this chapter 
unless proof of financial responsibility for all claims 
arising out of acts of malpractice occurring after the 
effective date of this act (1975) is provided to the 
commissioner as required in this section. 
(4) Such health care liability insurance or cash or 
surety bond shall be in amounts of at least $100,000 
per claim and $300,000 per year. 
(5) While such health care liability insurance, self-
insurance or cash or surety bond approved by the 
commissioner remains in force, the health care provider, 
the provider's estate and those conducting the provider's 
business, including the provider's health care liability 
insurance carrier, are liable for malpractice for no more 
than $200,000 per claim and $600,000 per year or the 
maximum liability limit for which the provider is insured, 
whichever is higher, if the health care provider has met 
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occurrence of medical 
$2,000,000 if 
s. For hospitals with 
evidence must be 






by the Act without filing evidence of insurance if 
they will deposit with the Commissioner of Insurance 
either (1) cash in the amount of $300,000, or (2) a 
surety bond in the amount of $300,000 for each year. 
A hospital can become "qualified" under the Act with-
out furnishing evidences of insurance by filing a 
financial statement with the Commissioner of Insurance 
which demonstrates sufficient assets to fulfill its 
obligations under the Act to the extent of $2,000,000 
or $3,000,000 depending upon the numbers of beds •.. " 
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MALPRACTICE - SECTIONS 801, 802, 803 
REPORTS RECEIVED AND INVESTIGATIONS OPENED 
1976, 1977 AND JANUARY - JUNE 1978 
Dollar Amount Number of Reports Received Number Sent to Investigations 
Jan-June Jan-June 
1976 1977 1978 1976 1977 1978 
~ 
" - 4,999 73 35 18 0 0 0 
5, - 9,999 156 118 65 0 0 0 
,000 - 14,999 122 91 52 0 0 0 
,000 - 19,999 85 70 24 0 0 0 
,000 - 24,999 53 41 22 0 0 1 
25, ,999 54 70 21 1 4 6 
,000 + 230 266 126 N/A 266* 123** 
773 691 328 N/A 270* 130** 
indicates the data is not available 
* 
** 
37 investigations of cumulative totals of more than $30,000 
03 investigations cumulative totals of more than $30,000 
Bureau of Medical Statistics 
October 12, 1978 
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ght some s ificant problems and 
area of procedural reform. Like 
ever changing and demands constant reform. 
is a scus to 
decisions and recommendations which 
our procedural system. Our 197 




1 are to from 
purposes of tort law. Professor 
se purposes are 1) deterrence; 
3) rness, 4) z of administrative 
II 
RECOMMENDATION 2 - ARBITRATION 
sage Senator 's bill (Cal. Stats. 1978, 
7 , CCP Sec. 1141.10, et seq.) , issue using arbitration 
z, Gary, "Report to the Joint Committee on Tort 
" Jan. 19, 1978 ( i report on file with the 
• 
78-359 
for small cases moot 1 for: 1) 
arbitrat is more $ ,000, 
or upon of the amount in contro-
versy; 2) de novo j on e 
if the result of novo not more , 
costs of subsequent 1 shifted to electing 
party; 3) provisions to the Judicial Council 
regarding practice and procedure for all actions submitted to 
arbitration under the bill. The remaining issue of the arbitra-
tion legislation 
explains, mandatory 
constitutional right to a j 
litigants 
parties. 2 However, 
U. S. Supreme Court 








tutional As Professor 
would be violative of 
closes the courts to 
of the rights of the 
ion to the 
was held that the to 
a compul arbitration statute 
an appeal from award 
costs and the giving a 
of costs to accrue the 
for upholding the constitutionality 
of the provision was that the right to jury trial was not burdened 
2cf., Brooks v. Small Claims Court, (1973) 8 Cal. 661; 
Prudential Insurance Compan~ v. Small Claims Court, (1916) 76 Cal. 
App. 2d 379, relying on Cap~tal Traction Company v. Hof., (1899) 
174 U.S. 1 (directly under 7th Amendment of u.s. Constitution). 
(1955) 381 Pa. 223, 112 A. 625, 
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. at 226). 
and that upheld 
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Furthermore, 
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out four years to know he 
may be held liable (assuming statute of limitations on 
underlying cause 
claim this creates havoc 
one year) . Insurance companies 
their reserves resulting 
premiums. 
sor s 
notice of suit to 
filed. The sm 








cr a procedure to 
two weeks after 
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in c 1 
ing a 
shall 'forthwith' issue a summons and deliver 
the marshal." 
the c 
for service by 
A to require the 
to the ing a complaint. Such notice might so a 
declaration of mer Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 364, 
such notices are already required in actions against health care 







, t courts 
as a precedent to 
' f st concern, of 
be offset advantage of decon-
to ear settlements of cases. That a 
to juri sor tz 1 
concern tical 
occur out 
enactment statutes, even extra-
1 j is no the 
as a condition to s to a 
c e 
tment across the board 
to s Sec 364 is 
is 
a no procedure 
s 364 on of 
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PROCEDURE FOR SHIFTING COSTS 





cull out tort cla 1) , 2) summary j 
and 3} pre-trial conference. There is also a 
for partial summary judgment. As pointed out by Justice 
s. Thompson, Second Dis Court of Appeal, the availabil 
of this partial summary judgment procedure ten overlooked 
and it should be used more frequently. 
In the opinion of ssor Schwartz, given 
available, the need for an additional method of eliminating frivo-
lous suits has not been adequately established. He sees li 
merit in a pre-trial, cost-shifting procedure, but does 
that a pos ting of full costs might be 
in view of the hinds 
is precedent for 
Section 5814). 
is more d 
of Civil Procedure Sec 
make a settlement 
jury returns a ict 
refusing party must 
perspective gained by the Court. 
workers' compensation (see, 
t authority on point as found 
998. That a 
such offer 
the amount of the offer or 





the time of the In addition, the California Code of C 1 
Procedure provides for the implementation of pre-trial conferences 
in civil actions and California Rules of Court, Rule 208, provides 
that pre~trial conferences are only required where requested 























in the number success In a special report 
entitled, " Changes Hands," 
Economics, August 7, 78, burdens and difficulties of 
suit are under from original 
action to judgment malpractice action was 
lengthy (197 978) ; st and 
in prosecuting were , and cost to 
defendant was 
Present cause is on case 
• authority. s i to pla v. Stone, ' J • the 
needs to may questionab It 
• staffs' opinion were to be proof of wi principle measure 
of liability probab cause. 
v 
BIFURCATING TORT TRIALS 
If s scretion a bifurcation will "promote the conven-
ience of witnesses or ends of justice," a judge may, sua sponte or 
at request of e party, bifurcate a trial into liability and 
damage portions (Code c 1 Procedure Section 598) . The purpose 
7 366 
to s 
sor Schwartz out, there are two 
1) it will save time 
notes s Chicago researchers conclud-
20%--
2) of 
to issue of 1 
to sor b , 
s a " impli-




ury cases, issue 
1 
sue However, in 
to sses 
or a s be 
VI 
OF EXPERTS 
and offer of an expert 
s i res pons payment of his expert. 
sory Meeting, 7/31/78, 
78-367 
As pointed out Model Code of Evidence of 42, 
with using 
so-to- , is 
of expert witnesses, a "hired-gun" approach 
distrust which the testimony generates since 
it comes from a b source. ssor po out 
advantage of court appointed experts is to 
of fact informed sions. 
There are two methods of using court appointed witnesses. 
The first is to al the court after notice and motion sua 
to appoint its independent expert. If the parties can stipulate 
upon an expert, the court shall have no discretion to appoint 
other than the expert so stipulated; if the parties cannot 
an agreement, then the court will appoint an expert of its own 
choosing. In either case, no other expert shall be allowed to 
testify. 
The second alternative, the one adopted by the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence of 1975, by the Model Code of Evidence of 1942, 
and by the Model Expert Testimony Act of 1936, is basical 
same but allows the parties to select and call expert witnesses 
of the choosing with sclosure to the jury of the court appointed 
expert. The distrust, , generated by testimony of 
parties' experts is greatly lessened by the jury's probable bel 
that experts selected by the judge will be impartial and if two 
experts agree, a conflicting opinion will be discounted. 
There are also two methods of compensating the court appointed 
expert. The first is payment through public sources. Professor 


































judgments are to be satisfied by 
to s are the workers' 
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compensation cases, s for 
liability. 8 
Professor to inc rea practice of 
compromise ses resolve a di workers' 
sation c im by sum payment. He bel that the experience 
under workers' ion is moving away from periodic 
however, his report c s no for s propos 
Since the enactment of AB lXX 1975, per payments 
have been authorized medical malpractice cases. experience 
under AB is 1 on Tort 1 
is presently accumulating data on the effectiveness of AB lXX; 
see, ~ Report of Jo Committee on Tort Liability: Medical 
Malpractice, Jan. 1979) . Other states have a greater 
ence to j the effectiveness of this A 
publication "State Health slation Report," 9 explains 
the value of s: 
" ... In most states judgments can only be rendered 
in lump sum awards. This of payment often 
ill-suited cases where awards include payment 
for anticipated medical care, earnings, 
pain is because of the specula-
tion involved as amounts actual needed in 
the future. a payments , 
payments are made over the actual life of the plain-
tiff or for the period of disability. Thus, under 
this system, funds are available for the purpose 
for which they were intended and there is no windfall 
to the beneficiaries of a plaintiff who dies sooner 
8see, Code of Civil Procedure §667.7; Government Code §970.6. 
9"state Health slation Report," Vol. 5, No. 1, 1977, 





















He further points out 
are skeptical of the validity 
of substantial pain and fering awards. 
His thorough discussion of this subject emphasizes the 
need for legislative reform: 
1. Pain and suffering damages do not serve the compensa-
tion purpose of tort , i.e., reimbursing that which the 
has expended; 
2. Standards should be established for determination of 
pain and suffering 
trary to basic tort 
individual cases. 
, results when verdicts treat 
s, con-
ical 
equal litigants in an unequal way; 
3. plaintiff defense on 
the amount and suffering award thwarts settlements and 
is contrary to ef 
In view of 
Committee on Tort 
recommends that a 1 
by the Legislature. 
j administration. 
considerations, staff of the Joint 
accord Professor Schwartz, 
on pain and suffering damages be set 
IX 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Professor Schwartz ses three questions concerning 
punitive damages: 1) Should punitive damages ever be available; 
2) if available, in what category of cases should they be allowed, 
and 3) in cases they are allowed, what standards should be 
used for determining amount? 
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disregard consumer sa to 
subsequent s nature by sk of high judg-
ments exceed the cost of standards. In the 
Product Liab 
1978, a letter from Ford Motor 
Highway Traffic Sa dated 3 was 
the following quote from that transcript points out, 
serve a deterrent function, punitive damages must 
where de with 
"Ford recognizes the 
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The cost to Ford Motor Company, i.e., the cost to consumers, was 
related to the benefi of modifying Ford Pinto automobiles so 
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Contributory negligence is con-
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s own 
cause cooperating with i-
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The rule contributory negligence was rooted in the 
longstanding pr one should not recover from another 
for damages brought upon oneself (Buckley v. Chadwick, 1955, 45 Cal. 
2d 183) • Since dec is in __ , supra, the all-or-nothing rule 
of contributory was superceded by a system of pure 
comparative negl the latter system, in all actions 


























far as the 
section 1 be 
recovery and the extent of 
tital on compensatory 
relief. 11 
The 1 sections be to 2, Chapter 1, 
Sections 3281, 82 and 83 












of such amendment 
of pure comparative 
ifornia C Code: 
to recover damages 
harm to property, any 
to the plaintiff 
amount awarded as 
jury attributable to 
fault, but does not 
or was disregarded 
doctrines, such as last 
omissions are in any 
on Tort 
be to 
toward the person or 
, or that 
term 
apply both to fault 
to contributory 
1 believes the effect 
latively implement the system 
t which would apply to all tort actions. 
2. Pure Versus Comparative Systems. In v. 
Yellow Cab Co., the Court adopted a system of pure compara-
tive negligence. Under such a system, plaintiff's recovery 


















plainti 's recovery 
was: 1) 








was not greater than 
bar of contributory 
Committee 














of last clear chance 
of comparative 
v • Mann , ( 18 4 2 ) 15 2 . Rep. 588, 
highway and the defendant 
't reasonable care, 
to recover defendant had the last 
s " 




s that may carry 




the doctrine a plaintiff might recover, 
standing any negligence his own, the defendant had the 
clear chance to avoid the accident. As the Court in low 
Cab Co., su;era., points out, doctr:i .,..._~" f last clear chance 
was a palliat to the harsh of contributory negligence. 
The Conunittee s with the 
of comparative fault principles, eed for the doctrine of last 
clear chance disappears. Thus, our recommendation that the 
doctrine should be abandoned. 
2. Violation of Safety Statutes. law pro-
vides that violation of a statute which seeks to protect a class 
of individuals against particular conduct creates a presumption 
of negligence (Evidence Code Section 669, Satterlee v. Orange Glenn 
School Distr , [1947 29 . 2d 581) • The doctrine applies 
against a plaintiff as well as a defendant. The effect of the 
presumption is to satis the burden of proving a party's 





of neglience per se is not incon-
of comparative , staff 
modification of such doctrine. 
3. Res Ipsa Loquitor. Res Ipsa Loquitor is an 
tiary concept whereby negligence is proved. The traditional 
of the doctrine are: 
ements 
a. The event causing injury must be of a kind which 

















process of as 
negligence" ( 
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The crucial question , when is assumption of the risk 
assumption of it merely a variant of the 
doctrine of comparative 















of the risk is express; 
of risk were: 
below standard 
f's own protection; 
defendant's 
's 
s two forms 
ss Assumption: where plaintiff's acceptance 
is, written or oral; 
b. Implied As where plaintiff's acceptance 
of the risk can by his conduct. For example, plaintiff 
may know that defective brakes. Defendant offers 
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s ff may be acting 
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is the form, then 
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90, the court 
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no duty or did not breach 
other { 
duty. In its sense, it is accurate to 
say ... defendant was not negligent. But in 
its secondary sense, i.e., as an affirmative 
defense to an 
duty, it is incorrect to say 
risk whe or not he was at fault " 
Under the sk 
in its secondary sense differs from contributory negligence, plain-
tiff's conduct under the former is measured by the standard of 
the reasonably prudent man. plaintiff acts unreasonably, noth-
ing distinguishes it negligence . at 9 ) . 
This produces an anamalous a plaintiff, 
reasonably assuming sk, is barred from recovery whereas if 
he unreasonably assumes risk (contributory negligence) , his 
recovery For s reason and because of 
inequitable results whi cou come from the subt distinctions 
of conduct versus consent and reasonable versus unreasonable 
conduct, the staff Jo Committee recommends that assump-
tion of the ri as a defense only where it express 
as defined above. 
5. Under existint Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 666, if a defendant cross complains against the plaintiff, 
and estab shes at trial that the damages in the cross complaint 
exceed the damages in the complaint, judgment on the cross complaint 
must be given only for the excess. 
For examp , if plaintiff's damages are determined to 
























affirmed Jes v. 
was granted 
8 I L.A. 30967). 
is difficult to 





666. 's that the judici 
principles of fault warrants a different result. 
It that California's adoption of compara-
tive negligence has closely followed that of Florida. 13 It is 
not surpris to plaintiff relies on the Florida cas~ 
of Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian, ( . 1977) 342 So. 2d 
471, for the support the proposition that the rule permitting 
set-off should not be applicable under principles of comparative 
fault. The Court in that case said: 
... that the concept of 'set-off' as "We cone 
announced 
parties to a 
to the extent 
mutual liabil 
s only between uninsured 
action or to insured parties 
insurance does not cover their 
(Id. at 474). 
One rationale for such a view is that "judgments for fault-
discounted net damages are never to be off-set against each other; 
they represent real compensable juries."14 
The problem full compensation for the injury arises 
right of recovery by an insured from his own insurer for the amount 
of the non-excess damages for hwich he is uncompensated. 
A viable reso to the problem is found in Posner, 
Reeslund & William, Comparative Negligence in California: Some 
Legislative Solutions--Part III, 9/9/77, L. A. Daily Journal at 4-25: 
13see, ~~ Hoffman v. Jones (Fla. 1973) 280 So. 2d 431, 
and Li v.-ve11ow Cab Co. (Cal. 1975), supra. at 13 Cal. 3d 804 
(jud1c1al adopt1on of comparative fault). 
1 4George & Walkowiak, "Blame and Reparation in Pure Compara-
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"Pending future judicial or legislative develop-
ments, we are content for the present to assume the 
position taken by the Florida court in this matter: 
'We feel the trial judges of this State are capahle 
of applying {a] comparative negligence rule without 
our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected 
problems. The problems are more appropriately 
resolved at the trial level in a practical manner 
instead of a theoretical solution at the appellate 
level. The trial judges are granted broad discre-
tion in adopting such procedures as may accomplish 
the objectives and purposes expressed in this opinion 
(citation omitted)" (Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra. at 
826-27). 
It has been over three years since the Li decision and anyone who 
has reviewed the great number of appellate court cases involving 
comparative fault issues knows that trial courts are still struggling 
to resolve the problems. 
Some of the problems stem from the status of the substantive 
law subsequent to Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra. (whereas other 
problems arise as a matter of proper procedure). 
It is hoped that what follows will assist the Legislature 
in resolving the pressing problems presented by adoption of the 
comparative fault system. 
A. Substantive Law Prior to Li. 
1. Contribution and Indemnity. 
a. Contribution: Traditionally, contribution is 
the right of one who has discharged a common liability to recover 
from another also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to 
pay or bear (Black's Law Dictionary, 399 (4th Ed. 1968). Contri-
bution was the right to partially shift the loss. California Code 
of Civil Procedure Section 875 provides that only those tortfeasors 
who are joint judgment debtors are entitled to contribution rights; 
78-388 
876 that the portion to be shifted is determined 
judgment equab among all joint judgment debtors. 
is, pro rata sharing. Sections 578 and 579 provide a judg-
ment may be against one or more of several defendants. These 
have been interpreted consistently with the common law 
a tort action are j and several liable 
judgments may be rendered against more or one of them (Proper v. 
Sutter Drainage District, [1921] 53 . App. 576). 
This an contribution may be exemplified as 
"A" is stopped at a stop 1 "B" is 
"A" and "C" is following "B". "B" stops, but "Cn does not. 
"C" "Bu causing uB" to hit "A". " sues "B" and "C" on the 
B" stopped too "~""' 't stop at all. "' 
for "A" against both "B" "C" on 
nB" ncn are ; tortfeasors. "A" may satisfy .) 




C". r is the pro rata share or 
were two defendants. 
b. is the shifting of the 
s from one been compelled to pay it 
of another who bear it instead (Prosser, 
Ed.] Section 51 at 311 [1968]). 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 875 subordinates 
contribution to indemnity rights providing: 
Such right of contribution shall be admini-




(f} not impa any r of indemnity 
under existing law, and where one tortfeasor judgment 
debtor is entitled to indemnity from another, there 
shall be no ight of contribution between them." 
The courts have long implied a right of indemnity shifting the 
entire loss from one who was merely passively or secondarily negli-
gent. If, however, a party were active in causing the harm, no 
right to indemnity would accrue. 
The operation of this principle may be seen as 
follows: assume the facts in the above example that "C" hits "B", 
causing "B" to hit "A". If both "B" and "A" were rightfully stopped 
at a stop signal and "C" failed to stop because he knew his brakes 
were worn out, then "C" would be actively negligent. "B" on the 
other hand can be held to being only secondarily negligent by 
rear-ending "A". If "A" sues both "B" and "C", or if "A" sues "B" 
and "B" cross compla against "C". upon satisfaction of the 
entire judgment to "A", "B" has rights to indemnity as against "C" . 
The amount of those rights is equal to the entire amount he paid 
to "A" since indemnity would shift the entire loss. 
B . 
Motorcycle v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 694, 
700, Justice Thompson pointed out how the adoption of comparative 
negligence compelled changes in the then existing provision for 
contribution and indemnity. 
"The impact of 'pure' comparative negligence 
eliminates totally the all-or-nothing rule on 
the side of the tort coin which determines 
plainti 's right of recovery. The same 
reasoning . . . is equally applicable to the 
obverse side of the coin--that which determines 
the extent of relative liability of persons 
who may be liable in negligence to plaintiff." 
78-390 
because the system of comparative is based on the principle 
t the extent of liability determines the extent of fault. Thus, 
as stated by Justice Thompson in his appellate opinion in 
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court: 
"In a system where the liability of several 
defendants concurrently causing an injury is 
based fault, the conclusion is that the 
extent fault of each [defendant] should 
govern the extent of liability of each." 
78-391 




TO THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TORT LIABILITY 
THE APPLir.ATI0!1 OF COHPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE IN STRICT LIABILITY CASES 
Prof. Gary T. Schwartz 
UCLA School of Law 


















III. The Correctness of Daly 







The Comparison Process in Ordinary 
Negligence Cases 
1. Comparing "Negligence" 
14 
15 
(a) Comparing Risk-Burden Unreasonableness 15 






A Hard Proglem: Unidentified Negligence 
English Experience 
The California Experience So Far 







1. What Daly Says 25 
2. The Approach of a "Plaintiff"-Only Variable 26 
3. Comparing Causation 28 
4. Comparing Norm Departure 31 
5. A Comparison Proposal 33 






The Clark Proposal 







V. Reconciling the Product Plaintiff's Theories in 
Contributory Negligence Situations 49 
i 
78-394 
TABLE OF CASES 
. 225 (1978) 
. Rptr. 3 8 0 ( 19 7 8 ) 
) 
(l 44) 
, 34 P. 2d 377, 






6, 8, 31, 
32, 35 
4, 5, 7, 
8 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 
14, 17, 22, 
25, 26, 27, 
8, 29, 30, 
3 ' 34, 39, 











1, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 
15, 17, 19, 




TABLE Of CASES (Continued) 
Link-Belt Co. v. Star Iron & Steel Co. 
65 Cal. App. 3d 24, 135 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1977) 
Luque v. McLean 
8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) 
Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co. 
555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977) 
Pan-Alaska sheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & 
Deslgn Co. 
565 F.2d 1129, 1140 (1977) 
Co. 
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Co. 
56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961) 
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. 
15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36, 48, 






















correct 1 a str t-1 ity/ 
e s • 1 i divided 
defendant, rather than res 












on f s 
be, 
be 
is to a II son," 
d be one true to 
's "res pons ity" 
f to the 
extent 
f (probably) 









by a flat 30 percent. 




e e to C. 
ile C can 
more more " 
• rates 
stave o ser 



















's fee as 
D-3 first. 
ellectual erest 
3 I am 
not c 
le to c. If 
D-1 or 2 
-3 s s 







to te or 








The s s of impl warranty is recognized 
in California via the Commercial Code. Cal. U. Com. 
Code § 2314. There appear to be significant "privity" 
limitations on an implied warranty claim, and under the Code 
prompt notice to the manufacturer is a prerequisite to 
later prosecution a claim. its ordinary commercial 
applications, implied warranty rarely raises any issue 
contributory ligence or assumption of risk. 
Occasionally, the implied warranty theory is relied on 
in a personal injury context. E.g., Hrutter v. Zogarts. 
Cal. 3d , 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 ( 75). 
the status is tort ctrines like contributory negli 




s something that the law, in California 
never clear. See L. & M .
ts ility § 16.01[3]. 
v_.;__L..;;_e_e __ __,_ _ . 20 9 . App. 2d 568, 26 Rptr. 276 
(1962) th 
App. 3d 24, 135 
c. 
tr. 134 ( 77). 
Strict liability was established in California by the 
California Supreme Court in 1963, in its landmark decision 
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 
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to the plaint 's "respons ility," English courts 
deemed to require consideration of the 
plaintiff's the defendant's "responsibi ty" alike. 
the case, supra. 
In California, Committee has not taken serious 
the Daly Court's pla iff-only language. Its strict 1 i ty 
instruction, professing to follow Daly, calls for jury 
to determine "what percentage of the combined proximate 
causes of plaintiff's injury is attributable to plaintiff's 
contributory fault," and "what percentage of such combined 
proximate causes is attributable to the defective product.'' 
BAJI 9.04. 
3. Comparing Causation 
Especially since causation comparisons have often been 
undertaken in negligence cases, it can be argued that it is 
causation that should be compared in strict liability. 
Indeed, comparing causation diminishes the awkward problem 
of the lack of fault in strict liability. There is precedent 
for this. In statutory-duty strict liability cases, Eng 
courts are inclined to compare causation. See P. Winfield & 
J. Jolowicz, supra, at 117. One federal court, adopting 
comparative negligence for strict liability unseaworthiness, 
has explicitly suggested a comparison of causation in the 
strict liability context. See Pan-African Fisheries, 
supra; 565 F.2d at 139. The "contributed" language in Dalv 
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cont fee the 
cannot be gainsaid. 
damages 
tort system as allowing 
Insurance adjustors 
explain their payouts terms "one-third for the doctor, 
one-third for lawyer, one-third the victim." H. L. 
Ross, Settled Out of Court 
bility of pain and 
away from any 1 
(1970). Moreover, availa-
damages has taken the urgency 
reconsideration of the no-
costs rule, at least its tort law application. 
In light of se cons ions, a legislature could 
choose to 1 
stipulating that a case, plaint should be 
allowed to recover 1 s out-of- losses, and 
1/ 
also for the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee.-
Legislat s proposal would to set 
forth a reas courts to take account. 
Here, ion of cont in 
medical malpractice cases effected in California by AB lXX 
is obviously relevant--especially since the complexities of 
many malpractice cases renders those cases analogous to 
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enough to create an un s the 
plaintiff who negligence 11 be better 
on negligence on str t liability. This would also be 
true were Legis to approve this Report's expanded 
comparison propos r1oreover, should the 
any of the three proposals set forth above 
islature adopt 
this Report as 
alternatives to "comparison" strict liability situations, 
cases would necessarily arise in which the careless plaintiff 
could recover more damages by suing negligence and incurring 
a Li reduction damages than by in strict 1 li 
and encountering the enacted damage-reduc proposal. 
\~at about implied warranty: what tort defenses are 
available in an impl action? the extent 
to which strict 1 1 has monopolized personal ury cases 
in recent years, a question in which implied warranty 
courts have se required to answer. But the case 
law certainly leaves room for proposition that tort 
law's defense of contributory negligence should be deemed 
completely to a claim sed on the sales law 
doctrine of lied warranty. (Seep. 2, supra). If this 
is a correct statement of law, then the Daly holding--
asserting contributory negligence as an important damage-
reducing factor strict liability actions--could lead to a 
resurgence of implied warranty claims on behalf of care s 
product victims seeking to rely on the one legal theory that 
would ignore their care sness in calculating their damages. 
- 50 -
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All this seems wrong. The California Supreme Court 
properly made clear that strict products liability 
d the primary theory in personal injury product 
accidents. While it has condoned plaintiffs who wish to 
either a negligence theory or an implied warranty 
in addition to strict liability, the basic purposes 
of strict liability would be thwarted a plaintiff guilty 
contributory negligence could receive a larger recovery 
under either negligence law or implied warranty law than 
under strict liability itself. Therefore, even if the 
Legislature chooses to leave the Daly comparison suggestions 
undisturbed, the Legislature should at least establish that 
an implied warranty personal-injury action, the victim's 
contr negligence shall operate to reduce the victim's 
recovery a Daly fashion. If the legislature codifies 
Report's strict-liability "comparison" proposal, it 
should render that proposal applicable to implied warranty 
actions as well. f it enacts any of the three non-comparison 
proposals, it should them applicable to all products 
c , whether pursued under a negligence, strict liability, 
or implied warranty 
- 51 -
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rule is based on a principle as fundamental to our law today 
as it was centuries ago. The principle is not unique to 
landowner cases but is applicable to our entire system of 
justice--one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a 
hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby. We have 
consistently applied this doctrine in our other recent pro-
nouncement in other cases of basic tort doctrine"--and here 
the Court alludes to both Luque and Li. 
This paragraph in Walters is intriguing, to say the least. 
Only once does the Walters opinion anywhere mention the 
"assumption of risk" phrase. Yet it is clear that the 
"fundamental principle" on which the Walters Court has relied 
is the assumption-of-risk principle, and that the rule of 
law which the Walters Court states is the assumption-of-risk 
rule. And in articulating that rule the Court does not limit 
the rule to "unreasonable" or "negligent" risk confrontations; 
any knowing and voluntary confrontation will suffice. (Indeed, 
there is nothing in the facts of either Walters or the typical 
fireman's case which seriously suggests any unreasonableness 
in the policeman's or fireman's conduct.) 
In Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co., now pending before 
the Supreme Court, an employee's supervisor ordered the 
em::loyee to drive a tractor. Another employee told this employee 
tiat the tractor was having problems with its power steering. 
78-472 
The employee tes ervisor 
about the power-steering that supervisor 
denied that any prob ex is The supervisor dis-
puted that this conversation took place; but the supervisor 
agreed that he had "ass the loyee to the particular 
trac.tor. The employee then suffered an injury while driving 
the tractor, and eventually sued the tractor manufacturer. 
The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on assumption of 
risk, and the jury returned a plaintiff verdict. The Court 
of Appeal revers this verdict, concluding that the judge 
























The Court of Appeals decision was in September, 1975. 






and eventually asked for reargument on June 17, 1977. 
(Daly was reargued on the same day.) The Supreme Court's 
eventual opinion in Campbell can be expected to examine the 
assumption of risk ambiguities left open by the combination 
of Li, Daly, and Walters. Since the facts on assumption of 
risk in Campbell are quite weak (seep, 29 infra), the 
Campbell Court might be led to abo~ish the assumption-of-risk 
defense in a categorical way. This would be a mistake. 
V. A PROPER ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE 
In my view, there should be a doctrine of assumption of risk 
that would function as a complete defense to an action in tort, 
whether the action is based in negligence or strict liability. 
However: the doctrine should be narrowly and rigorously defined. 
Given the limits of this definition, the defense would not be 
available in many of the cases where the defense has been deemed 
available in the past. Assumption of risk should be recognized 
as a defense only when (a) the risk created by the defendant's 
tortious conduct (or defective product) is necessarily connected 
to some clear benefit which the plaintiff receives or hopes 
to receive from that conduct (or product), and (b) the plaintiff 
in fact chooses to expose himself to that risk in order to secure 
that associated benefit. In these circumstances, and probably 
in these circumstances only, should the assumption-of-risk 
defense be recognized. Several illustrations of proper applica-
tions of this defense are offered below. 
78-474 
A. Montgomery Ward sells model mower 
for $150, but o as an tion a s feature--a "deadman 
contra 
22/ 
device-=- adds $20 to the purchase price. The 
plaintiff, in buying power mower, declines to purchase 
this option because he does not want to pay its cost. The 
plaintiff then suffers an injury which would have been pre-
vented had the deadman control device been present. Later, 
the plaintiff sues Montgomery Ward for selling a defective 
, product. In this suit, a jury would be willing to conclude, 
u.~der Barker, that absence of the deadman control device 
renders the power mower defective. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that the plaintiff chose to encounter the risk in 
order to achieve the cost s which this risk-encounter 
made possible. The plaintiff should therefore lose his lawsuit, 
for reason of his assumption of 
B. Montgomery Ward's power mower cost $150, Sears' 
cost $170. se power mowers are similar, except that 
the Sears s a control device--which accounts 
for 
2?1 _:::::) 
most of the price difference between the Montgomery Ward's 
This device stops b of a power mower whenever 
the operator re es the mower's handle. It therefore 
prevents against finger amputations as the operator 
tries to clear out the mmvrer' s discharge shute. See 
La"Nn Mowers-Safety vs. Utility, Consumer Reports, 
July, 1978 pp. 387-88. 
T~~s illustration 
do not yet inc 
a "hypo t al:" power mowers 
such a control device. 
22 
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and the Sears' products. Plaintiff, knowing of this safety 
differential, buys the Montgomery Ward's mower in order to 
save money. Plaintiff then suffers an injury which would have 
been prevented by the Sears' deadman control device. Plaintiff 
sues Montgomery Ward, alleging its sale of a defective product. 
Once again, the jury would be willing to find defect. The 
plaintiff's lawsuit should be barred by assumption of risk. 
C. A. person smokes a certain or and of cigarettes. He· 
does so because of the keen pleasure which cigarettes provide. 
Evidently that pleasure is brought about by cigarette ingredients 
(nicotine and tar) which can also cause cancer--as the plaintiff 
well knows. After smoking for many years, plaintiff acquires 
cancer and sues the cigarette manufacturer. Under the Barker 
burden-of-proof rule, there is at least a presumption that the 
cigarette has been defectively designed. Nevertheless, the 
23/ 
plaintiff's lawsuit should be barred by assumption of risk.---
At least for the immediate future, the hazard in cigarettes 
is an inevitable by-product of the very ingredients in cigarettes 
which gives the smoker the pleasure which leads him to smoke 
in the first place. 
23/ See Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 21 
(D. Virgin Islands 1968). 
D. 
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A person has a medical prob for which ordinary 
medicine offers no more than a partial cure. He goes to an 
unlicensed doctor who practices medicine in an unorthodox 
way disapproved of by the American Medical Association. The 
person knows that by accepting this doctor's treatment, he 
will be losing the benefits of traditional medical care. He 
nevertheless chooses to experiment, in the hope that the 
unlicensed doctor's unorthodox method of treatment will be 
effective. This is a hope necessarily tied to his forsaking 
of traditional medical care. The unorthodox treatment produces 
no results (or adverse results), and the plaintiff sues the 
doctor for malpractice. The plaintiff's lawsuit should be 
24/ 
barred by assumption of risk.--
E. A fireman is injured by a fire negligently set. 
Firemen, as a class greatly benefit from negligent fires. 
Most fires involve negligence in their creation; without 
negligent fires, there would be little need to hire firemen. 
The injured fireman has chosen a career in firefighting over 
other possible careers, in light of the excitement of fire-
fighting as we as its satisfactory salary levels. The fireman 
sues the party whose negligence was responsible for the fire. 
T~e fireman's suit should be barred by assumption of risk. 
( s analysis of course supports the fireman's rule affirmed 
~~~alters v. Sloan. Dissenting in Walters, Justice Tobriner 
~oi~ts au· t~at no rule bars a highway maintenance worker (or, 
one might add, a salesman traveling on a highway) 




from recovering for injuries caused by a third party's negligent 
driving. Such a person may benefit from the existence of 
a highway system; but he receives no benefit from the negligent 
driving of any other motorist. The fireman and salesman situa-
tions are thus fundamentally different for assumption-of-risk 
purposes.) 
In these lawsuits mentioned above, not only should the 
defendants prevail, but these results should be explained in 
terms of assumption of risk rather than of any other legal 
doctrine. The issue of contributory negligence certainly does 
not explain the results. First of all, if the matter were 
merely one of contributory negligence, under comparative 
negligence the plaintiff could still receive a substantial 
recovery. In any event, there is nothing in any of the 
examples which suggests that the plaintiff has behaved unrea-
sonably or carelessly; and nothing in the logic of the examples 
seeks to discourage the plaintiff from engaging in his conduct 
or to penalize the plaintiff because of that conduct. Contri-
butory negligence is therefore not the issue at all. 
Nor is the real issue the absence of negligence (or defect) 
or the absence of "duty." To be sure, in E-x:ample A it is 
possible to say that the behavior of the manufacturer was 
reasonable,given the choice which the manufacturer gave the 
~lain~i=f. However, as we all know, the emphasis in strict 
25 
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not the reasonableness of its conduct. In any event, even if 
manufacturer's conduct is thought reasonable, it only 
achieves this "reasonablerr status because of the element of 
choice which it confers on the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff's 
choice is therefore the key to the example, assumption of 
risk is the most appropriate way to express the example's 
result. The idea of no negligence--or no "duty"--seems even 
less adequate as applied to Sears in Example B, since in 
that example the power of choice enjoyed by the plaintiff 
was due not to any particular effort on the defendant's part, 
but rather to the general operation of the marketplace. In 
Example D, it would be absurd to say that the disapproved 
medical treatment cannot be deemed negligent, or that the 
doctor owes no "duty" to his own patient. In Example E, the 
p responsib for the fire has been negligent by hypothesis, 
can be sued by any of the fire's ordinary victims. And I 
of no coherent definition of "duty" which would support 
idea that--assumption of risk apart--the fire-setter owes 
fi"' H h ,... no cuty to t e r~reman. 
(English law has taken the view that in order to establish 
assunption of risk, the plaintiff's conduct must entail not 
cn:1.y an implied acceptance of the risk itself, but also an 




Unfortunately, the English case law has failed to make clear, 
either by way of general definitions or helpful specific 
24a/ 
examples,- what is covered by this concept of implied 
acceptance of liability. The English rule might help explain 
the pro-defendant results in Examples A and D above. But it 
seems indeterminate in its application to the other examples, 
and also in its application to several of the examples to be 
set forth in Part VII below. I am, therefore, unpersuaded 
by Professor Fleming's recommendation that California follow 
the English model.) 
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN ASSUMPTION-OF-RISK DEFENSE 
In Examples A and B, it was assumed that a jury could 
find the power mower defective because of the absence of the 
deadman control device. wby, then, should the law bar the 
plaintiff's lawsuit? Under Barker the jury judges the product 
defective because it concludes that the risks inhering in 
the absence of the safety device outweigh the benefits 
associated with that absence (in this case, the product's 
reduced cost to the plaintiff.) But the plaintiff, in 
making his knowledgeable purchase, reveals his view that from his -
vantage point the benefits do exceed the risks. The slogan of 
assumption of risk might well be: "Let the plaintiff decide." 
24a/ See, e.g., Imperial Chemical Industries v. Shotwell, 
'1Q'~] ~ ,... 6,..6 ~-_,b) .~.·"'· ) . 
Z7 
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The idea behind assumption of risk is in certain classes 
of cases, insofar as the defendant's conduct (or product) 
runs a risk to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be in a better 
s than the jury to determine whether that risk 
adequately justified. Given the way in which the plaintiff 
exercised his power of choice, it appears that the 
defendant's risk-taking, vis-a-vis the plaintiff, is something 
which tort law ahould neither disapprove of nor seek to discourage. 
is thus a utilitarian explanation for assumption of risk: 
risk-taking that runs between the defendant and the plaintiff 
is, given the implications of the plaintiff's choice, not the 
25/ 
kind of risk-taking which society should seek to prevent.---But 
is also a humanistic explanation for assumption of risk. 
plaintiff having made a choice which reveals his satisfac-
th the defendant's conduct, our ~espect for the plaintiff 
as a full human decision-maker requires that we regard the 
26/ 
p 's revealed sat faction as decisive.-- Ironicallv, 
respect for the plaintiff as an individual requires us 
to deny his lawsuit. 
26/ 
See R. Posner, Economic Analys of 72-73 (1st ed. 1973). 
Cf. Mansfield7 Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 




These justifications for assumption of risk do assume 
that there can be a discrepancy between how the plaintiff 
evaluates the defendant's risky enterprise and how the jury 
(absent the plaintiff's choice) would evaluate that same 
enterprise. What are the possible explanations for any such 
discrepancies? There are several. (1) The plaintiff may 
be someone who is more willing than the average person to 
take risks when the risks contain potential benefits. For 
example, the plaintiff may be the kind of person who, were he 
an investor, would be inclined to buy on margin or sell short on 
the stock market. There is nothing wrong with such "favorable" 
attitudes towards risk-taking--even though the jury may have 
27/ 
a more average-person attitude.--- (2) The actual risk 
occasioned by the defendant's act may in part be a function 
of how careful the plaintiff is in his own conduct or in his 
handling of the defendant's product. (The deadman control 
device, for example, may not be necessary for the person who 
operates a power mower with care and skill in the first place.) 
For the plaintiff who correctly perceives that he is more 
careful or skillful than the average person, the ratio between 
benefits and risks arising out of the defendant's conduct/product 
27/ SeeR. Posner, supra. 
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be more favorable than the is for average 
person. (3) Even assuming no divergence between the values 
skills of the plaintiff and t~ose of the average person, 
plaintiff's evaluation of the risk/benefit ratio may be 
more accurate or trustworthy than that of the jury. The jury 
, after all, an amateur ad hoc group which looks at matters 
through the distorting lens of hindsight. 
WHEN TrlE ASSUMPTION-OF-RISK DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY. 
The rationale for assumption of risk offered above would 
ustify the defense in a limited number of cases, of which 
examples have been given above. What is important, however, 
recognize is that the rationale does not support the 
fense in the vast majority of cases in which the defense 
fact been traditionally invoked.as grounds for denying 
plaintiff any recovery. Examples of such improper applica-
are given be 
A. ~~ emp ass to use a machine which the 
28/ 
loyee knows contains a danger or defect-.- It stretches the 
to find any benefit, economic or otherwise, which 
employee receives as a real result of this product defect. 
most one can poss ly say is that--relying on very simplified 
economic assumptions--the employee's wages, in light of the 
ds o~ his work assignment, may be marginally higher than 





they otherwise would be. But even should this be so, a jury 
would be properly unwilling, absent special evidence, to 
believe that the employee exposed himself to the machine (and 
its risks) for the purpose of securing this marginal wage 
increment. Rather, he subjects himself to the machine in 
order to keep his job. And in all likelihood that job is 
more desirable to him than other jobs for a number of factors 
unrelated to any marginal wage increment. These factors include 
job security (including retention of seniority rights), 
wage levels (apart from any risk premium) opportunities for 
advancement, the ease of commuting from home to work, fringe 
benefits, the interestingness of the work, and the congeniality 
29/ 
of one's fellow workers.-- The assumption of risk defense 
defined in this Report should not be applied in such a case. 
B . The buyer of a car, having driven the car for a 
period of time, realizes that its steering mechanism is working 
improperly. The car owner has a friend who knows of this also. 
t The two of them take a drive to~ether in the car, wanting to 
30/ 
go from one location to another.-- Their taking of this trip 
may be unreasonable; if so, their products liability recovery 
can be appropriately reduced as a matter of comparative negli-
gence under Li and ~· But the doctrine of assumption of risk 
:9,' See A. Rees, The Economics of Work and Pay 97 (1973). 
3:;/ See 5?e::-ling v. Hutch, 10 Cal. App. 3d 54, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
- r-, 1. ( '· ,.. ;., -:;.: ~ - 1 a ; " ) 
I .J- -T L. ... J. .._) J...;:) 1- • - ~ 1 'J • 
31 
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should not bar their recovery altogether. As for the car 
owner, the only possible benefit he have received as a 
result of the product defect a marginally lower purchase 
price, associated the less extensive quality control program 
of the particular manufacturer. But 
be hard to believe that the owner 
sent special facts, it would 
bought this car from this 
manufacturer for the reason of this marginal cost saving. The 
case of the friend is even easier. It is hard to identify 
any benefit which the friend has received that is necessarily tied 
to the car's defect; and certainly tne friend has not chosen to 
ride in the car because of any such benefit. Neither the owner 
nor the friend should be barred from suing by the assumption-
of-risk doctrine. 
C. The plaintiff's next-door neighbor owns a vicious 
dog which trespasses upon the p 's property. The 
plaintiff, aware of this, does nothing about it, not even 
laining to Several days later, he is severely 
31/ 
bitten.- This p received no benefit from the 
ence of the vicious dog; therefore, he should not be 
ected to the assumpt 0 defense. Conceivably, his 
cility as a neighbor may entail contributory/comparative negligence. 
31/ Harshall v. Ranne, 493 S.W.2d. 535 (Tex Ct. Civ. App. 1973). 
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D. The defendant, in sponsoring a National Lap Sitting 
Centes t, furnishes a chair which is unreasonably and negligently 
frail. The plaintiff, who knows of the chair's frailty, suffers 
an injury when the chair breaks while fourteen women college-
32/ 
students are sitting on his lap.-- In this case, the plaintiff 
receives a significant benefit (or pleasure) from the defendant's 
general activity--the running of the contest. But the plaintiff 
receives no identifiable benefit/pleasure from the negligently 
risky aspect of this activity (the frail chair). There may 
be contributory/comparative negligence, but there should be no 
assumption of risk. 
E. The plaintiff accedes to the defendant's request 
that the plaintiff help the defendant pull-down a tree located 
on the defendant's land. The technique the defendant chooses 
to fell the tree is unreasonably risky; this technique the 
1 plaintiff perceives upon his arrival. In helping bring down 
33/ 
the tree, the plaintiff suffers an injury.-- Perhaps one 
can say that the plaintiff receives some "altruistic" benefit 
I in being allowed to provide assistance to his neighbor; but 
there is nothing to suggest that he receives any benefit from 
the unreasonable technique which the defendant has selected. 
32/ Wyly v. Burlington Industries, Inc. 452 F.2d 807 
(8th Cir. 1971) (applying Texas law). 
Hig:_-,_ v. Coleman, 215 Va. 7, 205- S.E.2d 408 (1974). 
33 
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F. A tennis pro plays on a synthetic tennis court which 
is in a defective condition. As a result of the defect, she 
34/ 
severely injures her knee.-- Bubbles on the tennis court's 
surface presumably made her aware of the hazard at the time she 
started playing. The tennis pro may well benefit from the 
availability of artificial surfaces. But it is hard to see 
how she receives any benefit from the defective nature of this 
artificial surface, and impossible to believe that she is 
playing tennis at this particular time and location in order 
to secure that benefit. 
G. At this point, there is a need to reconsider the 
II II 
facts in Example B (among the proper' assumption of risk 
applications.) That Example presupposed a consumer who bought 
a Montgomery Ward's product rather than a Sears' product in 
order to achieve the cost saving which the absence of the safety 
device of the Montgomery Ward's product made possible. So long 
as this explanation of the plaintiff's purchasers is accurate, 
application of the assumption-of-risk defense is proper. Note, 
however, that if all we know is the fact of the Montgomery Ward's 
purchase, we cannot infer from that fact, standing alone, that 
the consumer s motive for his purchase was to achieve the cost 
saving made possible by the lacking safety device. There are, 
in truth, any number of differences between the Sears' and 
:-!ontgomery Ward's products in addition to the safety device/ $25 
3~/ z:e.La.man v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App. 2d 21, 371 
~ ~ ~~ ~~-/ (~Q~7) 
.... • ......l • .:;.... ""'- -' _,; ~ .J.. ..., I • .. 
• 
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combination. If any of these other differences chiefly motivated the 
plaintiff's purchase, there would be no basis for applying 
assumption of risk. In certain product situations, a 
safety-device/cost-saving combination may be so dominant as 
to explain, standing alone, the buyer's purposes. Consider 
two brands of bottled grape drink, X and Y, costing 10~ and 25~ 
a bottle, where the price difference is almost entirely explained 
by the fact that one manufacturer but not the other is 
34a/ 
now utilizing shatterproof bottles. -- Given this huge difference 
in price and the general similarity of products like grape drink, 
if the plaintiff buys the 10~ drink rather than the 25~ drink 
a jury could easily conclude that the plaintiff did so because 
he was unwilling to expend for additional safety protection. 
Given, by contrast, the slighter price difference between 
the Montgomery Ward's and Sears' products and the greater 
number of important differences between those products, the 
sheer fact of the plaintiff's purchase is much less suggestive 
of why that purchase was made. Since assumption of risk is 
an affirmative defense for the defendant to allege and prove, 
in the power mower case it will be the defendant's burden to 
establish with credible (although perhaps circumstantial) 
evidence that the safety-device/$25 combination really helps 
to explain why the plaintiff decided to purchase the 
34b/ 
Nontgomery Ward's product.-
3~a/ See :?.. • Posr:.er, supra. 
3L:.C::/ o: cc'..:rse, the:-e may be several motives for the plaintiff's 
cec~s~~~. It should be enough for assumption-of-risk purposes 
~= :ie ~esire to secure the risk-associated benefit played a 
s~;~~=~ca~t pa=~ ~n that decision. 
35 
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VIII. DOES THE PROPOSED ASSUMPTION RISK DEFENSE GO TOO FAR? 
CRITICISMS, AND POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS. 
Given the justifications offered on behalf of the proposed 
assumption of risk rule, narrow as that rule is it is not impervious 
to some criticism. Particular lines of criticism suggest the 
possibility of the selective modification of the proposed rule. 
The justifications spoke in terms of giving appropriate effect 
to the plaintiff's risk-assuming decision. The assumption behind 
the justifications is that the plaintiff has made a mature, 
responsible decision to encounter the risk. The various lines 
of criticism suggest particular ways in which this assumption 
of maturity in decision-making may be inapt. 
A. Certainly, a mature, adult decision presupposes a 
mature, adult decision-maker. For this reason, it is probably 
necessary to exempt children from the coverage of the 
assumption-of- sk rule. Eighteen is now the legal age of 
majority in California--the age at which young people are 
legally allowed to make contracts, acquire property, vote, 
and so on. If eighteen the at which California regards 
young people as having the power to make decisions with legal 
i~plications, then eighteen should also be the cut-off age 




should therefore not be available when the victim is less than 
35/ 
eighteen. (If the victim's conduct is arguably unreasonable, 
on the contributory negligence issue his youth will be con-
sidered as a relevant mitigating circumstance in ascertaining 
(1) whether his conduct does indeed involve contributory 
negligence, and (2) under comparative negligence, what pro-
portion of fault should be assigned to him.) 
Similarly, since assumption of risk anticipates a mature 
and sober decision, the defense should not be applied when 
the plaintiff has made his risky decision while intoxicated. 
(Of course, intoxication greatly strengthens a contributory 
negligence claim.) 
B. Th.e "environment" in which the plaintiff makes his 
36/ 
risk decision-- may be poorly conducive to mature decision-
making. Consider an amusement park attraction which subjects 
its participants to a certain risk, but where "there would [be] 
35/ Under present California law, only children of "very tender 
years" have been exempted from assumption of risk. See 
Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. App. 2d 742, 
135 P.2d 176 (1943) (three-year-old plaintiff). 
36/ See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask - Restructuring 
Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 
60 Ia. L. Rev. l, 23 (1974). 
37 
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no ooint to the whole thing, no adventure about it, if the 
37/ 
risk had not been there."- This seems at first a strong 
case for assumption of risk: the risk is closely tied to 
a benefit, and the plaintiff is willing to encounter 
that risk in order to secure that benefit. Nevertheless, 
the plaintiff's decision to take the amusement park ride 
will usually be made on the spur of the moment and in the 
extreme hurly-burly of the amusement park environment. In 
such a situation, it may be doubtful that the plaintiff's 
risk-assuming decision is the kind of mature decision which 
the assumption-of-risk rule presupposes. Especially since 
this environment is under the control of the defendant 
amusement-park operator, it may be appropriate to reject the 
assumption-of-risk defense. This ''environmental" limitation 
on the defense should be defined tightly, however, to prevent 
it from being an argument which the plaintiff will be able 
to assert, as a way of complicating the issue, in every 
assumption-of-risk case One can-formulate the modification 
as follows: The assumption of risk defense should be unavailable 
~f plaintiff was required to make his risk decision in a 
defendant-created environment ;;v-hich is extremely ill-suited 
"~' 5 i I -
responsible decision-making. 
:!ur?r~y v. Steeplechase .Amusement . , 250 N.Y. 479, 




C. It can be argued that people are quite likely to 
"err" in making decisions in favor of encountering risks. 
Professor Calabresi notes the psychological tendency to believe 
38/ 
that accidents happen only to "the other guy;"- Professor 
Gerald Dworkin refers to the difficulty people experience in 
translating their "intellectual knowledge" about risks into 
39/ 
knowledge that is "subjectively genuine."- If these tendencies 
are regarded as accurately describing human conduct in general, 
then the utilitarian justification for assumption of risk would 
be thrown into doubt: a policy of "paternalism" might do a 
better job at achieving appropriate accident prevention than 
a system which allows individuals to make up their own minds--
and thereby make mistakes. I am on record as agreeing that 
the tendencies noted by Professors Calabresi and Dworkin can 
40/ 
be found at work in some human conduct.--But I do not believe 
that these tendencies mar or characterize the conduct of 
most people most of the time. After all, most persons usually 
drive their cars safely, and usually cross streets safely. 
Since the Calabresi and Dworkin suggestions fail as generaliza-
tions, they are not adequate to undermine the assumption-of= 
risk defense in any general way. In any event, they seem 
relevant mainly to the utilitarian justification for the defense. 
'1 8 I ::::.._1 
!.:..0/ 
G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, 55-57 (1970). 
Dworkin, Paternalism, in Horality and The Law, 107, 
120-22 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971). 
See Schwar~z. Contributory and Comparative Negligence: 
A Rea??raisal, 87 Yale L.J. 697, 716 (1978). 
39 
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If the defense's rationale is understood in humanistic terms, 
the fact that individuals might err in their risk decisions 
could be deemed irrelevant; the humanistic principle of 
individual choice could easily be understood as holding that 
the right to choose includes the right to make a wrong decision. 
D. There is, however, a fall~back or intermediate position. 
In an ordinary case, the conclusion that the defendant's conduct 
is negligent (or its product defective) is reached merely by a 
lay jury often on the basis of conflicting and complicated 
evidence; a particular jury's determination is sufficiently 
inauthoritative that it is not even admissable as evidence 
(let alone binding as precedent) in any later case raising the 
same negligence (or defect) issue. In such circumstances, 
society's evaluation of the inappropriateness of the 
defendant's risk-creation is a rather "soft" evaluation which 
can ?roperly be subordinated to any knowledgeable and voluntary 
assumption of risk by the plaintiff. In other cases, however, 
it may be fair to say that society is utterly convinced of the 
inappropriateness of the defendant's risk. The stronger 
society's conviction in this regard--the more "conclusive" 
its judgement that the defendant's risk is inappropriate--
the less willing society (via its legal system) should be to 
believe that the defendant has acted intelligently and 
ccnsistently wit~ his self-interest in choosing to encounter 
L I i __:::..; 





justification for assumption of risk simply fades in the 
presence of the enormity of the defendant's risk. And at 
some point, even the humanist would be willing to intervene 
in order to protect an individual against pro-risk decisions 
on his part that seem so clearly unsound. For reasons of 
this sort, the proposed rule could be modified by excluding 
it from cases involving the defendant's "willful and wanton 
42/ 
misconduct."- Moreover, if there is a statute prohibiting 
certain defendant conduct, that statutory prohibition can be 
read as expressing a society's strong judgement--
rendered by its legislative agency--about the inappro-
priateness of the defendant's risk. Arguably, therefore, 
assumption of risk should be no defense when the plaintiff's 
claim of negligence (or defect) is based on the defendant's 
43/ 
statutory violation.-- Many of us, however, are somewhat 
skeptical of the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of legisla-
tive deliberations; we would be less inclined to infer a 




Under existing California Law, assumption of risk is 
a defense even when the defendant's "misconduct"~s 
"willful and wanton." Lee Ching Yee v. Dy Foon, 
143 Cal. App. 2d 129, 299 P.2d 688 (1st Dist. 1956). 
Cnder present California law, the defendant's statutory 
violation negates assumption of risk. Finnegan v. 
Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950). 
But this is a position which most other jurisdictions 
have declined to accept. See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 496 F, comment e. 
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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Statutory confirmation of "pure" compara-
tive negligence, and 
( 2) Adoption of the modified set-off formula 
in Section 3 of the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act; 
(1) Apply "comparative negligence" to claims 
based on strict liability, and 
(2) Include "recklessness" and "willful mis-
conduct," short of intentional injury, 
among the kind of fault capable of 
reducing, but no longer necessarily barring 
recovery; 
Retention of the "joint and several" 
liability rule even where the plaintiff 
contributed to his injury through his own 
fault; 
Statutory enactment of contribution by 
shares proportioned to fault in lieu of 
the existing system of contribution 
"pro rata" (equal shares); 
Abolition of the "joint judgment" require-









The share of any insolvent or absent tort-
feasor shall be distributed among the 
remaining defendants and the plaintiff 
(if at fault) in proportion to their 
respective shares of responsibility; 
A release entered into by the plaintiff 
and a tortfeasor shall discharge the latter 
from all liability for contribution, but 
the plaintiff's claim against the remaining 
tortfeasors shall be reduced by the amount 
of the released tortfeasor's share of the 
loss; 
{1) In the case of a work injury caused by the 
concurrent negligence of the worker's 
employer and a third party 
(a) The employer should be allowed to 
recover from the third party any 
part of his compensation liability 
that exceeds his notional share of 
the tort damages, and 
(b) The third party should be allowed 
to claim contribution to the extent 
of the employer's share of fault 
or the employer's workmen's compen-
sation liability, whichever is the 
smaller (Section 65) i 
(2) If the employee's negligence occurred with 
that of the third party, his negligence 
iii 
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should be imputed to the employer so as 
to reduce his claim to reimbursement 
(Section 70) 
(3) Alternatively, the employer's right of 
reimbursement should be abolished, regard-
less of whether he was negligent or not, 
but the third party's tort liability 
should be reduced by the amount of workmen's 
compensation paid or payable to the 
employee (Section 67) . 
iv 
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I. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
1. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 1 the Supreme Court of California 
abandoned the all-or-nothing common law doctrine of contributory 
negligence in favor of comparative negligence, so that a contribu-
torily negligent claimant was no longer necessarily completely 
barred from recovery but merely suffered a reduction of damages in 
proportion to his own share of negligence for his injury. By this 
decision, California joined a spectacular trend in recent years 
which to date has brought 32 jurisdictions in the United States 
to adopt some version of comparative negligence. 2 The introduction 
of comparative negligence has encountered an overall favorable 
response, ranging from enthusiasm to, at least, acquiescence. While 
the Li decision has been criticized on the ground that the reform 
was an essentially legislative task, 3 it is now obviously too late 
to assert a legislative priority. It would be desirable, however, 
l13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). 
2see generally Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (1974); 
1978 Supp.); Woods, Comparative Fault (1978). 
3E.g., dissenting opinion by Clark J. See my vindication 
in Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last--By Judicial Choice, 
64 Calif. L. Rev. 239, 273-83 (1976) [cited hereafter Foreword]. 
For a critical view of the Court's handling of the Civil Code (§1417) 
see Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.--A Belated and Inglorious Centennial 
of the California Civil Code, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 4 (1977). Besides 
California, Florida, Alaska and Michigan adopted comparative negli-
gence judicially, in all cases after a lengthy justification for 
judicial activism: see Hoffman v. Jones, 380 S.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); 
Katz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Ala. 1975); Kirby v. Larsen, 256 N.W. 
2d 400 (Mich. 1977). 
1 
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to include a statutory statement of comparative negligence in a 
comprehensive statute recommended in this Study. 
2. "Pure" Comparative Negligence. The only really centro-
versial aspect of the Li decision was the Court's choice of the 
"pure" form of comparative negligence in preference to the "Wisconsin 
rule" which enjoys overwhelming following among the statutes in 
other states 4 and the qualified recommendation of the defense 
lobby. 5 Under the "pure" version, a plaintiff may recover some 
damages, however great his proportion of fault compared with the 
defendant's, whereas under the Wisconsin rule, a plaintiff can 
recover only if his negligence is less than the defendant's or, 
under a more favorable variant, is no greater than the defendant•s 6--
in the first case his share must not exceed 49%, in the latter 50%. 
The "Wisconsin" 49% rule is especially prejudicial to plain-
tiffs because it will continue to bar recovery by either party in 
the great number of automobile collisions where fault is found to 
be equal in the absence of any "finer tuning." This likelihood is 
compounded by the practice rule in some states requiring that the 
jury be kept in ignorance as to the legal consequence of a finding 
of 50% liability. 7 Its harshness is further increased by the rule 
4see Schwartz (supra n. 2) Section 3.5; Woods (supra n.2) 
Section 4.3. 
5see the Defense Research Institute's position papers, 
endorsed by the IAIC, FIC and AIA, Responsible Reform (1969) 23 and 
its successor, Responsible Reform--An Update (1972) 15. 
6Pioneered in N.H., this version gained increased attention 
as the result of its adoption by Wisconsin in 1971. It has since 
been adopted in Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey and Texas. 
7see Foreword (supra n. 3) at 245, n. 26. 
2 
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in some states requiring a comparison between the plaintiff's 
fault and each defendant's separately, so that if the plaintiff's 
share is less than the defendants' aggregate, but more than that 
of each defendant separately, he still fails to recover. 8 The 
other variant--the "50% rule"--which was pioneered by New Hampshire 
in 1969 and gained attention especially after Wisconsin switched 
to it in 1971, disqualifies only plaintiffs whose fault was greater 
than the defendant's so that, at least in the common case of equal 
fault, both parties can still recover an aliquot share from each 
other. 
3. Proponents of the "49%" and the "50%" rules invoke the 
moral argument that it is unjust to permit a party who is more at 
fault to recover anything from another less culpable. This becomes 
the more plausible when the party with greater fault also happens 
to suffer the greater injury. Suppose the fault ratio in a 
collision between 11 A" and "B" was 25%:75%, while "A's" damage 
totalled $1,000 and "B's" $5,000. Is it fair that "B" should be 
able to claim $1,250 from "A", when "A" could only recover $750 
from "B"--in other words, that the guiltier of the two should 
recover more than the other? 
There are two answers to this rhetorical question. First, 
the degree of a defendant's fault and the extent of the plaintiff's 
damage are typically quite unrelated; slight negligence can cause 
a great deal of damage; gross negligence may result in only a 
little damage. Nor does the law attempt to modify that random 
8This rule originated in Wisconsin: see Schwartz (supra 
n.3) at 78-80, 256-60. 
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relationship: a barely negligent defendant will have to pay for 
the whole of a large loss limited only by rules of "proximate 
cause." There is no reason for adopting a different principle in 
cases of contributory negligence. Comparative negligence merely 
requires a sharing (in accordance with the parties' fault) of each 
party's separate loss, but is indifferent to the size of their 
respective losses. 
Secondly, the argument assumes that both parties will be 
paying for their liability out of their own pockets, whereas in 
all likelihood the losses will be borne by insurance carriers. 
Arguments appealing for fairness may carry some measure of plausi-
bility in their application to individuals, but not to insurers 
whose function it is to spread the cost of accidents and levy 
premiums on a broad base. 
4. A more pragmatic reason for the defense lobby's prefer-
ence for the Wisconsin rule is that it reduces substantially the 
cost for defendants and their insurers. Not only does it dis-
qualify all claims by a party more than 49% [or 50%] at fault, it 
also arms the defendant's insurance adjuster or attorney with a 
powerful negotiating weapon in beating down the demands of plain-
tiffs, under the risk that litigation may ultimately deny them 
any recovery whatever. The rule therefore has the tendency not 
only to disqualify many victims, but to depress the damages 
recovered by most others. Plaintiffs resisting such tactics would 
be driven to litigate. By the same token, "pure" comparative 
negligence would tend to promote settlements, since defendants 
and their insurers would be more inclined to compromise when the 
stakes are so considerably reduced. 
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Significantly, all judicial adoptions of comparative negli-
gence opted for the "pure" version,9 while most statutory adoptions 
chose the "Wisconsin" rule promoted by the defense bar.lO The 
judicial choice, I would suggest, was less likely the result of 
plaintiff-bias than of the conviction that the Li principle of 
loss sharing proportionate to fault should be applied to all cases 
of multiple responsibility, rather than admitted only by way of 
exception to some cases while the remainder continued under the 
contributory negligence bar. Retention of the "pure" version is 
therefore here recommended. 
5. Set-Off. A more technical problem with "pure" compara-
tive negligence is how to adjust counterclaims. Under the 
"Wisconsin" 49% rule, counterclaims for losses arising out of the 
same accident are, of course, impossible, but under "pure" compara-
tive negligence and the "50%" rule, such counterclaims are quite 
frequent, especially in cases of automobile collisions. Suppose 
that "A" and "B" each suffer $100,000 of damage and that their 
fault is apportioned in the ratio of 30:70. "A" may therefore 
claim $70,000 from "B", and "B" may counterclaim $30,000 from "A". 
Under modern procedure, claim and counterclaim would 
ordinarily be set-off against each other, 1 1 with the result that 
9see the decisions cited supra n. 3. 
lOA list updated to 1977 is found in Foreword (supra n. 3) 
n. 1, 3 and 4. 
11cf. Adams v. Cerritos Trucking Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 957, 
145 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1978) (claim by tortfeasor "A" against joint 
tortfeasor "B" for "A's" damage conditioned on "A" discharging 
her share of joint liability to plaintiff). 
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"A" recovers $40,000 from "B" and "B" nil from "A". If both 
parties are uninsured, this result is entirely unexceptionable, 
indeed desirable especially if "B" were judgment-proof so as to 
prevent him from pocketing $30,000 from "A" while defaulting on 
his own larger debt to "A". 
6. The equities are, however, radically different where 
both parties carry liability insurance. The purpose of liability 
insurance is not only to protect the insured against the adverse 
impact of liability, but to assure that the victim be actually 
compensated for his tort loss, instead of having merely an empty 
claim against a judgment-proof defendant. 12 But to allow set-off 
between "A's" and "B's" liability insurers would thwart the latter 
function and confer an undeserved windfall on the insurers. To 
revert to the preceding example, instead of a total of $100,000 
($70,000 to "A" + $30,000 to "B") flowing to the accident victims, 
only $40,000 will; by the same token, the insurance carriers will 
together save $60,000 at the expense of those they were meant, 
and paid, to benefit. 
7. Two procedures are available to avoid this undesirable 
result. One is to prohibit set-off whenever one or all parties 
are insured against liability. 13 The other would attain the same 
result whenever both parties are fully insured or solvent, but 
deal more fairly with the not uncommon situation where one or the 
other party does not carry adequate coverage. This procedure was 
12see e.g. Barrera v. State Farm, 71 Cal. 2d 659, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 106, 456 P.2d 674 (1969). 


























was entitled to greater damages) would have fared considerably 
worse, "B" better, 16 thus "penalizing the party who can pay his 
obligation, if the other party is unable to pay." 17 Instead, the 
suggested formula creates an incentive to carry adequate coverage, 
which would be desirable from everybody's point of view (including 
insurers'). 
8. RECOMMENDATION 1: (1) Statutory confirmation of "pure" 
comparative negligence and (2) adoption of the modified set-off 
formula in Section 3 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 
9. Fault. Your Committee specifically solicited my 
comments on the question of what kinds of fault were susceptible 
to comparison under a comparative fault regime. 18 At one end of 
the spectrum, one party may have been grossly negligent or even 
reckless; at the other end of the spectrum, his liability may be 
strict (no fault): how can one compare either one with ordinary 
negligence? Even where both parties are negligent, their negli-
gence may be related to entirely different spheres, like the 
negligent producer of a defective automobile and an inattentive 
driver. Justice Clark has been foremost in focussing criticism on 
the perplexity of comparing "apples and oranges." 19 
The problem has been considered in several contexts by 
California courts. 
16"A" would have recovered only $30,000 from "B's" insurer, 
nothing from his own, and thus would have been $40,000 short (4/7 
of his loss; $30,000 from "A's" insurance). 
17comment to Section 3 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 
18Letter of July 7, 1978 (Denise Jarman, Legal Intern). 
19American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 
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twin principles of strict products liability and traditional negli-
gence,"21 but questioned the "insistence on fixed and precise 
definitional treatment of legal concepts." 22 For one thing, there 
had been "much conceptualistic overlapping and interweaving" 23 in 
this area; for another, contributory "negligence" was itself a 
misnomer, since it did not connote breach of a duty to another and 
was therefore different anyway from "actionable negligence" by a 
defendant. Comparative "fault" would therefore have been a better 
term; or, better still, "equitable apportionment or allocation of 
loss." 24 Hence, instead of "matching linguistic labels," it was 
more useful to "examine the functional reasons underlying the 
creation of strict products liability in California to ascertain 
whether the purposes of the doctrine would be defeated or diluted 
by adoption of comparative principles."25 Justice Richardson's 
opinion concluded that these goals would not be frustrated, 
inasmuch as the plaintiff would continue to be relieved of proving 
the defendant's negligence, "defenseless" plaintiffs would still 
be protected except for a reduction of damages proportionate to 
their own fault, and the cost would still be spread among society. 
After dismissing the contention that the admission of com-
parative negligence would lessen the manufacturers' incentive to 
2l20 Cal. 3d 725, 734. 
22 rbid. 
23rbid., at 735. 
24rbid., at 736. It is notable that the American usage of 
"comparative negligence" stands alone; in England and the Common-




produce safe products, the Court addressed the claim that "as a 
practical matter, triers of fact, particularly jurors, cannot 
assess, measure, or compare plaintiff's negligence with defendant's 
strict liability." 26 Pointing to the federal experience under the 
maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, Richardson J. concluded that 
jurors were quite capable of undertaking a fair apportionment of 
liability. This view is evidently shared by a preponderant number 
of courts in other states, 27 by many scholars, 2 8 and by the drafts-
men of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act which defines fault as 
including "acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or 
reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, 
or that subject a person to strict liability." 29 
11. The contrary viewpoint was forcibly put in Daly by the 
dissenting opinions of Jefferson J. and Mosk J.30 The former 
stressed the difficulty faced by jurors in comparing negligence 
with strict liability and the resulting unpredictability and 
inconsistency of verdicts; the latter predicted substantial pre-
judice to plaintiffs because the majority decision handed a power-
ful and "boilerplate" negotiating ploy to defendants and thus 
undermined the protective function of strict products liability. 
26rbid., at 738. 
27rbid., at 739-740. Including most foreign countries with 
substantial experience of this problem: see 11 International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law ch. 7 Section 173 (Honore). 
28 rbid., at 741. 
29 section l(b). See also the California State Bar draft 
Section 1 (SB Section 775) which applies comparative fault to "all 
tort . . actions," the accompanying comment specifically argues 
for inclusion of strict liability. 
30rbid., at 750-57 and 757-64. 
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12. Clearly, the issue is one of policy, not semantics. 
If one views strict liability as an exceptional deviant from a 
central principle of liability based on fault, the plaintiff's 
fault not only seems relevant but may invite the conclusion that 
it should actually exclude all liability of the tortfeasor. Thus 
it is the preponderant view that a tortfeasor liable without 
fault is entitled to a full indemnity from a negligent tortfeasor, 31 
but it is, of course, notable that the issue in that context does 
not affect the victim and therefore does not impinge as directly 
on any protective purpose of the strict liability rule. Hence 
where the issue is not between joint tortfeasors inter se, but 
between defendant and victim, the real choice is between the "risk" 
and the "insurance" theory of liability.32 
Under the risk theory, the plaintiff's negligence would be 
taken into account when the basis of the tortfeasor's strict 
liability is the risk created by his activity. That risk is, of 
course, all too obvious in the case of defective products, so 
obvious indeed that the liability is frequently distinguished from 
"absolute" liability and some courts have even likened it to "fault" 
liability, sufficient on any account for comparing fault. 33 This 
theory has its strongest proponent in Germany. Some of the German 
statutes creating strict liability specifically provided for the 
defense of comparative negligence, but the principle has long 
3lsee Kissel, Contribution and Indemnity Among Strictly 
Liable Defendants, 16 For the Defense 133 (1975); Foreword, 
270 n. 118. 
32see 11 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
ch. 7 Section 173 (Honore). 
33Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W. 2d 
393 (1974). The Wis. statute authorizes comparative negligence only 
with respect to "claims based on negligence." 
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since become one of general "common law" application. 34 Weighed 
on the side of strict liability is the "enterprise risk" (Betriebs-
gefahr), e.g. the risk posed by driving an automobile, truck or 
train, flying an airplane, or transmitting gas or electricity. 
This is counted against plaintiffs no less than defendants, 35 so 
that in an automobile collision, even an "innocent" driver ordi-
narily suffers a reduction in his claim against another negligent 
driver. Even the "conceptual" problem has been eased because, 
according to the official theory, what is being compared is not 
fault, but causative effect. Thus the reduction or extinction of 
liability depends on the injured party's contribution to the harm, 
and even gross negligence does not wholly exclude liability. 
The competing "insurance" theory stresses the protective 
purpose of the strict liability rule which arguably should not be 
impaired by the threat of reduction for the injured party's fault. 
This view appears to have the largest following in the u.s. where 
traditionally the plaintiff's contributory negligence has been 
regarded as irrelevant to claims based on strict liability. 36 But 
as already pointed out, the chief motivation in the past appears 
to have been to escape the drastic effect of the all-or-nothing 
rule rather than any philosophical commitment. Moreover, the case 
law was sparse and unimpressive until strict liability received 
its mighty boost in its application to defective products. The 
problem is, therefore, essentially novel in the United States. 
34supra n. 32. 
35Esser, 2 Schuldrecht (3d ed. 1969) 496. 
36see Restatement, Second, of Torts Section 402A, Comment n. 
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13. Unfortunately, the debate in Daly did not yield an 
adequate justification of the opposing views. Only Mosk J. put 
the ''insurance" theorem clearly into the forefront of his dissent; 
Jefferson J. alluded to it, 37 but only to explain briefly why he 
preferred to allow the plaintiff to recover in full rather than 
bar him completely, his main point being to continue the all-or-
nothing rule for want of any practical method of comparison. On 
the other hand, the majority was bent only on defending the 
practicality of comparison and the negative proposition that it 
would not impair the efficacy of strict products liability. It 
assumed as an incontrovertible premise that the Li rationale was 
otherwise applicable to strict liability. It thus failed to 
propose a sound theoretical foundation for making the required 
comparison and floundered amidst such terms as "comparative 
fault" and "equitable apportionment" as better alternatives to 
"comparative negligence." 
The risk theory would have furnished such a needed founda-
tion, as would perhaps a nod toward causation as an auxiliary 
criterion for comparison. Notably, the English legislation 
avoided this impasse by employing the more open terminology that 
the damages "shall be reduced to an extent as the court thinks 
just and equitable, having regard to the claimant's share in the 
responsibility of the damage." 38 Moreover, the same legislation 
defines fault as consisting in "negligence, breach of duty or 
3720 Cal. 3d 725, 756-57. 
38Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s. 1. 
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other act or omission which gives rise to liability in tort." 39 
This has enabled courts to have regard not only to the parties' 
fault in the conventional sense, but also to the causative 
potency of their conduct, the fact that the impact of reduction 
on the plaintiff is quite different from that on a defendant (who 
is insured) and other considerations relevant to fair loss distri-
bution. As already pointed out, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act 
specifically includes strict liability in its definition of 
fault. 40 
14. Oddly enough, neither side in the Daly debate took 
issue over whether reduction on account of contributory fault 
would advance the cause of accident prevention. The argument 
that it would has been a staple of the new school of lawyer-
economists who seek liability rules that would promote the most 
"efficient" accident preventive responses by potential plaintiffs 
and defendants. 41 Their argument typically assumes rational 
responses by the affected parties to given choices, such as that 
users of a product will exercise greater care in self-protection 
under the threat of reduced damages. Professor G. Schwartz 
recently explored, but convincingly demolished, this utilitarian 
argument as an unrealistic foundation for the defense of contri-
butory negligence in any of its forms. 42 This does not, of course, 
39rbid., s. 4. 
40supra n. 29. 
41E.g. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 123-24 (2d ed., 
1977); Demetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter, 1 J. Leg. 
Stud. 13, at 27 (1972). 
42G. Schwartz, Contributory Negligence and Comparative 





preclude other justifications, such as a sense of fairness that 
one who claims compensation from another for having created an 
unreasonable or excessive risk should not expect the law to ignore 
completely his own contribution in foolishly bringing about his 
own injury. 
15. Strict liability may raise a problem in the context 
not only of contributory negligence, but also of contribution. 
A strictly liable defendant may seek contribution from a negli-
gent joint tortfeasor, and vice versa. Pre-Li law was largely 
distorted by distinctions between "primary and secondary" or 
"active and passive'' negligence, and by the all-or-nothing 
dilemma where contribution was not available. It was this very 
confusion which prompted the New York and California courts in 
Dole and American Motorcycle to make a new start under the banner 
of "partial indemnity" (infra). The California Supreme Court in 
American Motorcycle specifically stressed the need for a new 
start after commenting at length on the unsatisfactory prior 
decisions dealing with products liability defendants. 43 These 
decisions can therefore no longer provide any guidance for the 
future. 
In accordance with the preceding discussion, therefore, 
there is no longer any good reason why a strictly-liable defendant 
should necessarily either have to bear the whole or none of the 
loss concurrently caused by his defective product and the negli-
4 3Arnerican Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 
578, at 591-99, especially its analysis of Ford Motor Co. v. 
Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1971). 
See also Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and 
the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 73 (1976). 
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gent conduct of another tortfeasor. In particular, not even the 
"insurance" theory of strict liability would militate against 
contribution since it is not within the protective purpose of the 
strict liability rule to protect anyone other than the victim, 
least of all anyone whose negligence contributed to the injury. 
This view was recently adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois 
in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co.,4 4 allowing 
contribution to the manufacturer of defective machinery against 
a negligent e:mployer.45 As that court saw it, "the public policy 
considerations which motivated the adoption of strict liability 
. . were that the economic loss suffered by the user should be 
imposed on the one who created the risk and reaped the profit 
When the economic loss of the user has been imposed on a defendant 
in a strict liability action, the policy considerations . are 
satisfied and the ordinary equitable principles governing the 
concepts of indemnity or contribution are to be applied . .. 46 
On the facts of Skinner, contribution rather than indemnity 
appeared the proper solution. Significantly, the Court regarded 
. h . . f . . h 1 47 causat1on as t e cr1ter1on or apport1on1ng t e oss. 
16. Willful Misconduct. So far there has been little 
judicial clarification of the converse situation, namely, the 
44374 N.E.2d 437. 
45How to reconcile contribution or indemnity with the 
employer's immunity under the workmen's compensation statute 
raises another issue discussed in Section VIII of this Study. 
46rbid., at 443. 
47 ..... be apportioned on the basis of the relative 
degree to which defective product and the employer's conduct 
proximately caused [the injuries]" (at 442). 
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effect of grosser forms of fault by the plaintiff. One problem 
area concerns the supply of liquor to a person who is obviously 
intoxicated, in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 25602 (since 
repealed 48 ). In Kindt v. Kauffman,49 the Court of Appeal (3d 
Dist.) upheld a demurrer to a claim for personal injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident by a bar patron who was obviously 
intoxicated when supplied with liquor by the defendant bartender. 
The Court held that no duty was owed to such a patron and that 
an adult bar customer who voluntarily becomes intoxicated is 
guilty, as a matter of law, not of mere negligence but of willful 
misconduct. Even after Li, such conduct remained an absolute bar 
to recovery, whether the defendant was himself guilty merely of 
negligence, or also of willful misconduct; in short, there was 
no rule of comparative willful misconduct. However, in Ewing v. 
Cloverleaf Bow1 50 the Supreme Court disapproved of two proposi-
tions in Kindt: it held (1) that bartenders did owe a duty to 
their patrons no less than to third-parties endangered by their 
patrons, 51 and (2) that a patron does not necessarily, as a 
matter of law, commit willful misconduct in consuming liquor even 
when bent on deliberately becoming drunk. 52 In consequence, if 
the jury concluded that the patron's conduct was merely negligent 
but the bartender's amounted to willful misconduct, such willful 
48Laws of California, 1978 ch. 929, 930. 
4957 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976). 
5020 Cal. 3d 389, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 572 P. 2d 389 (1978). 
51Ibid., at 401. 
52Ibid., at 404. 
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misconduct would remove the bar of contributory negligence in 
accordance with pre-Li law. The Court did not venture any comment 
on the likely outcome of such a case under the Li rule. 
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act applies the "comparative 
fault" regime to all "acts or omissions that are in any measure 
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor 
or others." 53 It is doubtful whether "reckless" was not intended 
to include also "willful misconduct;" at any rate, there is no 
policy reason why it should not -- only intended injury or self-
injury should be excluded. But for the sake of clarity, it would 
be advisable to include in any adoption of the Uniform Act in 
California a specific reference to "willful' misconduct," a term 
less familiar in other states. 
17. The application of "comparative negligence" to forms 
of aggravated fault may occur in three different situations. 
First, the defendant may be reckless, but the plaintiff merely 
negligent. The pre-Li rule which allowed the plaintiff to 
recover in full was dominated by the all-or-nothing dilemma. 
Since this compunction has now disappeared, it is possible to 
combine reduced recovery for the plaintiff with liability for the 
defendant. To say that recklessness or willful misconduct is 
fault of a different kind rather than degree was merely a rhetori-
cal device which is no longer necessary to do justice in this 
situation. 
53section l{b). The same conclusion could be inferred, but 
less clearly from the California State Bar draft's open-ended defi-
nition of fault as "any act or omission ... which constitutes 
breach of any duty ... " (The comment to Section 2 does not 





The second situation is the converse: the plaintiff being 
reckless but the defendant merely negligent. Under pre-Li law, 
the plaintiff could not recover if merely negligent, a fortiori 
if reckless. Under the comparative negligence formula, it will 
now be possible to allow him to recover albeit substantially 
reduced damages. Aggravated fault is still fault that can and 
should be brought into comparison with lesser fault, regardless 
of its label. Significantly, a recent Swedish reform allows 
reduction of damages no longer for ordinary negligence at all 
but only for gross negligence and the like. 54 This distinction 
is based on the view that the impact of reduced recovery for a 
plaintiff who is typically not covered by insurance is too puni-
tive to be justified except in case of grosser forms of misconduct. 
In the U.S. where social security benefits are far less available 
to accident victims than in Sweden, this reasoning has, if any-
thing, added force. 
The third situation is one where both parties are guilty 
of recklessness or willful misconduct, as is likely to be the case 
of the bartender and intoxicated patron. Here two solutions are 
possible: either to compare the two equal types of fault, or to 
deny all recovery. The latter alternative, as already related, 
appealed to the Court of Appeal in Kindt v. Kauffman.55 It 
likened the situation to persons who engaged in a joint illegal 
enterprise, such as speeding and prize fights, where the tradi-
tional rule has been to dismiss all claims on the maxim ex turpi 
54Tort Liability Act ch. 6, Section 1 (1975). 
55supra n. 49. 
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causa non oritur actio. To allow recovery, even reduced recovery, 
would not only offend morality, but tend to encourage patrons to 
excessive consumption of liquor. Nor would liability provide a 
deterrent to tavern owners who would simply pay higher insurance 
premiums and pass the cost on to the public. The dissenting judge, 
Friedman J., on the other hand, believed that, while Section 25602 
was ineffective as a criminal or licensing provision, a civil 
sanction would stimulate the tavern owner's responsibility in 
conjunction with the comparative negligence rule. Clearly, the 
issue is one of policy which might well be left to the courts to 
work out on an ad hoc basis. A specific provision to deal with 
joint illegal enterprises involving "willful misconduct" is not 
therefore recommended. 
18. I do not propose to discuss the relation between 
contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. This 
topic has been extensively debated by courts and commentators. 56 
I am in full agreement with the proposal of the Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act to include in the definition of fault (Section l[b]) 
"unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable 
express consent." 
19. RECOMMENDATION 2: (1) Apply "comparative negligence" 
to claims based on strict liabil include "recklessness" 
and "willful misconduct," short of intentional injury, among the 
kind of fault capable of reducing, but no longer necessarily 
barring recovery. 
56E.g. Schwartz (supra n. 2) ch. 9; Woods (supra n. 2), 




II. AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE 
20. The Li court deliberately refrained from addressing 
itself to the several problems raised by the introduction of 
comparative negligence in multi-party situations. It noted that 
such problems "lurk in the background" but directed the lower 
courts to apply the Li rationale to unsettled questions in a 
practical manner. 57 A weighty argument in favor of legislative, 
rather than judicial, introduction of comparative negligence has 
been precisely the need to deal with the whole complex of inci-
dental issues in one blow, instead of countenancing a protracted 
period of legal uncertainty. This pessimistic prognosis revealed 
itself as only too true: hundreds of cases came to clog trial 
courts in the next two years in anticipation of an authoritative 
resolution of issues that were hopelessly dividing intermediate 
courts of appeal.58 Nothing whatever was gained by this post-
ponement, since the issues were from the start unlikely to be 
clarified by protracted reflection or practical experience. It 
was none too soon when the Supreme Court in American Motorcycle 
Assn. v. Superior Court 59 at last had an opportunity of addressing 
these tardy issues. 
5713 Cal. 3d at 823-27, 532 P.2d at 1240-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
at 872-74. 
58stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 
Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 63 Cal. App. 3d 
934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1 Dist. 1976); American Motorcycle Assn. 
v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 497 (2 Dist. 1977). 
5920 Cal. 3d 578, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978). 
22 
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21. In American Motorcycle the plaintiff, a teenage boy, 
sought to recover damages for serious injuries he incurred as 
participant in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices. He 
sued the sponsoring organizations who (besides denying negligence 
and alleging contributory negligence) sought leave to file a 
cross-complaint against the plaintiff's parents for negligent 
failure of supervision. The trial court denied the motion on the 
ground that the California Contribution Act (CCP Section 875) 
allowed contribution only among tortfeasors held liable in a 
joint judgment and, since the plaintiff himself had not (for 
obvious reasons) made his parents co-defendants, the defendant 
had no cause of action against them for contribution. 60 The 
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the rationale of Li 
required the abrogation of joint and several liability for con-
current tortfeasors:61 first, because any individual defendant's 
liability should no longer exceed his own share of fault any more 
than a plaintiff's; secondly, because a plaintiff guilty of con-
tributary negligence did not have the same equity as a totally 
innocent victim in claiming to recover his full damages from any 
one of several co-tortfeasors. For this reason, the court's 
solution was expressly limited to situations where a plaintiff 
was himself at fault. 
60see Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
393 (1962). 
61135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977, 2d Dist. Div. 1; opinion by 
Thompson J.). The Court granted mandate to allow the joinder on 






Eventually the Supreme Court, though affirming the writ of 
mandate, differed radically from either of the courts below regard-
ing the resolution of the problems raised.62 In an opinion by 
Tobriner J., the Court held that (1) the Li rationale did not 
warrant abolition of the joint and several liability of concurrent 
tortfeasors, regardless of whether the plaintiff was himself at 
fault;63 (2) a defendant could claim "partial indemnity" from 
a concurrent tortfeasor for his apportioned share of fault,64 
notwithstanding the direction of CCP Section 875-876 that contri-
bution be allocated "pro rata" (i.e. according to the number of 
defendants) and not in accordance with their individual shares of 
fault;65 (3) such "partial indemnity" can be claimed from a 
co-tortfeasor even though he has not been made a party-defendant 
by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the requirement of CCP Section 
875 that contribution is limited to tortfeasors who have been 
held liable in a joint judgment; 66 (4) a good faith settlement 
with one tortfeasor released him from all liability to share with 
co-tortfeasors, but reduced the plaintiff's claim against such 
co-tortfeasors only by the amount of the settlement, not by the 
settlor's share of fault: in both respects adopting for "partial 
indemnity" the policy laid down for contribution by CCP Section 
877, 67 (5) the plaintiff's share of fault must be determined by 
62supra n. 59. 
6320 Cal. 3d at 586-91. 
64rd., at 591-99. 
65rd. at 599-605. 
66rd. at 605-07. 
67rd. at 603-04. 
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weighing his negligence against the combined total of all causa-
tive negligence, not only that of co-defendants, but including 
even absent tortfeasors.68 
The following discussion will analyze each of these points 
in turn. 




III. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
22. The Court reaffirmed the traditional "joint and 
several" judgment rule 69 in its application, after Li, as much to 
plaintiffs who are guilty of contributory fault as to those who 
are completely innocent. It thereby differed from the court below 
which would have allowed contributorily negligent plaintiffs to 
recover from any one defendant only his apportioned share of 
liability. 7 0 The Court advanced three arguments: First, it 
rejected the contention that since Li there was now a basis for 
dividing damages, namely on a comparative negligence basis, in 
contrast to the prior all-or-nothing philosophy. The joint and 
several liability rule, the Court said, was long ago extended 
from "joint tortfeasors," in the strictest sense of tortfeasors 
acting in concert, to all concurrent tortfeasors who, though 
acting independently, cause an indivisible injury. (The term 
"joint tortfeasors" is hereafter used in this Study in the more 
comprehensive second sense) . Since the negligence of each was a 
proximate cause of an entire and indivisible injury, there was no 
equitable claim vis-a-vis an injured plaintiff to be relieved 
69This terminology has become customary in the U.S., by and 
large superseding "liability in solidum" or "solidary liability." 
70That decision (supra n. 58) had been influenced by the 
desire to conform to the Li rationale without violating CCP §875. 
Since the Supreme Court found another way around CCP §875, it was 




from liability for the whole of that injury. "In other words, 
the mere fact that it may be possible to assign some percentage 
figure to the relative culpability of one negligent defendant as 
compared to another does not in any way suggest that each defen-
dant's negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire 
indivisible injury.n71 
But as Clark J. pointed out in his dissent,72 this argument 
by the majority proves too much: plaintiff's negligence is also 
a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury, but this did 
not prevent the Li court from repudiating the all-or-nothing 
solution. 
23. The Court's second argument consists of two parts: 
first, 73 it points to the incontestable fact that even after Li 
some plaintiffs will continue to be wholly free of contributory 
negligence. But while these no doubt continue to deserve the 
benefits of the "joint and several" liability rule, this does not 
prove that those guilty of contributory negligence should be 
treated the same. All one can say is that, if there is to be the 
same rule for all plaintiffs, the hardship of depriving innocent 
plaintiffs of the "joint and several" liability rule arguably 
outweighs the hardship for defendants in,being so answerable even 
to negligent plaintiffs. 
24. The second part of this argument in favor of "joint 
7lrd. at 589. 
72rd. at 611. 





and several" liability74 is that a plaintiff's culpability is not 
equivalent to a defendant's because the first consists merely in 
lack of self-care ("self-directed negligence") whereas the 
second connotes danger to others.75 This distinction ought, of 
course, to be heeded in apportioning shares of fault, 76 but does 
not seem to justify treating the shares, once ascertained, differ-
ently under the focus of the Li principle (viz. that liability 
should not exceed an individual's share of fault). Indeed, the 
argument comes close to challenging the Li principle itself 
insofar as it suggests that plaintiff's and defendant's culpa-
bility are of a different order.77 The Court itself recognized 
the double-edged nature of its own argument by weakly suggesting 
that, although it did not preclude comparative negligence, "the 
fact remains that insofar as the plaintiff's conduct creates 
only a risk of self-injury, such conduct, unlike that of a negli-
gent defendant, is not tortious."78 At this point the argument 
collapses. 
25. However, the Court's third rationale touched a firmer 
base. The cutting edge of the "joint and several" liability rule 
is that it imposes the risk of a co-tortfeasor's inability to pay 
his share on the remaining defendants, whereas limiting a 
74rts link with the first part is obscure; it looks more 
like an independent rationale. 
7 5rd. at 589. 
76see Fleming, Law of Torts (5th ed. 1977) 257. 
77cf. Clark J. at 612 (''But the differences warrant 
departure from the Li principle in toto or not at all") . 
78rd. at 590. 
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co-tortfeasor's liability to his own share alone would place that 
risk on the plaintiff. As already pointed out, the former solu-
tion is universally regarded as the fairer where the plaintiff 
is entirely innocent. On the other hand, it is not self-evidently 
also the fairer (as the Court thought it was) where the plaintiff 
was himself at fault. One's doubt increases the greater the 
proportion of the plaintiff's fault compared with the defendant's: 
suppose that P[laintiff] 's fault was 60%, D[efendant] 1 's 10% and 
D2 's 30%. Why should n1 , who is far less at fault than P(l:6), 
"guarantee" also of n2 •s share, when P's negligence, no less than 
o1 •s, was a proximate cause of his injury and his fault greater 
to boot?79 Surely the only fair solution compatible with the Li 
rationale of limiting each participant's liability to his own 
share of causative fault is to impose the risk of n2 •s insolvency 
neither wholly on P nor wholly on n1 , but to distribute it among 
P and n1 in proportion to their respective shares of fault. The 
best way to accomplish this result is to retain the "joint and 
several" liability rule, subject however (as will be pointed out 
below) to a later redistribution of n2 •s unsatisfied share. 
An additional practical reason is that a rule of "several" 
liability would inject substantial complications into tort liti-
gation and settlement, and thereby place a new burden on the 
disposition of tort claims. It would necessitate a verdict on 
79clark J. (at 613) thought it more plausible for a juris-
diction like Wisconsin to adhere to "joint and several" liability 
because a plaintiff whose share was greater than the defendant's 
would still be debarred from recovering against any of them. But 
the problem differs only in degree, not kind, according to the 






the responsibility of all conceivable parties to the litigation 
even where there is no question of the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence and might even tempt the plaintiff into the embarrassing 
position of arguing that an insolvent defendant was not negligent 
in order to avoid reduction of his verdict against the remaining 
defendants. 
26. In sum, the majority opinion in American Motorcycle 
did not make the strongest case on behalf of a sound result. It 
got lost in the maze of conceptualism instead of facing up to the 
practical aspects of jettisoning the "joint and several" liability 
rule. That rule is justified, not by a one-sided preference for 
plaintiffs, but by the very principle of evenhandedness between 
plaintiffs and defendants in Li. It should therefore appeal to 
the plaintiffs' and defendants' bar alike on grounds of fairness: 
the "several" liability rule of the Court of Appeal in American 
Motorcycle is unfairly skewed against plaintiffs, whereas the 
Supreme Court's opinion carries the seeds of unfairness for 
defendants. 
In a small number of jurisdictions the "joint and several" 
liability rule has been abandoned in its application to contri-
butorily negligent plaintiffs.8° But the overwhelming majority 
have extended the rule to such plaintiffs, either by express 
legislation or by judicial decision.81 Such an extension is also 
contained in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the California 
SOE.g. under the Kansas, Nevada, New Hampshire and Vermont 
statutes. 
81see the state-by-state tabulation, with citation to the 
relevant statutes or decisions, in the Appendix to American Motor-
cycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 506-12. 
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State Bar draft (SB 1959), and was recommended in Professor 
G. Schwartz's Report to your Committee82 in opposition to the 
proposal of the California Citizens' Commission Report.83 Since 
such an extension was not precluded by legislation in California, 
no objection could be raised to the Court's decision to so extend 
it in working out the implications of its own Li precedent.84 
It may, nonetheless, be preferable to give statutory sanction to 
the rule in the context of the more general statutory revision 
recommended by this Study. 
RECOMJ.VIENDATION 3: Retention of the "joint and several" 
liability rule even where the plaintiff contributed to his 
injury through his own fault. 
82Recommendation 4D. 
83Report 114-23. 
84clark J.'s insistence that this was a legislative task 
(id. at 612-13) must be viewed in the light of his same objection 




IV. COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION 
27. The second major ruling of the Court in American 
Motorcycle was to sanction comparative contribution among tort-
feasors under the new label of "partial indemnity."85 Contribu-
tion among tortfeasors has in the main been a creature of statute 
in derogation of the common law which, as in the parallel situ-
ation of contributory negligence, countenanced only an all-or-
nothing solution. In a few, but ill-defined, situations, the 
Common Law permitted a shifting of the whole liability from one 
tortfeasor to another (principally from one liable merely for 
faultless causation, e.g. in cases of vicarious liability); 
otherwise it denied all relief on the puritannical ground that 
it would not assist a wrongdoer (in pari delicto potior est 
conditio defendentis). In no event, could there be sharing. 
In a majority of U.S. jurisdictions, contribution was 
introduced by adoption, or at least under the inspiration, of 
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. This model, in 
both its versions (1939 and 1955), opted for "pro rata" contribu-
tion, i.e. by equal shares among the tortfeasors, rather than for 
"comparative" contribution, i.e. in proportion to their shares 
of fault. This choice has been defended on the following grounds: 
first, that (contribution being an equitable doctrine) "equity is 
equality." Secondly, since the negligence of each tortfeasor 
85supra n. 59, at 599. Applied to strict liability in 




must have been a proximate cause of the injury, its causative 
effect could not be assessed otherwise than by giving it equal 
weight with that of the others. More persuasive than these 
a priori arguments are two practical considerations: first is 
the simplicity of pro rata division. It dispenses with the need 
for, and costs of, any protracted inquiry into shares of fault 
and aids settlements because the formula is categorically fixed 
by law. Secondly, its advocates contend that the formula pro-
motes settlements in yet another way: insofar as a defendant 
with a low percentage of fault will settle rather than risk 
being found liable at a trial and incurring pro rata liability. 
This argument, however, seeks to make a virtue out of its potential 
for serious abuse, namely, as a means not for encouraging, but for 
extorting settlements from slightly negligent defendants. As the 
Wisconsin court observed, after labelling it "a convenient black-
jack," "the end does not justify [such] means."86 
28. Pro rata contribution is, however, incompatible with 
the Li rationale of apportioning liability in accordance with 
shares of fault. That rationale clearly has as much relevance 
between several defendants as it has between plaintiff and 
defendant(s). Obviously, its appeal increases the larger the 
disparity of fault: no wonder that it was in a case of 5:95 that 
the Wisconsin court felt impelled to abandon the pro rata rule. 87 
Moreover, in cases where a contributorily negligent plaintiff is 
facing several negligent defendants, the pro rata rule would, 
86Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d lr 12; 114 N.W.2d 105, 
111 (1962). 






since Li, lead to strikingly odd results: suppose, e.g., that 
P is adjudged 25% at fault, D1 25% and n2 50%. If P chose to 
collect 75% of his loss of $100,000 from D1 , as he is entitled 
to do under the "joint and several" liability rule, it would run 
counter to the Li rationale to limit D1 's claim for contribution 
to $37,500 (50% of $75,000) instead of $50,000 (D2 's fault-
proportioned share}. Such a rule would make the ultimate alloca-
tion of liability contingent on a random factor, namely, the 
amount which the plaintiff chose to collect from D1 . Hence, 
whatever the justification for the "pro rata" rule at the time 
when contributory negligence was a complete defense, it became 
incongruous with the introduction of comparative negligence. An 
increasing number of jurisdictions have, therefore, adopted 
"comparative contribution" either by legislation88 or judicial 
decision. 89 
29. The only obstacle to the California Court following 
this trend was California's Contribution Statute of 1957 (CCP 
§875) which followed the 1955 Uniform Act in prescribing the 
"pro rata" rule. 90 The·same obstacle had been faced down by the 
88E.g. Minn. Stat. Ann. §604.01 subd. 3(b); Nev. Laws 
(1973) ch. 787 ~1, subd. 3(b); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §507, 7-a; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A, 15-15.1 to §2A, 15-15.3; N.Y. Civil Practice 
Act (C.P.L.R.) §1401 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.D. Cent. Code 
§9-10-07; Ore. Rev. Stat. §18.485; Tex. Vernon's Civ. Stat. 
Art. 2212a §2(b); Utah Code Annot. §78-27-40 (2); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. 1959, Tit. 12 §1036. 
89Bielski v. Schulze, (supra n. 86), Packard v. Whitten, 
274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971). 
90The statute was sponsored by the State Bar of California 
which provided an explanation of its purposes to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee (1 Sen. J. Appendix) (Reg. Sess. 1957, p. 130). 
34 
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New York Court of Appeals five years earlier Dole v. Dow 
Chemical Co.91 Following this precedent, the Supreme Court 
argued that its version of sharing among tortfeasors in accord-
ance with fault was a development of "equitable partial indemnity" 
which had not been foreclosed by the statutory scheme of "contri-
bution" enacted by CCP Sections 875-877. This argument was 
entirely result-oriented and might well be criticized as a 
usurpation of the legislative function.92 As previously explained, 
indemnity has always meant a shifting of the complete liability, 
while contribution signifies a sharing of liability. Thus for the 
Court to invent the label of "partial indemnity" for a new judi-
cial regime of loss sharing was merely a semantic maneuver to 
sidestep the parameters of the legislative regime of "contribu-
tion."93 In effect, the Court read CCP Section 875-877 out of the 
statute book by freeing "partial indemnity" from two unwelcome 
limitations: (1) the requirement of a joint judgment (see infra) 
and (2) the "pro rata" allocation of shares. 
The New York legislature, prodded by its own Court's 
decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., two years later amended 
its Contribution Act by enacting contribution in proportion to 
fault.94 Faced with exactly the same situation, the California 
9130 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). 
92see my criticism of Dole v. Dow Chemical in Foreword 
(supra n. 3) at 255-56. 
93The Court also attempted to reinforce its position by 
finding statutory encouragement in the statute itself for a con-
tinued development of "equitable indemnity" (at 599-605). It 
would serve no purpose in this Study to counter this disingenuous 
argument point for point. 




legislature should do likewise. Such also is the proposal of 
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the California State Bar 
draft (SB 1959). 
30. RECOMMENDATION 4: Statutory enactment of contribu-
tion by shares proportioned to fault in lieu of the existing 
system of contribution "pro rata" (equal shares) . 
36 
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V. THE "JOINT JUDGMENT" RULE 
31. In enacting its contribution statute in 1975 (CCP 
Section 875), California deviated from its model, the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955), by limiting contribu-
tion to tortfeasors against whom "a money judgment has been 
rendered jointly." It has since been held that no cross-complaint 
for contribution can be filed against a tortfeasor not sued by 
the plaintiff so as to make him a party defendant in the plain-
tiff's action and thus set the stage for an eventual joint 
judgment.95 "The result is a circular series of contingencies 
that cannot be satisfied. The defendant has no right to contri-
bution unless he obtains a joint judgment, he cannot obtain a 
joint judgment unless he states a cause of action, and he cannot 
state a cause of action unless he has a right of contribution.96 
32. Several arguments account for this position. One is 
that it avoids such complications as inconsistent verdicts, dis-
putes over the amount of the plaintiff's loss, what effect to 
attach to a prior settlement, lapse of time, and so forth. Another 
that it promotes administrative efficiency by deterring multiple 
litigation. But both objectives can be attained without pro-
95General Electric v. State of California, 32 Cal. App. 3d 
918, 925-26 (1973); Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 
26 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962). See Goldenberg & Nicholas, Comparative 
Liability Among Joint Tortfeasors: The Aftermath of Li v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 8 U.W.L.A. L. Rev. 22 at 43-54 (1976). 





hibiting cross-complaints. Thus Michigan, prior to abandoning 
the joint judgment requirement altogether in 1974, specifically 
permitted cross-complaints for contribution to satisfy the joint 
judgment requirement.97 
Less tractable are two policy arguments. Foremost is the 
plea that the plaintiff should be free to select his adversaries 
without possible prejudice from having defendants foisted on him 
at the trial who might evoke special sympathy, leading to lower 
verdicts. This is an argument against cross-complaints but not, 
of course, against separate actions for contribution. 
The preceding argument may be reinforced on the ground 
that a plaintiff's decision not to sue a particular co-tortfeasor 
will often be based on the conviction that he is less well 
equipped to bear any part of the loss than the other(s). Denial 
of contribution may thus serve sound notions of loss allocation 
by preventing a "strong'' tortfeasor from shifting part of the 
accident cost to a substantially weaker tortfeasor; the most 
obvious illustration being a liability insurer seeking contribu-
tion from an uninsured tortfeasor. The very facts of the American 
Motorcycle case reveal just such a situation: namely, two pre-
sumably insured corporate defendants claiming contribution from 
the teenage victim's parents who were almost certainly uninsured 
against claims for negligent lack of supervision. Although this 
policy argument has been raised categorically against any form of 
97Michigan Comp. Law Ann. Section 600.2925 (1974). 
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contribution among tortfeasors,98 it might be implemented at 
least--so the argument runs--where the plaintiff himself considered 
contribution undesirable. 99 
33. The argument to the contrary, however, strikes most 
observers as the stronger on balance. It is simply that a plain-
tiff should not have the unrestricted power unilaterally to decide 
how the loss should be allocated among several tortfeasors and 
thus to prevent, if he so wishes, any distribution among them. 
In truth, the "joint judgment" rule perpetuates the worst feature 
of the old common law principle of no-contribution by giving this 
enormous, uncontrolled power to plaintiffs. If indeed there are 
situations in which contribution would be against public policy, 
that determination ought to be made by the law, not the plaintiff, 
granting a specific immunity or prohibiting contribution. 
Besides, the "joint judgment" rule may tend to discourage 
settlements, since a settlor is disqualified from claiming contri-
bution. The risk he takes of settling for more than his due 
share is indeed somewhat increased under comparative since he 
would have to guess right not only the total amount of the damages, 
but also s own relative share of fault. That the prejudicial 
9 , Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Prag-
matic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941) which elicited a 
rebuttal from Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: 
A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170 (1941). Recently, Weir 
9 Intern'l Encycl. Comparative Law [hereafter cited Encyclopedia], 
ch. 12, at 78) sided with James by advocating abolit1on of 
contribution, if not altogether, at least by insurers and other 
"excellent loss-spreaders." 
99It is all the more remarkable that the Court's opinion 
in Americ~n Motorcycle barely adverted to this aspect, merely 
guarding itself against any implication that it endorsed filial 






effect on settlements is not a figment of the imagination is 
documented by the special legislative waiver of the requirement 
that it was felt necessary to pass in order to facilitate speedy 
settlements after the Baldwin Hills Dam disaster in 1963. 100 
The trend has, therefore, been decisively against perpetu-
ation of the "joint judgment" rule. Michigan long ago first 
mitigated it, as already pointed out, by authorizing joinder and 
later abolished the requirement altogether.lOl New York also 
abolished it, in train with introducing comparative negligence 
for plaintiffsl02 and comparative contribution among tort-
feasors.l03 Legislation in California should follow the same 
course. 
Abandoning the "joint judgment" rule opens the possibility 
of increased multiple litigation which would not only increase 
legal costs and impose an unnecessary burden on judicial admini-
stration, but also raise the prospect of inconsistent verdicts. 
A tortfeasor sued in the second action would not be bound by the 
verdict in the first with respect either to liability or shares 
lOOstat. 1964, First Ex. Sess., ch. 1. Held constitutional 
in City of Los Angeles v. Standard Oil of California, 262 Cal. 
App. 2d 118, 68 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1968); appeal dism., 393 U.S. 267 
(1968). An illustration of a settling tortfeasor's claim for 
"partial indemnity" since American Motorcycle is Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 
Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978). 
lOlsupra n. 97. 




of fault. 104 Since the responsibility of all participants in 
the accident must in any event be assessed in order to fix the 
shares of fault of any one of them (infra s. 41), it is all the 
more desirable to have all of them before the court in order to 
take advantage of their conceivably conflicting testimony and 
fix their shares of responsibility once and for all. 
However, I do not consider it necessary to impose either 
incentives or penalties in order to promote joinder. For if the 
plaintiff chooses not to join a particular tortfeasor himself, 
it will in most cases be in the defendant's interest to do so. 
So long as the latter may freely implead any other person for 
the purpose of asserting a claim for contribution or indemnity--
and such procedure is readily available under CCP Section 
428.10(b) 105--there is thus already a sufficient incentive based 
on self-interest which needs no reinforcement. Given the ample 
authority of California's long-arm statute, 106 nonresidence will 
rarely be a reason for the plaintiff's failure to join a particular 
tortfeasor, but in any event such an obstacle could no more be 
overcome by the defendant than the plaintiff. 
35. If, contrary to the preceding recommendation, sane-
tions for compelling joinder were deemed desirable, two alterna-
104Goldenberg & Nicholas, supra n. 95, at 49-50, add "any 
inconsistency of verdicts between the two actions could result 
either in unjust enrichment to the prior defendant (i.e., if in 
the later verdict the plaintiff's damages are found to be greater 
or the defendant's proportionate fault found to be less), or in 
the defendant being short-changed (i.e., if the later verdict 
found plaintiff's damages or proportion of fault smaller or the 
defendant's degree of culpability greater)." 
1 5This procedure was hitherto precluded by the "joint 
judgment" rule. 




tives are available. One would debar a defendant from later 
claiming contribution in a separate action, at least if he had 
no reasonable cause for failing to cross-claim. 10 7 This would 
be analogous to the existing compulsory cross-claim provision 
regarding any "related cause of action [a defendant] has against 
the plaintiff." 108 
The other alternative would be to put pressure on the 
plaintiff by limiting his claim to each defendant's individual 
share only, in case of unjustifiable non-joinder of others. 
Admittedly, this method would in one respect be less drastic than 
the former, since it would not preclude the plaintiff from later 
bringing a separate action against those he originally omitted 
to sue. But in most situations in which he wished to spare a 
particular tortfeasor, e.g. because (as in American Motorcycle) 
he was a close relative, his reason for doing so would also pre-
elude him from suing later. In any event, we are accustomed to 
respect a plaintiff's unwillingness to take the initiative in 
joining a particular party for whatever reason; and so long as 
the defendant he does sue has the opportunity of joining him as 
a co-defendant, there can be no great opportunity for abuse. 
Thus the plaintiff's decision against joinder need not be at the 
defendant's expense since the latter has always the means to 
defuse it. 
107Goldenberg & Nicholas, supra n. 95, at 50-53. Such a 
provision is contained in the Proposed Statute of the State Bar 
(Section 6) and SB 1959 (proposed CCP Section 881) . It was 
adopted by the Ontario Court in Cohen v. McCord [1944] 4 D.L.R. 
753 (C.A.); Rickwood v. Aylmer (1957) 8 D.L.R. 2d 702 (C.A.). 
108ccP Section 426.30(a). 
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36. Yet another ground for objecting to a plaintiff pro-
ceeding separately against different defendants is the abusive 
practice of verdict-shopping, i.e. testing his luck before 
several juries in the expectation of eventually collecting up to 
the highest verdict.l09 Under the English legislation which has 
been widely followed in the British Commonwealth, this practice 
was discouraged at the time of introducing contribution among 
tortfeasors by limiting plaintiff's recovery in subsequent actions 
to the amount awarded in the first, and depriving him of his legal 
costs unless the court is of the opinion that there is a reason-
able ground for bringing the subsequent action.llO Verdict-
shopping, however, is not widespread because the contingent fee 
system discourages it, and because it is generally in the defen-
dant's interest to join all other tortfeasors for contribution. 
No legislative change in this regard is therefore recommended. 
37. RECOMMENDATION 5: Abolition of the "joint judgment" 
requirement for contribution. 
109see Note, Consequences of Proceeding Separately Against 
Concurrent Tortfeasors, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 700-02 (1955). 
lJOLaw Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1936 




VI. THE INSOLVENT OR ABSENT JOINT TORTFEASOR 
38. If one or more of several joint tortfeasors is unable 
to pay his full share of the damages, who should bear the burden 
of the shortfall? Three solutions are possible: (1) the plain-
tiff, (2) the solvent defendant(s), or (3) to distribute the 
shortfall among the solvent defendant(s) and any contributorily 
negligent plaintiff in proportion to their shares of fault. 
Alternative (1) is accomplished by limiting the liability of each 
tortfeasor to his own share only, in lieu of "joint and several" 
liability. In section III of this Study that solution was 
rejected, even in its application to plaintiffs guilty of contri-
butory negligence, as incompatible with the Li rationale of 
distributing the accident cost proportionately to fault. The 
solvent defendant has no greater equity than the plaintiff to 
escape his share of the shortfall. 
The flaw of solution (2) lies in the fact that it makes no 
allowance for the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any. 
For there is no reason, compatible with the Li rationale, why a 
defendant should bear a share disproportionately larger to his 
fault than a contributorily negligent plaintiff merely because a 
co-defendant is unable to pay his own full share. 111 In sum, to 
lllThe State Bar draft Section 6(c) (and SB 1959: proposed 
CCP Section 880[c]) incorporates solution (2) but without stating 
any reason for excluding plaintiffs at fault. That that proposal 




1 on the so defendant would be as 
to whol on the would be to 
the latter le with the principle 
s 
on solution compatible with , there-
fore to among the solvent parties, 
f as well as (s), in the proportion of their 
re shares Thus the ratio between P, n1 and 
n2 was 25:50:25 and n2 was insolvent, P's share would be increased 
2/3 of the deficiency. This solution has been 
jur 






lars,ll2 enacted several common law 
adopted by the Uniform Comparative 
114 It was so approvingly commented on by 
case.ll5 
iple be translated into practice? 
s Study, the "joint and 
rule s first, but not necessarily the 
ustment between plaintiff and defendant(s). 
example, D2's insolvency is 
the tr , his share can, and should, 
n at 614. 
45 
, Legislative Loss Distribu-
36). Others: Glanville 
Section 48 
1 Liability Act 1961 s. 28i 





be immediately redistributed between P and o1 in the ratio of 
1/3 and 2/3, as is indeed contemplated already under the existing 
statutory direction (CCP Section 875[b]) to administer contribu-
tion "in accordance with the principles of equity."ll6 
There is, of course, no reason for applying a different 
principle if the insolvency becomes known only later. But in 
that event a supplementary judicial order would be needed to 
reallocate the insolvent's share. This raises no serious admini-
strative problem since o2 •s share would already have been fixed 
by the jury's verdict; the matter can, therefore, be expeditiously 
dealt with by motion. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977) 
Section 2(d) properly suggests a time limit for such a motion, 
such as one year after judgment in the original action, and 
specifically provides that the party whose share is reallocated 
remains "subject to contribution and to any continuing liability 
to the claimant on the judgment." 
41. A related problem is how to deal with absent tort-
feasors. The California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle 
expressly approved the revised BAJI instruction (No. 14.90) that 
juries assess shares of responsibility among all responsible 
participants of the accident, whether or not joined as parties 
to the litigation.l17 It would seem proper that, rather than 
116That this provision has the purpose of determining 
"pro rata" shares by first excluding insolvent tortfeasors is 
expressly mentioned in the Comment to the Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act Section 2 (1955). The procedure is illus-
trated by the English case of Fisher v. C.H.T. Ltd. (1966) 2 Q.B. 
475, 480-81 (C.A.). 
ll7At 590 n. 2. 
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adding absent tortfeasor's share to the remaining defendants 
alone, that share be stributed proportionately among them and 
any contr ly negligent f.ll8 The absent defendant 
would, of course, remain liable to contribution, though free to 
relitigate s lity since he is obviously not bound by 
res judicata or issue estoppel. If the claim for contribution 
is successful, the latter's share would be redistributed among 
the plaintiff the defendants in the original action who had 
provisionally absorbed it. Since the plaintiff is directly 
interested a contribution claim, he should have a right 
to initiate and/or become a party co-plaintiff. 
An approach, espoused by the Uniform Campara-
tive Fault Act, is to limit the allocation of shares to the 
litigating Ignoring "absent tortfeasors" is defended 
on the ground cannot be told with certainty whether 
[such a] was actual at or what amount of fault 
should be to , or whether he will ever be 
nll9 The effect this proposal, will be noted, 
is e the f st-mentioned proposal of 
di share absentee among the remaining 
State Bar draft Section 6(c) and SB 1959 (proposed 
CCP 880[c]) would stribute the absentee shares only 
among the remaining "judgment debtors" (i.e. defendants): see 
also corr@ent A to Section 3. As already pointed out in relation 
to the same proposal for uncollectible shares of party defendants 
(supra n. 111), s does not hold the scales evenly between 
faulty defendants and plaintiffs. 
II 
119comment to 2. It is also--rightly--pointed out 
defendants will have significant incen-





defendants and any plaintiff at fault. 12 0 
42. RECOMMENDATION 6: The share of any insolvent or 
absent tortfeasor shall be distributed among the remaining 
defendants and the plaintiff (if at fault) in proportion to their 
respective shares of responsibility . 
120A difference would arise only if under the first-
mentioned proposal the absentee's share was distributed only 
among the defendants, excluding any plaintiff at fault. 
48 
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VII. THE SETTLING JOINT TORTFEASOR 
43. Settlement with one of several joint tortfeasors 
raises two principal issues: (1) the finality of the settlement 
vis-a-vis the remaining tortfeasors, amount the plaintiff can 
recover from those other tortfeasors. Varying answers, reflect-
ing continuing shifts in assessing this situation, have been 
forthcoming.l 21 
The original version of the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act (1939) espoused the principle of equality among 
tortfeasors by providing that the settling tortfeasor(s) remained 
liable for contribution in the amount by which his share exceeded 
the dollar value the settlement. The settlement could be made 
final only by stipulating for a reduction of the remaining 
tortfeasors' lity by the amount of S's pro rata share.l22 
Only three States adopted s version of the Act, a common 
explanation being that it discouraged settlements by providing 
little to S or P to settle. 
44. Under Dean Prosser's direction, the second version of 
12lsee general Comment, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 
18 Stan. L. Rev. 486 (1966). Comparative: Encyclopedia, supra 
n. 98, Sections 100-01, 125-26. 
122section 2. Adopted Arkansas, Hawaii and South 
Dakota; also Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 701 (D.C. Civ. 1962). 
As an alternative to ''pro rata" reduction, reduction by the 




provided for (1) finality of a good faith settlement vis-a-vis 
any other tortfeasor, D as well as P, and (2) reduction of D's 
liability only by the amount stipulated in such settlement or 
actually paid, whichever was the larger. This version was 
adopted by a greater number of States, including California,l23 
but it is far from clear whether it was this feature rather than 
an increasing disenchantment with the common law rule of 
no-contribution which was the primary motive. The plaintiffs' 
bar has been the principal advocate of this solution, because 
an under-value settlement in good faith does not prejudice the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, it is clearly incompatible with 
the Li principle of each party bearing his own proportionate 
share of the loss and thereby unfairly disadvantages the non-
settling tortfeasors by a transaction to which they are not a 
party and in which they have no voice. Besides, while there is 
an undoubted public benefit in settlement, that benefit accrues 
only where all claims relating to the loss are included. Such, 
however, is not accomplished by the 1955 version because P is 
free to litigate with the remaining tortfeasors. The saving of 
"transaction costs" (principally legal and court expenses) in 
settling merely with one joint tortfeasor is too marginal and 
speculative to justify the rule in face of the Li principle. 
45. Accordingly, there has been a swing of the pendulum 
to the more moderate view that, while the settlor (S) should be 
free from claims for contribution, the plaintiff's recovery from 
the other tortfeasors should be reduced by S's full share of 
l23ccP Section 877. 
50 
78-550 
fault. This , long advocated by scholars,l24 has by now 
acquired a large following in legislation,l25 as well as inde-
pendent judicial decisions;l26 it has also been adopted by the 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977) but not by draft bills 
endorsed by the plaintiffs' bar. 127 It is clearly more compatible 
with the Li rationale than the "pro tanto'' reduction rule in that 
it limits the nonsettling tortfeasors' liability to their own 
proportionate shares, unaffected by the settlement to which they 
were not privy and in which they had no voice. 1 28 Surprisingly, 
however, the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle129 
broke with the Li rationale a second timel30 by adopting the 
Contribution Act formula of "pro tanto" reduction also for "par-
tial indemnity." It did so ter, without the benefit of ---
124Gregory Legislative Loss tribution in Negligence 
Actions, 78 (1936); Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory 
Negligence, 416 (1951); Foreword, supra n. 3, at 257-58; Golden-
berg & Nicholas, supra n. 95, at 53; Kikel, Comparative Negligence, 
Multiple Parties and Settlements, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 1264 (1977). 
125Arkansas, Hawaii, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Wyoming. 
126E.g. Pierringer v. Hager, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 
106 10-12 (1963); Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 




1 27The State Bar Section lO(a) and SB 1959 (proposed 
884[a]) are identical with the current version of 
877(a). The comment in the State Bar draft does not 
the reader to alternatives! 
128For the same reason, it is also preferable to "pro rata" 
reduction ch had been the first choice of the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act (1939) (supra at n. 116). Gomes v. 
Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Civ. 1967, Virgin Isl. law without 
statutory guidance) specifically preferred "fault" to "pro rata" 
reduction and argued that s effect on settlements was the same. 
1 9supra n. 59, at 603-04. 
130As pointed out by Clark J. who preferred the view recom-





briefing or argument,l31 and without any extended discussion 
beyond invoking the pro-settlement argument which, as already 
pointed out, does not really support its weight. 
46. The alternative solution of reducing the plaintiff's 
recovery by the full amount of the settlor's full share does, 
however, raise the question of why the plaintiff should in this 
instance bear the whole burden of any deficiency (regardless 
indeed of whether he was himself contributorily negligent) , when 
in situations not involving a settlement the burden would either 
be shared with the remaining defendants,l32 or placed entirely 
on the latter (depending on whether the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent or not) . 
There are several reasons for drawing this distinction. 
The plaintiff remains, of course, the sole arbiter whether to 
settle and, if so, for how much. If he does not wish to assume 
the risk that the settlement is subsequently determined to be 
under-value, he need not settle at all. On the other hand, he is 
given a strong incentive to drive the hardest bargain with·the 
settlor and not to prejudice the remaining tortfeasors by a 
settlement that is either collusive, deliberately discriminatory, 
or unintentionally inadequate. This self-regulatory incentive 
is clearly more effective than the requirement of "good faith" 
under the current California statute and the Uniform Contribution 
Act from which it is derived. 
l3lsee Clark J. at 610 n. 1. Lemos v. Eichel, 83 Cal. 
App. 3d 110, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1978) held that reduction for 
plaintiff's fault is made prior to reduction of settlement amount. 
This is clearly correct though less advantageous to plaintiffs. 
l3 2According to the recommendation in Section V of this 
Study. 
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47. Actually, there has been little occasion for clarify-
ing the meaning of "good faith" in this context.l33 Clearly the 
burden of proving lack of good faith is in practice a heavy one 
as long as courts are persuaded that settlements should be 
encouraged in pursuit of the statutory policy underlying the 
"pro tanto" rule. 13 4 If the consideration for the settlement 
approximates the plaintiff's best estimate of the settlor's share 
of liability, the requirement is obviously satisfied. But it 
seems also to be common ground that a settlement up to the 
settlor's insurance coverage will pass muster, even though it 
falls far short of the settlor's share.l35 Why should a plain-
bear the whole deficiency in such a case, when he would 
only have to bear a proportionate share he declined to settle? 
Evidently, a plaintiff who did so must have reason for thinking 
133The Uniform Acts Annotated contain no case citations 
whatever to this phrase. In California, it has been explored 
only in Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 
986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972) and Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 
62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976). 
134clark J. argued (at 610 n. 2) that the good faith 
requirement practice to discourage settlements and thus 
defeats the rationale of the "pro tanto" rule. Sanctions for 
of good faith are explored by Friedman J. in River Garden 
Farms v. Superior Court, supra n. 133, depending on whether the 
plaintiff and the settlor, or either of them alone, was impl 
cated. It should be noted that, due to California's "joint 
judgment" rule, a settlor still cannot be sued for contribution 
even if the settlement is set aside. 
135E.g. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, supra n. 133, at 
238-39: "But we opine that it would be a rare case indeed where, 
as here, a joint tortfeasor who was the immediate causative agent 
of the claimant's injuries, who settles for the full amount of 
his insurance cov~rage, may reasonably be charged with lack of 





that it would st l to so: 
because recovery 
against le 
quent l s while 
to el j or even to settlor 
to give testimony s 
remaining s. 136 Most 
plaintiff is no sure to enter 
value settlement he not to assume the 
risk of the deficiency. 
48. , the be rewarded by being 
allowed to keep , even 
he would in end a s sa tis-
faction of s s.l37 Any create a 
situation which to s incentive to 
Nor does the t present a to 
contrary. e one- is to pre-
vent the lf at expense 
of the defendants, principle not violated: the 
non-settling 1 s 11 not required to pay more 
than their has bought peace. 
136so-cal Carter" or "sliding recovery 
agreements" have judicial or even legislative 
protection for the remaining defendants: e.g. Calif. CCP Section 
877.5. See Professor G. Schwartz's Report to your Committee 
(p. 110-113) on the Cal zens' ssion recommendation 
4B-2 to "prohibit Mary " agreements. If anything, the 
recommended rule will tend to discourage such collusive arrange-
ments far more present rule. 
137s0 
A.2d 129, 135 
54 
44 N.J. 228, 239i 208 












VIII. IMMUNITIES AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
50. A of contribution exists only among parties who 
are jointly liable for same j condition is not 
satisfied if the party from whom contribution is sought not 
liable to the tort victim on account of an immunity. Common 
examples are when that party is spouse, parent or child of 
the victim.l38 In a few jurisdictions, the view has been taken 
that such immunities may not defeat contribution 
ale is linked exclusively to direct claims by the 
their ration-
, e.g. 
fear of collusion between spouses at the cost of the defendant's 
liability insurer,l39 a concern which would not extent with the 
same force, or at all, to contribution claims; most jurisdictions, 
however, apply the immunity to 
has not been faced in Californ 
claims. Hitherto the problem 
because, prior to 
Motorcycle, contribution was permitted only among parties held 
liable in a joint j Besides, the problem is now of 
lesser dimension than it would have been 20 years because 
most of the more common immunities figuring in tort li 
have, in the meantime, lished Cal , e.g. 
family immunities, charitable immunity, the guest statute and 
138see Prosser, Law of Torts, 309 (4th ed. 1971). 
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issue of comparative 
therefore disqualifies c 
igence 
s not only to the 
also to contribution. It 
for contribution between one liable 
in contract and liable tort (and, of course, between 
persons e contract). This creates a serious gap 
which has recently been closed 
(Contribution) Act 1978.190 
England by the Civil Liability 
(2) Section 2 (SB Section 876) defines fault to include 
"breach of any duty of [a] person to himself or others." This is, 
to say the least, infelicitous since one cannot owe a duty to 
onesself. 191 
(3) Section 3 (SB Section 877) prescribes the special 
verdict procedure, comparable to Section 2 of the Uniform Act. 
One notable is the California draft requires a 
comparison of between all "tortfeasors" (following 
American Motorcycle) , while the Uniform Act deliberately confines 
comparison to the li gating "parties" alone. The significance 
of this difference is revealed in Section 6 which deals with the 
"absent" share. The runs counter to the recommendation 
of this Study.l92 
(4) Section 4 (SB Section 878) requires set-off without 
qualification and thout so much as a word of explanation for 
190see also Law Commission, Report No. 79 (1977). 
19lsee Daly v. General Motors Corp. (supra n. 20) at 735. 
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rule that any non-settl defendant's liability 
by the amount of the settlement, subject to 
such settlement was in good faith. This solution 
and is, therefore, supported by CTLA. 
By contrast, the Uniform Act proposes to reduce the remaining 
defendant's liabil the settling tortfeasor's equitable 
share, if greater than amount of the settlement. For reasons 
previously stated, s Study prefers the latter solution.194 
(11) Section 11 (SB Section 885) is an uncontroversia1 
definition section. 
X X X 
194supra Section VI. 
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S the case is the latest point in the products 
liability evolution i , there should be some under-
stand g of state of the law pr to the decision. 
Generally to state a cause of action for strict products 
liability, the plaintiff must show: 
l. De manufactured or sold a product 
2. The product had a defect which made it 
dangerous to the user 
3. While the product was being used in an 
intended or seeable manner, plaint 
s ury or property damage as a 
result of the defect ln the product. 
Also 
to strict products 
Prior to the case of 
the doctrine of 
based upon negligence 
strict products 1 il 
driver were 
Immediately prior to an 
a gas station) turned le 
negligence was not a defense 
but assumption of risk was a defense. 
llow 13 Cal. 3rd 804 (1975), 
a defense to an action 
was not a defense to 
iff driver and defendant 
e ctions on the same street. 
section iff (attempting to enter 
of defendant~ cab. Defendant~ 
cab had entered the ersect a llow light and was traveling 
aintiff's left turn was made at an unsafe speed. 
at a time when a cle wa from the opposite direction 
so close as to const 
but the trial court den 
negligence. On 
recovery through 
negligence and e 
negligence. The 
bility and 1 1 
of negligence 
e an immediate hazard. sued Yellow Cab 
d because of 's contributory 
Court allowed some 
defense of contributory 
the doctrine comparative 
new doctrine is to as gn responsi-
d ct proportion to the amount 
The reaso of the Court in Li was to promote the 
equitable allocation o loss among all parties legally responsible 
in proportion to the (Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal 
3rd 725 , 737 [1978]). The Court ln Daly also spoke of the 
"wooden formallsms of tort and contract principles". 
It appears Court and Daly and other recent decisions 
is attempting to achieve more-rairness-Tn loss spreading and com-
pensation and less ity within the tort law system. With this 
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icular facts of this case, 
ion or of his asserted 
equipment may be considered? 
es apply to actions 
des characteristics 
3) Under the c 
error occurred upon admission 
intoxication. (However, s 
of the case, prejudicial 
of of decedent's alleged 
is not to say that such evidence 
shall always be ss 
law, the trier of can 
to the product.) 
under proper statement of the 









1) Use of e 
belt/shoulder 
prevented de 
1 door me 
designs 
s 
sm canst ed a design 
afforded greater protection. 
the force of the impact 
the Opel were equipped 
iff's experts. 
even if 
d by p 
i s' jections were allowed to 
l's door lock or seat 
ss system would 
ection. 




r manual d 
and seat belt/shoulder harness 
be used for accident security. 
d at the time of the 
s evidence was admitted for 
of determining whether Daly 
equ ). 
cause decedent d 't use the safety equipment and 
the case was based upon de ctive product, the issue was raised 
as to whether comparat ne igence be applied in a strict 
liability action. 
The Court d scussed 
and comparative ne l nee. 
star s of strict liability 
strict liabil , the Court showed 
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once a complete bar 
ff s recovery. 
would be unable to 










le to s 
according to the Court, 
ct products liability 
either by case law or statute. 
The concluded: 
system 
should be and it is he 
founded on products 
cases the s 
to the extent 
negligence is 
e defense 
that is a 
abolished 
of comparative fault 
extended to actions 
1 lity. In such 
of 'assumption of risk', 
form of contributory 
II 
The term " lt" was adopted by the Court. 
This is probably a more accurate appellation than "comparative 
negligence" since negligence involves a duty to another and a 
breach of that duty, whereas comparative fault denotes loss 
apportionment. 
princ les expressed Daly v. General Motors Corp. 
are applicable to all cases which trial has not begun before 
the date that the Court's decision becomes final. According to 
subdivision (a) of Rule 24 of the California Rules of Court, a 
decision of the Supreme Court becomes final 30 days after filing 
(unless shortened or extended by the Court). The opinion was filed 
March 11, 1978. There , absent modification, the decision will 
become final April 15 1978. refore, the principles enumerated 
do not apply to cases has been commenced prior to 
the date the decis The principles, however, do 
apply to s. also noted that the trial of the 
Daly matter occurred pr to the Supreme .Court decisions in Li v. 
YeiTow Cab Co., supra, and Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3rd 
359 (1976) and the trial court did not have the benefit of those 
decisions. In Horn op , the Court rejected the contention 
that non-use of equ was "assumption of risk" or 
product "misuse'', i.e. a defense to strict products liability . 
ly, the Court as an aid to court and counsel in the 
event of retrial stated that in determining whether a product is 
defective, all of t luding safety features should be 
considered and the product looked at as a whole. 
In add to the majority opinion above discussed, there 
was a separate concurring opinion by Justice Clark, a concurring 
and dissenting opinion by Justice Jefferson, concurred in by Chief 
Justice Birq and a ssenting opinion by Justice Mosk. 
Justice Clark 
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 
alluded to American Motorcycle Assn. v. 
3rd 578 (1978) and stated that there are 
fault. According to Justice Clark 11 it is difficulties in 









Brief of Jaramillo v. State of California 
(1978) Cal. App. 3d 
FACTS: 
sues anal uries arising out of an 
auto accident pla collided with an automobile 
driven by Jones, owned by McKeon Construction and maintained by 
the State of California. Prior to trial plaintiff settled with 
defendants Jones and McKeon for $350,000. He then proceeded to 
trial against defendant state. The jury found plaintiff's total 
damages were $500,000. It then apportioned responsibility finding 
plaintiff 33.3 percent at fault and that 66.7 percent of fault 
was due to Jones and the State. After deducting 33.3 percent 
from $500,000 jury assessed damages of $333,500 against the 
State. From s award the court set off $350,000, the 
amount of the prior award. This was done pursuant to CCP §877. 
As a result, recovered nothing. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Under requirement of CCP §877 lS the amount offset 
from an award for settlements with other tortfeasors an amount 
equal to the settling tortfeasors proportion of fault or is the 
amount of the consideration paid for the settlement. 
HELD: 
The amount of offset lS the actual amount of consideration 
paid for the settlement. 
RATIONALE: 
CCP §877 specifical requires a judgment be reduced 
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In view of my personal assumption that ours is a compen-
satory system rather than one based on blameworthiness, I 
predict plaint will get the profits from settlements while 
defendants will the losses. 
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there from further 
the Le s-
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and concise presentation 
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concluded that could 
J l decision. 
the language of Civil 
Code Section lS page 816 of the opinion: 
"Everyone is re s , not the result of his willful 
acts, but also for an jury occas by his want 
of ordinary care or skill in the mana property or 
person, except by want of 
ordinary care, jury upon this, of 
course, as the Court po out, the reader is immediately struck 
by the fact that seems to specific terms for a rule 
of comparative ne The Court was looking specifically 
at the language " as." The Court, however, says 
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igence s should not be 
sconduct. However, comparative 
d to conduct. The court 
icated, on last clear chance and 
as the latter doctrine is but a variant 
are to subsumed under the general 
ion to t, and the 
of contributory 
process of assess 
matter of jury s 
discretion of the 
sion we leave 
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the moment within the broad 
v. Yellow Cab Co., supra p. 826). 
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all cases. The second form, or the 
based upon fault up to the point 
gence is to or greater than 
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igence of the 
property shall not 
s awarded shall be 
to the amount of 
le o the person recovering. 
last clear chance is abolished 
se assumption of sk is also 
d to the extent that is merely a 
of the former doctrine of contributory 
ligence; both of these are to be subsumed 
under the process of assessing liability 
proport tone igence." (Li v. Yellow Cab, 
supra pp. 828, 829). 
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PAGE 6 
The court then made the opinion retroactive to all 
cases trial had not be before the date that the 
deci became Just Wri , Tobriner 
concurred the op by Just e Sullivan. Justice 
concurred but wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice 
agree the result, but felt that the combination of 
ed retroactivity and applying to the parties of the 
ident case was inconsistent th prior holdings of the court 
sofar as prospectivity and retroact y of decisions was 
concerned. Justice Clark with Justice McComb concurring dissented 
the opinion. stice Clark argued against the concept that the 
court could change the law 1 of the stated of 1 
Code Se 1714. Justice Clark believes that the decision 
amounted to the amending of a statute, namely 1714 and that this 
power is vested solely in the islature. 
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increasing modest increments, defendants are winning a 
of cases. 
From these facts is logical to conclude the 
volume of litigation and claim severity does not justify the 
dramatic increase in the cost of liability insurance experienced 
by manufacturers. Certainly the situation of product liability 
cannot be called a "cris " Insurance is available to manu-
facturers at some price and with some policy modification. Reported 
cases of manufacturers unable to obtain insurance constitutes a 
minority of all cases. While insurance costs are consuming a larger 
portion of the manufacturer's revenue dollar, the percentage 
remains small and thus far has not created any severe hardship. 
II 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A. Introduction. At the center of the alleged "crisis" 
in product liab ity is the perception that the development of 
the law has generated uncertainty regarding the manufacturer's 
potential liability and availability of adequate defenses. 15 
With emphasis on strict liability, this section reviews 
theories of product lity from a historical perspective and 
attempts to isolate major issues. 
B. Definition. Product liability has been defined as "the 
area of case law involving the liability of sellers [or other 
lS"Righting the Liability Balance,'' Report of the California 
Citizens Commission on Tort Reform, September, 1977, p. 140. 
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suppliers] of chattels to third persons with whom they are not 
in privity." 16 Traditionally, liability for product-related 
injuries is imposed under theories of negligence, warranty, and 
more recently, strict liability in tort. The development of each 
cause of action has been neither uniform nor precise. This has 
been particularly true of strict liability. 17 
C. Negligence. As an outgrowth of nineteenth century 
attitudes toward unrestrained free enterprise, the courts refused 
to permit a plaintiff not in privity of contract with a manu-
facturer or other product supplier to recover for injuries resulting 
from a defective product (supra, fn 16 at 642). The rationale 
behind the privity requirement was that an "infinity of actions" 
would ensue by requiring manufacturers to defend against remote 
plaintiffs in the absence of a contractual relationship. 18 Subse-
quent case law mitigated the harsh effect of the privity rule by 
carving out numerous exceptions for products which were intrinsi-
cally dangerous to human life. The privity requirement was finally 
disposed of in MacPherson v. Buick, (1916) 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 
1050. MacPherson held that regardless of whether the product is 
inherently or imminently dangerous to human life, if "the nature 
16Prosser, William L., Law of Torts, 4th Ed. (1971), p. 641. 
(Hereinafter cited as Prosser.) 
17west, D., "A California Perspective on Strict Products 
Liability," 9 PLJ 775 (1978). 
18winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402. 
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more dangerous than consumer. The "intended 
use" formula fails to cons uses we 1 within contemplation 
of the consumer which may pose a serious sk harm. To eliminate 
this result, the Court imposition liability 
whenever the product's use e", regardless 
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facturer must des a manner so as to 
contemplate a certa amount of suse. More s icantly, the 
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injury was by 
burden should appropriately shift to 
light the relevant factors, that 
the product is not defective" , fn 31 at 431). 
Shifting the burden proof to the defendant, the 
Court explained publ po 
to escape liability for an 
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element is not se. Is f to prove what 
the manufacturer or foresee? If so, 
standard the plaintiff's evidentiary burden, a result 
directly contrary to the purposes of strict 1 lity (supra, 
fn 17 at 793). On the other hand, the "reasonab foreseeable" 
limitation on proximate cause is designed to protect defendants 
from liability for all harms that result for their allegedly 
tortious conduct (supra, fn 19 at 198). 
D. Injury. The plaintiff must also show the defect 
the product resulted in actual injury to plaintiff. The social 
responsibility aspect product liability dictates that parties 
injured by a defective product be adequately compensated for losses 
arising from injury. Allowable damages include compensation 
for personal inj damage and wrongful (supra, 
fn 16 at 666). Damages pecuniary or economic losses, i.e. 
business losses, etc., alone are not recoverab under 
product liabil act limitation on such economic loss 
is to preclude manufacturers being responsible for specula-
tive damages the bargain is a ted 
plaintiff's 
The assessment of punitive damages in strict liability cases 
is an open question. In theory, product liabil should 
not recognize concepts of fault. Liability is imposed based on 
3 4seely v. White Motor Co., (1965) 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 




s 1 can 
s compel 
conduct. s are 
s 
35 
E. of comparative 
Co. 
str product 
has refus to con-
controversies 
Court to decide the 
str 1 1 
, or a tort 
liability. 
Court ld that " 
e a str 1 lity 
where $125 million 
were awarded 




























































(Id at 743). 
In respons 
a strong dissent 



































































IED PRODUCT LOSS 


















a s See 
at 0) • More is 
laced on the tax 
In the run, 
reduce costs as 
dec zes the amount 
turer 
a product 
an agreed upon stan-
cost of program cons a tax deduction. 
3. THE LEGISLATURE AUTHOR! DIRECT THE 
DEPARTMENT INSURANCE TO PROMULGATE RULES 
UNDER INSURANCE SECTIONS 900 ET TO 
INSURANCE COMPANIES OPERATING IN 
CALIFORNIA TO EXPAND EXISTING STATISTICAL 
CLAIM 
WIDER USE OF PRODUCT LOSS 
DETERMINING RATES, AND TO 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 
AND LOSS INFORMATION. 
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form See, Exhibit A 
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1. THE LEGISLATURE AMEND THE CIVIL CODE TO 
PROVIDE THAT IN STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY 
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portion of the 
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PROXIMATELY CAUSED HARM TO THE PLAINTIFF, 
THE DEFENDANT HAS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING 
THE BENEFITS OF THE CHALLENGED DESIGN OUT-
WEIGH THE RISKS INVOLVED 
AMONG FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE TRIERS 
OF FACT ARE THE GRAVITY OF THE DANGER POSED 
BY THE CHALLENGED DESIGN, THE LIKELIHOOD 
THAT SUCH DANGER WOULD OCCUR, THE MECHANICAL 
FEASIBILITY OF A SAFER ALTERNATIVE DESIGN, 
THE FINANCIAL COST OF AN IMPROVED DESIGN, 
AND THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES TO THE PRODUCT 
AND TO THE CONSUMER THAT WOULD RESULT FROM 
AN ALTERNATIVE DESIGN. 
s 
i 
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iz that a causal 
and ury before 1 lity 
the jury would have occurred regard-
was , then post-production 
modification should not be a defense. 
It appears that the present rules of law can accom-
modate a product modification or alteration as a valid defense. 
For example, under the doctrine of comparative responsibility 
(fault) as developed by Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (supra), and Daly v. 
General Motors Corp. (supra), modification of a product by a user 
would be one of the items considered in evaluating the comparative 
responsibility of that user apportioning liability for the 
ultimate injury. Under pr of comparative responsibility, 
a manufacturer would not be 1 total loss if 
was a contr cause the injury. consumer's modif 
The loss would be accordance with the responsibility 
of each party. Therefore, 
a modification or alteration defense statute at 
not recommend 
s time . 
Our 
the rules of 
to accommodate the situation which 
fication or alteration. 
is to more 
or responsibility 
arise through product modi-
6. Product Age Statutes of Limitation. Products 
are purchased by consumers wi the expectation the product will 








s bar all 
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cases and requires the ured party to bring an action within four 
years of the date of injury, or within one year after the injured 
party discovers or should have discovered the injury~(california 
Code of Civil Procedure, Section 340.5). These statutes are 
directed at providing the injured party with a reasonable time 
after discovery of the defendant's tortious act to file an action 
to recover for damages. 
Proponents of the proposed statute of limitation 
claim that manufacturers are exposed to indefinite liability for 
products over which they have no control. They claim this inde-
terminate potential liability contributes to higher insurance 
costs and imposes an unfair economic burden on the manufacturer 
without a substantial justification. 
Evidence compiled by the staff indicates the number 
and severity of claims that would be eliminated by a statute of 
limitation does not warrant the statute's enactment. Insurers 
estimate that eight years after the date of manufacture, 4 percent 
of the claims on products representing 10 percent of ultimate 
payment dollars have yet to occur (See, Insurance Services Office: 
Product Liability Closed Claim Survey, supra). 
Further evidence reveals no reciprocal benefit would 
accrue to the public in return for enacting a statute of limita-
tions. Manufacturing trade organizations and insurance companies 
advocate the statute as necessary to stabilize the product liability 
insurance market. However, the response from insurance repre-
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Insurance contracts for product liability coverage may be 
o through several types of polic s with different rating 
sms. following are some of the more common policy types 
and rating mechanisms. 
A. Monoline These policies are limited to bodily 
injury (BI) and Property Damage (PD) liability coverage for the 
t li 1 exposure insured. Some premiums for 
monoline are by reference to a rate manual 
contains product c s s type of product risk 
involved, and a common unit of exposure (usually $1,000 of sales). 
The current product classification , used by the majority 
surance compan s over 400 separate classes. Approxi-
mate 65 to 75 classes assigned 
a rate in a manual. 
These ass rates are referred to as "manual rates" and 
are on a 
l exposures. 
a monoline policy a 
multiplying 




bas premium rate. 
of product 
l for BI and PD premiums for 
rated product are determined by 
of exposure ($1,000 of 
basic policy limit can be ob-
is computed by multiplying 
The remaining monoline rating systems are "(a)-rated" 




which are not manually rated are "(a)-rated". Rather than being 
based upon similar product liability exposure experience, these 
rates are determined by an underwriter's estimate of the product's 
risk. 
An example of an "(a)-rated" class is "valve manufacturers." 
Risks in this class will vary widely depending upon the exposure 
of each type of valve. Valves manufactured for an aircraft 
present a different risk than valves used in plumbing of private 
homes. Consequently, rates for these risks are determined separ-
ately based upon the insurance underwriter's informed judgment 
of the risk involved. Once the "(a)-rate" is established, the 
basic premium charge is calculated in the same manner as a monoline 
policy using manual rating procedures (i.e., rate x exposure unit). 
Monoline policies are usually purchased by small or medium risks. 
B. Commercial Package (Multi-line) Policies. These policies 
usually provide a combination of coverages for the unsured's 
complete range of operational exposures. The commercial package 
policy premium is determined using a monoline rate method that 
is discounted to provide a package policy price. Statistics are 
not available regarding the number of commercial package policies 
that are priced using manual rating or "(a)-rating" techniques. 
c. Composite-rated, Loss-rated and Large (a)-rated Policies. 
These policies provide a combination of coverages on either a multi-
line or monoline basis. Premium calculations for each of these 
policies varies according to the need of the insured and the 
product liability exposure involved. These types of policies 
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covered compos pol ies. 
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COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 
It Ia to be 00 to 100% of the total? And when It ll!>Pro:dmntel! 100%-the true 
nuisance claim-the trial court will mmnlly control the matter. 
The Innate of the pure contrll.>ltl! with the nondhwrimimtting 
rough justice of the cut11 out many dahm<~ in order 
to be sure to eliminate a ones, and the deei!;ion for the 
pure form. It is instan<·e in whi"h a eourt, 11.11 distill· 
guished from the 11. form of cotll!>ars.tive fault, it has 
selected the pure type, and that Ireland, the Canac!isn ilrovim~ell and 
Austr1llinn states have all adopted 1mre form. 
Contribution. The original common law rule wa11 that there is no contribution 
among joint tortfe!II!!Orll, no what the nature of the tort. !o':ome statet-~, 
however, have thi11 in the case of negligence. 
Many more have passed lltntutes tlrovi(ling for (-ontribu-
tlon, with the result that a substantial of the states now have contribu-
tion In some form and the Re11tatement of Torts I 886A, now provide& 
for it. 
The NCCUSL has two uniform contribution Acts-the fir11t in 
1939, superseded by a set in 1955. Both of these Acts 1•rovi<le for jlro 
rata contribution, which may be suitable in a state not applying the prim,j11le 
of comparative fault, but is imn11n·c~m·ia:te in a <.'<lmJmrative-fault state &lli!Or-
tioning ultimate responsibility on basis of the proportionate fault of the 
parties Involved. 
It bas therefore been decided to amend the separate Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfessol'!!l Act, but leave that Act for trossible Will by states 
not adopting the principle comparative fault. Instead, the 11resent Act con· 
tains appropriate sections eoverillg the rights existing between the JlB.rtiell who 
are jointly and severally liable in tort. The 1955 Act 11hould be l'eplaced by this 
Act in any state that adopts the comparative fault principle, and would be 
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Same facta lUi in Illustration 10. 
It is now found that D's share of 
$2,000 is uncollectible. Upon proper 
motion to the court that share 
reallocated M follows : 
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or $444. · 
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Section 11. [Repeal] 
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Commissioners' Comment 
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Based upon the conflicting evidence, the jury, by a 
10 to 2 vote, returned the verdict in favor of the defendants. 
The plaintiff's contention was that the Court erred 
when instructing the jury as it did because such instruction 
conflicted with the decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, supra. 
Cronin involved a bread delivery truck wh1ch had a defective hasp 
wh1ch was to retain the trays of bread behind the driver. During 
an accident, the hasp broke and the driver was injured when the 
trays slid forward, striking plaintiff and sending him through 
the windshield. In Cronin, the defendant maintained that the 
product's "unreasonable dangerousness" was an essential element 
that plaintiff must establish in any product case. The Court 
rejected that contention saying that that burden upon the plaintiff 
exceeded the burden which was placed upon a plaintiff in Greenman 
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963, 59 Cal. 2d 57). Defendant's 
content1on lS that the manufacturing defect which was in issue in 
Cronin placed a dual burden upon the plaintiff in that the plain-
tlff would have to prove, 1) that the product was defective, and 
2) that it was unreasonably dangerous. In a design defect case, 
according to the defendant, the plaintiff need only prove that 
the product was unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, defectively 
designed. 
The Court rejected the defendant's contentions and 
said that the objection to the unreasonably dangerous terminology 
was based upon the determination that that concept represented 
an undue restriction on the application of strict liability 
principles. The opinion pointed out that in the case of Luque v. 
Mclean (1972, 8 Cal. 3d 136), "a power rotary lawn mower with an 
unguarded hole could properly be found defective, in spite of the 
fact that the defect in the product was patent and hence in all 
probability within the reasonable contemplation of the ordinary 
consumer." (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra. p. 425). The 
Court explained ord1nary consumer expectat1ons are relevant to 
the defectiveness issue. The Restatement view and the defendant's 
contention regarding "unreasonably dangerous" are treated as a 
ceiling on the manufacturer's responsibility. However, the Court 
found that it should in reality be the floor, as indicated by past 
California decisions. At a minimum, a product must meet ordinary 
consumer expectations as to safety to avoid being found defective. 
The Court also discussed the "intended use" language 
and said that the instruction was additionally erroneous because 
it is not the intended use, but the reasonably foreseeable use 
which is important and, as is stated in Cronin, "the design and 
manufacture of products should not be carr1ed out in an industrial 
vacuum but with recognition of the realities of their everyday 
use." (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra. p. 425, F.N.9). 
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The Court also stated that Cronin reaffirmed the 
basic formulation of strict tort liability set forth in Greenman 
that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an art1cle 
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without 
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being." (Barker, supra. p. 427, quoting Cronin). 
The Court also stated "that a plaintiff satisfies 
his burden of proof under Greenman in both a 'manufacturing defect' 
and 'design defect' context, when he proves the existence of a 
'defect' and that such defect was a proximate cause of his 
injuries." (Barker, supra. p. 427). 
Defect, according to the Court, includes a number of 
deficiencies: 
1. A deviation from the manufacturers' intended 
result, e.g., an exploding soda bottle; 
2. Unsafeness because of an absence of a safety 
device; 
3. Danger because of a lack of adequate warning or 
instruction, e.g., a sun filter attachment on a telescope, the 
absence of which resulted in the damaging of a child's retina. 
According to the opinion, "in general, a manufacturing 
or production defect is readily identifiable because a defective 
product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended 
result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product 
line." (Barker, supra. p. 429). And in terms of the case, the 
Court stated, "first, our case is established that a product may 
be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates. that 
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in an intended or foreseeable manner." 
(Barker, supra. p. 429). Further, "implicit in [a product's] 
presence on the market [is] a representation that it [will] safely 
do the jobs for which it was built." (Barker, supra. p. 430). The 
plaintiff, pursuant to this standard, can demonstrate defectiveness 
by resorting to circumstantial evidence. 
Second, "a product may be found defective in design, 
even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through 
hindsight the jury determines that the product's design embodies 
'excessive preventable danger,' or, in other words, if the jury 
finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design 
outweighs the benefits of such design." (Barker, supra. p. 430). 
In this case, "a jury may consider, among other relevant factors, 





likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an 
improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product 
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative 
design." (Barker, supra. p. 431). 
The Court discussed the burden of proof that is 
assigned in establishing the various facets of defectiveness, 
emphasizing that "one of the principal purposes behind the strict 
liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of 
the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of 
action." (Barker, supra. p. 431). Therefore, the burden is such 
that when the plaintiff makes a prima facia showing that the 
injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden 
shifts to the defendant who must prove that in light of the 
relevant factors, the product is not defective. The Court points 
out that as a matter of public policy, "a manufacturer who seeks 
to escape liability for an injury proximately caused by its 
product's design on a risk-benefit theory should bear the burden 
of persuading the trier of fact that its product should not be 
judged defective." (Barker, supra. pp. 431-432). In this 
instance, the defendants' burden is one affecting the burden 
of proof rather than the burden of producing evidence. 
(Aside: The burden of producing evidence is a 
question of law. That is to say, the person having the burden 
must satisfy the trier of law that there is sufficient evidence 
to go to the trier of fact so that the trier of fact can make 
a determination based on the evidence. The burden of proof 
includes the burden of producing evidence; that is to say, the 
party with the burden of proof must satisfy the trier of law that 
there is enough to go to the jury on a fact question, but then, 
in addition, he has the burden of persuading the trier of fact 
on the issue and the uffialdegree of proof necessary in that 
respect is a preponderance of evidence.) 
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
l) an injury, and 2) the proximate causation of such injury by the 
product's design. The burden then shifts to the defendants who 
have the burden of proof under the risk-benefit theory. 
The opinion concludes that the defective design test 
enunciated by the Court is appropriate in light of the rationale 
and limits of strict liability, "for it subjects a manufacturer 
to liability whenever there is something 'wrong' with a product's 
design--either because the product fails to meet ordinary consumer 
expectations as to safety or because, on balance, the design is 
not as safe as it should be--while stopping short of making the 
manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which may result from 
the use of its product." (Barker, supra. p. 432). 
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The Court also discussed the jury function of weighing 
the effects of alternative designs. Thus, the trier of fact might 
consider whether an alternative design, although eliminating the 
particular accident, might be more hazardous in other situations. 
Also pointed out was that the taking of reasonable precautions 
by a manufacturer in an attempt to design a safe product may be 
relevant in negligence actions, but does not preclude the imposi-
tion of liability in strict liability actions. 
The opinion concluded, "we hold that a trial judge 
may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in 
design 1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed 
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or 2) if 
the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused 
his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the 
relevant factors discussed above, that on balance the benefits of 
the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 
design." (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra. p. 435). 
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The Definition of Defect in 
Products Liability Design Cases 
Summary 
Under the Supreme Court Barker decision, a product design 
is "defective" either if: 
(1) The product fails to meet consumer expectations; or 
(2) some feature of the product's design entails risks which 
are not justified by the feature's benefits. On this risk-
benefit issue, once the plaintiff shows that the product's 
design proximately caused his injury, the entire burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant. 
The Barker opinion intimates that in making its risk-benefit 
assessments the jury should consider new design alternatives 
which were not available at the time of the product's sale. 
The opinion also intimates that there is strict liability, with-
out any proof of defect, for injuries caused by ultrahazardous 
products. 
This memorandum concludes that Barker goes too far. Its 
recommendations are: 
That the "consumer expectation" standard be either elimi-
nated or replaced by a rule rendering a product's design presump-
tively defective if, without warning, it causes the product to 
perform less safely than other products of the same type. 
That the risk-benefit standard be endorsed, but its peculiar 





That design defect be measured as of the time of sale, at 
least insofar as technological developments are concerned. 
That the idea of strict liability, without defect, for 
ultrahazardous products be negated. 
Note: As background for this memorandum I have discussed 
Barker with about a dozen Los Angeles products liability lawyers 
on both sides of the plaintiffs/defendants fence. The recom-
mendations are, of course, my own . 
vi 
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I. Background 
A. "Automatic" Strict Liability 
In Greenman v. Yuba Power _f'_J;"_QQ.J!.~t~_. _ _Inc. (59 Cal. 2d 21, 
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 1963), the California Supreme 
Court announced a doctrine of strict products liability. It is 
important to recognize what this strict liability rule is not. 
One can easily think of a strict liability rule which would 
render the manufacturer (or retailer) fully liable in tort for 
all injuries that are occasioned by the use of its product. 
(An analogy would be to workers' compensation, which imposes 
strict liability on the employer for all injuries "arising out 
of" the employment.) Under this definition of strict products 
liability, a knife manufacturer would be liable for all cuts 
caused by use of its knives, and an auto manufacturer would be 
automatically liable for all highway accidents produced by the 
operation of their vehicles. (This latter application of the 
strict liability rule would subordinate the existing rules 
imposing tort liability on negligent motorists, and it would 
effectively eliminate the need to talk about various auto no-fault 
programs.) 
The doctrine of real strict liability which can be thus 
defined is one that is capable of being discussed in a coherent way. 





or Calabresi's Costs, 80 Yale L. J. 647, 659-60 (1972). If, 
however, strict products liability were defined to entail auto-
matic liability of this sort, it is possible that the law would 
wish to consider the measure of damages available in such a 
strict liability action; were liability as strict as this, it 
is arguable that damages should be limited to the victim's 
economic losses, and should not extend to intangible detriments 
like pain and suffering. Justice Traynor himself talks about 
such a liability/damages package in an important speech of his, 
published as a law review article in 1965. (Traynor, "The Ways 
II 
and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 363 (1965). The limitation on damages would, of course, 
be supported by the analogy to workers' compensation, where 
automatic liability results in compensation for economic losses 
only. 
For better or worse, the rule of strict products liability, 
as nurtured by Justice Traynor in his 1944 Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. concurring opinionl/ and as eventually adopted in 
Greenman by the California Supreme Court, is not at all such a 
rule of automatic liability, for it is a vital requirement of 
strict liability that the product be flawed by the presence of a 
product "defect." 
Mindful of this conspicuous "defect" requirement,?:_/ one can 
usefully compare strict liability to the negligence and implied 
warranty doctrines which pre-existed strict liability, and which 
now coexist alongside of it. Negligence requires a demonstration 
of some deficiency in the manufacturer's conduct, while strict 
1/ 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
2/ For the major role the "defect" concept plays in the federal 
auto ~afety program, see United States v. General Motors Corp,, 
565 F.2d 754 (D.C.Cir. 1977). 
3 
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liability allows the plaintiff to show instead a deficiency in 
the manufacturer's product. In most cases, if the product is 
deficient, the manufacturer's conduct can be proven deficient 
as well, especially with the help of res ipsa loquitor. But 
this is not always true. The res ipsa argument, for example, 
may find an unsympathetic jury. (One defense counsel has told 
me that prior to Greenman he consistently won jury verdicts in 
negligence cases where the plaintiff chose to rely on res ipsa.) 
In any event, strict liability liberates the plaintiff from bear-
ing any necessary burden of conducting an exploration, at trial, 
into the manufacturer's underlying conduct. For this reason strict 
liability is of considerable trial importance. As compared to 
negligence, therefore, strict liability "matters"--not over-
whelmingly perhaps, but still quite significantly. 
Liability under the implied warranty doctrine is essentially 
strict; and in implied warranty, as in strict products liability, 
the plaintiff can focus directly on the deficiency in the manu-
facturer's product. Under implied warranty, liability is estab-
lished if the product is deemed not "merchantable"--i. e., not 
"fit for ordinary use." Theoretically, it is not clear that 
any major differences exist between the implied warranty concept 
of "non-fitness" and the strict liability concept of "defect." 
At the time of Greenman, only the retailer may have been subject 
to implied warranty liability; but in the years since Greenman, 
this liability has been extended to the manufacturer as well. 
For all this, however, there are still important limitations on the 
4 
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warranty cause of action. Implied warranty law is designed to provide 
protection only to the retail buyer of the product and to certain 
others who stand in a close relationship with that buyer; there-
fore, many victims of product-related accidents--bystanders, 
for example--cannot avail themselves of the implied warranty 
doctrine. There are also a number of tricky prerequisites to an 
implied warranty claim, including the requirement that the vic-
tim give the seller prompt notice of the warranty violation. As 
Justice Traynor argued in Greenman, it is prerequisites of this 
sort (sensible enough in the ordinary commercial setting), that 
make implied warranty basically unsuitable as a primary theory 
in personal injury actions. Of course, the implied warranty 
doctrine still exists in California, as encased in the Uniform 
Commercial Code; and many complaints in personal injury 
products cases include an implied warranty count. But since 
juries get easily confused by the vJarranty concepts of "mer-
chantability" and "fitness," plaintiffs' counsel generally delete 
their implied warranty counts prior to trial so as to encourage the 
jury to give its full attention to the strict liability count, and 
also the negligence count. (If plaintiffs think they can prove negli-
gence, they will attempt to do so, even thou~h technically speak-
ing this is legally superfluous. The stronger the evidence is of 
the manufacturer's negligence, the more likely the jury is to 
rule for the plaintiff on the liability issue, and the more likely 
it is to give the plaintiff a larger damage award.) 
5 
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II. The Meaning of Defect 
A. Types of Defects 
It is now generally understood that there are at least three 
types of defects: "production" defects (~ .• an exploding coke 
bottle), "design" defects (~ .• the already famous Ford Pinto), 
and "warning" defects. (The absence of a warning can be regarded 
as a certain kind of defect in design.) According to a recent 
federal study, in sample jurisdictions 37 percent of all products 
cases involve production defects; 39 percent, design defects; 
21 percent, warning defects. The negligence doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor has been available in production defect cases since Escola in 
1944; andunder post-Greenman strict liability, these cases raise 
few perplexing legal problems concerning the defect concept. 
(Production defect cases are often difficult, but the difficulties 
lie in proving the facts of one case.) "Warning" defect cases 
1/ 
have also not been troublesome in California, at least so far.-
It is in design cases that the real confusion has arisen as to 
the meaning of "defect." 
B. Patterns of Recovery 
Whether for factual or legal reasons, pursuing a products 
claim is usually far from easy. Samples collected by the federal 
study indicate that of all products cases actually going to trial, 
the defense wins at least half. (Of course, the overwhelming 
majority of products claims are settled before trial. Therefore 
those cases that do go to trial are almost by hypothesis not 
representative.) In products cases (as in malpractice cases) a 
victim with less than $25,000 worth of legal injuries will find 
!/But see Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 





it difficult to secure the services of a high quality lawyer; 
the lawyer's contingent fee award does not adequately remunerate 
him for the time he will need to spend in winning the case. 
Products cases are in these ways quite different from auto-
mobile cases. In the latter, so long as the victim is willing 
to testify that the other motorist was driving too fast, the 
victim has a case that at least can go to the jury; insurers 
are thereby impelled to settle such small claims for what may 
be excessive sums. As a result, repeated studies have shown 
that auto victims with low levels of economic loss tend to be 
greatly "overcompensated," while auto victims with larger econo~ 
mic losses are severely "undercompensated." Information on the 
pattern of payouts in products claims is just beginning to come 
in. A recent ISO ClosroClaims Survey does suggest that in pro-
duct cases smaller claims are somewhat more fully compensated 
than large claims, but the sharp disparities that characterize 
auto claims appear to be absent in the products context. 
C. Legal Development of the "Defect" Concept 
1. Greenman had stated the strict liability test in terms 
of whether a product contained "a defect of which the plaintiff 
was not aware and which made [the product] unsafe for its intended 
use." 
2. Stimulated by Greenman, the American Law Institute 
approved a section for its Torts Restatement--drafted by Dean 
Prosser--imposing strict liability on the seller of "any product 
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer." Comment i, explaining "unreasonably dangerous," 
7 
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states that "the article sold must be dangerous to an extent 
beyond that which would be contemplated by the reasonable con-
sumer who purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge, common to 
the community and its conditions." Examples given are products 
that are not "unreasonably dangerous" sugar that harms a 
diabetic and butter that heightens a person's cholesterol level. 
As Reporter Prosser later explained, the "unreasonably dangerous" 
gloss prevents manufacturers from becoming "automatically responsible 
for all the harm that such things do in the world." (See Prosser, 
Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 Hast. L. J. 
9, 23 (1966).) 
3. In Escola and Greenman, Justice Traynor had evidently 
regarded "defect" as a rather easy concept. However, by the time 
of his 1965 speech/law-review article, he was beginning to appre-
ciate the uncertainties and perplexities of the "defect" concept. 
That article, however, perceived no necessary differences between 
the Greenman "defect" test and the Restatement test of "unreason-
ably dangerous defect." On the basis of a similar implicit perception, 
California opinions between 1962 and 1972 used the Greenman 
language and the Restatement language interchangeably. 
4. In its 1972 decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson CorE·· 
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), the 
California Supreme Court took two steps. First, it abandoned 
Justice Traynor's "intended use" test in favor of a test making 
liability possible whenever the product's use is "reasonably fore-, 




Secondly, the Cronin Court decided that the basic standard of 
liability should be "defect" rather than "unreasonably dangerous 
defect." In the Court's view, "unreasonably dangerous" was 
partly superfluous, since the purpose of that language is to 
negate the idea of automatic liability, and since that purpose 
is fully achieved by "defect" standing alone. But "unreasonably 
dangerous" was also, the Court thought, nefarious. It "rings of 
negligence" and has a "negligence complexion." It is capable of 
being understood as subjecting the plaintiff to a two-step rather 
than a one-step burden of proof. And it would negate liability 
if "consumer expectations" had been in one way or another lowered--
if, for example, the product's defect is "patent." 
5. Cronin results. The Cronin opinion, while stripping 
"defect" of its "unreasonably_dangerous" gloss, explicitly declined 
to provide "defect" with any other gloss, or to set forth any kind 
of working "defect" definition. Because of this, Cronin was 
generally scolded in the law reviews (see, ~·, Comment, 80 Dick. 
L. Rev. 663 [1976]), and was not followed in a number of other 
jurisdictions which otherwise had been happy enough to follow 
California's lead in products liability matters. See,~·· 
Kirkland v. General Motors CorD., 521 P.2d 1153 [Okla. 197~). 
In California, litigation in post-Cronin design cases was 
confused, as lawyers and judges struggled with the one-word 
"defect" standard. A few judges evidently felt that juries should 
be instructed in the language of "defect" and nothing more. A 
few other judges were uncertain about the admissibility of evidence 
9 
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professing to show the practical or economic disadvantages of 
some ''safer'' design alternative that the plaintiff had identified. 
Among law professors, however, I think it is fair to say that the 
general understanding, even after Cronin, was that a design-defect 
plaintiff needed to show the existence of some design alternative 
that would provide greater safety at acceptable or reasonable 
costs. The Court of Appeal opinions between Cronin and Barker 
were largely consistent with this view. See, e.g. Self v. General 
Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1974). 
(Evidently, however, the predominant post-Cronin trial practice 
somewhat departed from this understanding. See pages 20-21, 
below.) 
6. Barker. All of this Cronin-engendered confusion pro-
vides the backdrop for the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 C. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
(1978). In Barker, an employee was injured when he jumped off 
a high-lift loader which the defendant had manufactured and 
then leased to the victim's employer. The injured employee was 
subbing for the loader's regular operator, who was absent from 
work. The employee, heeding the yells from other employees, had 
jumped off the loader when the loader itself began to tip over 
while being operated on a sharply sloping terrain. At trial, 
the Barker plaintiff made several arguments as to what defects 
could be charged against the loader. One was that the loader 
should have had a broader wheelbase so as to render it more stable. 
(The Court's opinion does not mention this defect argument, but 
Barker's counsel tells me that the argument was explicitly made.) 






is taken as a given, the loader Has lacking in necessary safety 
devices: either "outriggers" (mechanical arms extending out from 
the machine), or roll bars or seat belts capable of protecting 
the operator of the lift in the event of a rollover. 
Although the trial in Barker was subsequent to Cronin (the 
Supreme Court's Barker opinion gets this chronology wrong), a 
confused trial judge gave the jury an "unreasonably dangerous" 
defect instruction. The jury (which has been described to me as 
strongly anti-plaintiff in its orientation) then came in with a 
verdict in favor of the defendant-manufacturer. The plaintiff 
appealed, and won a reversal in the Court of Appeal on grounds 
that the trial instruction had ignored Cronin. With nevJ appel-
late counsel, the defendant secured a hearing in the Supreme 
Court, arguing that in complicated cases involving product design--
and especially when the alleged design defect involves the omis-
sion of a safety device--the simple language of "defect" simply 
is not an adequate way of guiding juries; rather, in design-
omission cases, the language of "unreasonably dangerous" is appro-
priate after all. The defendant thus contended for a selective 
return to the Restatement language. The plaintiff, and also the 
California Trial Lawyers Association entering the case as an amicus, 
urged the Court simply to reaffirm its earlier Cronin ruling. 
Barker was argued in November 1976, and was not decided by 
the Supreme Court until January 1978, fourteen months later. In 
its Bar~er opinion, the Court first of all reaffirmed its Cronin 
holding that "unreasonably dangerous" is not part of the "defect'' 
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definition. The Court, however, went on to agree with the 
defendant's more general position that the language of "defect," 
standing alone, was inadequate as the strict-liability instruc-
tion in design cases. For such design cases, the Court proceeded 
to formulate a new, "two-pronged" defect test. (Evidently, "pro-
duction" defects are to be measured in terms of deviation-from-
the-manufacturer's-usual-product. See the new BAJI instruction, 
BAJI 9.00.3.) The first prong is that a design is defective if 
"the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable 
manner." The second prong is that the product is defective if 
the risk of danger inherent in the product's design is not out-
weighed by the benefits associated with that design. With respect 
to this "risk-benefit" prong, the Court, in a further step, shifted 
the burden of proof to the defendant in a rather dramatic way. 
Once the plaintiff proves that the "product's design proximately 
caused" the plaintiff's injury, the defendant can escape a "defect" 
finding only by proving to the jury's satisfaction that the bene-
fits produced by that design outweigh its evident danger. 
The Court seems correct in its conclusion that "defect" 
needs some elaboration in design cases. The Court may also be 
correct in its conclusion that "unreasonably dangerous" is not 
the needed form of elaboration. Moreover, the Court's risk-
benefit prong is clearly an appropriate test for proving a 
design defect. What is problernrnatical about the Barker 
opinion is its burden-of-proof holding accompanying the 





"consumer expectations." Those two rulings will be critiqued 
below. The memorandum's conclusions vlill be that these rulings, 
while well intended, are not really adequate, and should be 
legislatively modified. 
III. The Risk-Benefit Prong 
As noted, the prong itself is clearly correct. Even given 
the terseness of Cronin, most law professors had assumed that 
in design cases the test of defect was whether the design element 
was cost-beneficial. Insofar as this issue was somewhat con-
fused at the trial level subsequent to Cronin, the resolution of 
this confusion is fortunate; by clearly legitimizing the rele-
vance of a "trade-off" analysis, Barker performs a welcome ser-
vice. 
What is greatly troublesome, hmvever, is Bark::_!:_' s holding 
on burden of proof. Under that holding, once the plaintiff 
shows that the product's design was the proximate cause of his 
injury, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer to show 
that the design is risk-beneficial. This proposal was not 
advanced by any of the parties or amici in Barker, and has 
never been even mentioned (so far as I know) in the law reviews. 
The Barker Court thus ventured a rule without giving anyone a 
chance to comment on it. The Barker Court's concerns are legit-
imate, but its rule "goes too far"--to use that handy lawyer's 
phrase. 
A. The Extent of the Problem. 
First of all, it is a rule with an incredible ootential 
application. As one plaintiff's lawyer has told me, the rule 
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seems "limitless." It is hard to conceive of any product-
related injury in which the argument could not be made that 
13 
the injury was in one way or another caused by something in the 
product's design. 
1. Until now, the paradigm of a product that is dangerous 
but not defective is a knife that cuts. (See the Traynor essay, 
supra, at 367.) Yet under Barker, when a knife cuts its user, the 
burden clearly shifts to the defendant to prove that the knife 
design is non-defective, since clearly a design feature of the 
knife--i.e., its long, sharp blade--has been a cause of the injury. 
2. By now it is clear that smoking cigarettes causes cancer. 
We may not be able to identify the particular design feature of a 
cigarette \vhich is the causative el.ememt, but we do know that there 
is something in the design of a cigarette which is carcinogenic. 
Therefore, under Barker, in a cigarette cancer case the defendant 
can establish defect quite easily, and the burden of proof 
thus shifts to the cigarE!t'te manufacturer to prove that the 
design of the cigarette is not defective after all. 
3. In a typical automobile accident, a shrewd lawyer can 
probably identify numerous features of the car's design that 
have, in some sense, contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. 
Consider a car being driven at 55 miles an hour when the driver 
sees an obstacle 240 feet ahead; unable to stop in time, the car 
hits the obstacle, and the motorist goes through the windshield, 
suffering serious injuries. These injuries seem "proximately 
caused" by the car's design inasmuch as the car was designed 
to operate at speeds as fast as 55 miles an hour, inasmuch as 
14 
78-697 
the brakes were not capable of stopping the car within 240 feet, 
inasmuch as the car's windshield produced injuries on impact, 
and so on. 
B. The Alternative Design. 
In the alternative, Barker places an incredible burden on 
the concept of a "product design" that "proximately causes" an 
injury. Consider, for example, how a shrewd defense counsel 
would challenge the plaintiff's second-prong "proximate cause" 
argument in the automobile hypothetical case above. Is it (or 
isn't it) correct to say that the design of the car's englne, 
brakes, or windshield proximately caused the victim's injuries? 
If a car rolls over when its wheels are turned 30 degrees while 
the car is traveling at 100 miles per hour (cf. the facts of the 
Culpepper case described below), under Barker do we (or don't we) 
say that the "design" of the car has been a "proximate cause" of 
the injury? People fall off ladders all the time, and the fact 
that ladders are in some general sense unstable permits these falls 
to occur. Does it, or doesn't it, follow that in every case of a 
person falling off a ladder, the "design" of the ladder has "proxi-
mately caused" the fall? (Of course, this example is similar to 
the facts of Barker itself.) 
C. Statement of the Rule. 
One can paraphrase the Barker burden-of-proof rule in these 
terms: "Proof that the product's design proximately caused the 
victim's injury creates a rebuttable presumption that the design 
is defective in the risk-benefit sense." So paraphrased, the 
Barker rule sounds a little like res ipsa loquitor--a technique 
of proof which, thanks to Escola, has been routinely applied 
15 
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in production defect cases argued under a negligence theory. 
In a typical case of this sort, res ipsa is indeed a "simple, 
understandable rule of circumstantial evidence." (The charac-
terization is from Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 
687 (1944). I.e., if a properly handled coke bottle explodes, 
it is reasonable to assume that there has been some negligence 
on the bottler's part. The Barker rule, by contrast, is not 
simple, and it is not at all in line with common sense. As such, 
it will confuse not only judges and lawyers, but additionally 
the jury. Even now, I am told, both res ipsa and strict liability 
are somewhat risky theories to take to the jury, since the jury 
may get confused by res ipsa, and may find the notion of strict 
liability somewhat unfair. Since the Barker presumption rule is, 
if anything, counterintuitive, one would expect erratic results 
as the rule is fed to the jury, and perhaps even occasional jury 
nullification. 
D. The Nub of the Problem. 
The nub is this: One cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-
benefit defect in a product design until and unless one has 
identified some design alternative (or some design omission) 
which can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis. Yet 
under the Barker rule, the plaintiff is not required to identify 
any relevant design alternative (or design omission). 
One canon within the burden-of-proof jurisprudence is that 
the burden should be placed on the party who has control of the 
relevant information; this is the canon on which the Barker 
• 
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opinion relies. But another important canon is that the burden 
of proof should not be placed so as to require a party to prove 
a negative. The Barker rule violates this canon. 
Now, in particular cases, this violation may turn out to be 
harmless. In Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977), 
hearing granted--which was before the Supreme Court at the time 
it decided Barker--the rear door of a 1965 Lincoln Continental 
was "rear-hinged" rather than "front-hinged." Rear-hinging pro-
duces a certain risk (of the door flying open if opened slightly 
while the car is traveling), but it also provides a certain benefit 
(easy ingress and egress). Given what we all know about automobiles, 
there is a single, clear-cut design alternative (i.e., front-
hinging) with which the car's rear-hinged design can be com-
pared. Since the manufacturer has the possession of the relevant 
data, requiring it to prove that, all things considered, rear-
hinging is "risk-beneficial" is at least understandable. 
But Korli is an unusual case. When an automobile accident 
produces a gasoline- tank fire, (see the facts of the Self case, 
supra, under Barker the car manufacturer is evidently required 
to establish that there is no other location for the gas tank 
anywhere in the car that is preferable to the gas tank's actual 
location. In Barker itself, the plaintiff's injury was evidently 
"proximately caused" by the height and instability of the lift. 
Under the Barker rule, the defendant may be required to prove 
not only that there is no way to render the lift less stable, 
but also that no safety devices exist that are capable of minimizing 
injuries if the lift should happen to topple. 
17 
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E. Discharging the Burden of Proof. 
Arguably, the analysis undertaken immediately above is 
excessive. Perhaps the defendant often can easily discharge its 
burden of proof. In the knife case, for example, knife manu-
facturers perhaps can easily show, relying on little more than 
the jury's known experience, that a knife needs a long, sharp 
blade if it lS to function as a knife. (But how about the 
possibility of some "cage"-like safety device for the knife that 
would minimize the otherwise inevitable risk?) What is the 
burden of the defendant in Barker itself? Does the Barker 
defendant satisfy its burden when it establishes that the narrow 
wheel base of the loader is itself risk-beneficial? If we con-
ceive of the narrow base as the design feature of the product 
that proximately caused the injury, this might be true. (However, 
we know from the Barker opinion of the other possibilities of 
defect in the product's design--the absence of outriggers and 
seat belts. Under Barker, doesn't the defendant need to estab-
lish that installation of these safety devices would not have 
been risk-beneficial?) The sum of the back-and-forth argumenta-
tion above is that Barker creates a very messy issue as to what 
the defendant has to do to rebut the presumption of defect which 
the Barker rule generates. 
F. The Effect of the Rule. 
What I have been assuming hitherto is that the victim of 
a product-related accident will seek to rely on the Barker burden-
of-proof rule. However, my consultations with plaintiffs' attorneys 
has made clear that in a typical product case, with good facts, 
the plaintiff will effectively waive his right to rely on 
18 
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this feature of Barker. Barker allows the plaintiff, having 
shown merely that the product's design caused his injury) to 
close his case, and then wait for the defendant to explain to 
the jury why the design is appropriate after all; once the 
defense has introduced significant evidence on the desirability 
of the product's design, the plaintiff will then bring forward 
his own evidence concerning the undesirability of that design 
(in an effort to counter the defendant's presentation). But 
for a plaintiff to rely on this sequence may involve very poor 
trial strategy. The sequence puts the plaintiff on the defensive 
by allowing the manufacturer to get to the jury first with its 
explanation of the product's design, and why that design is a 
good one. If the plaintiff's facts are strong, the plaintiff 
has a clear tactical interest in getting the jury to consider 
his version of the design issue first, before the manufacturer 
gets a chance to tell the jury its side of the story. Wishing 
to convey to the jury the strength of his case, the plaintiff 
will want to come out "with all guns blazing"--i.e., with his 
strongest possible evidence as to the impropriety of the product 
design. With the help of expert witnesses, for example, the 
plaintiff will suggest that a particular protective device has 
been utilized "since the time of the Greeks." 
Therefore, as sweeping as the Barker holding on burden of 
proof may be, it may create a right which many product plaintiffs 
will not seek to exercise. Indeed, the relevant question may be 
this: In what limited class of products cases will the plaintiff 
78-702 
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choose to avail himself of the Barker rule? One plaintiff's 
counsel has suggested to me that Barker will be helpful when 
the facts on liability are reasonably good but when the plain-
tiff's injuries are relatively small. As noted, plaintiffs 
with injuries less than $25,000 find it difficult to hire high-
quality la'tvyers to prosecute their cases. The suggestion is 
that under Barker a lmvyer will be able t~ "low budget" such a 
case, and therefore will agree to handle small damage claims 
that he would otherwise turn down. 
Perhaps this result would ensue, but I am inclined to doubt 
it. If the facts on liability are good, the lawyer, needing to 
win the case in order to earn his contingent fee, retains his 
incentive to make his strongest pitch to the jury; and that 
strongest pitch may well involve waiving his Barker rights. 
Rather, the class of cases in which the Barker burden-of-
proof rule seems most clearly important, in a practical sense, 
are those in which the victim has suffered horrible injuries, 
but in which the facts indicating any design defect are quite 
weak. Given the factual frailty of the plaintiff's claim, before 
Barker the plaintiff might well have succumbed to summary judg-
ment or a directed verdict. Under Barker, however, once the 
burden of pr'oof has been shifted by the plaintiff's limited 
showing, only in a few cases will the defendant be able to offer 
the kind of "unmistakeable" evidence that will rebut the defect 
presumption as a matter of law. In all other cases, the issue 
of defect will therefore go to the jury, weak as the pro-defect 
facts Play be. 




the jury? Given the possibility of jury sympathy with a 
horribly injured plaintiff, in many cases the jury may cut 
corners on the evidence in order to grant the plaintiff a 
recovery. These cases are, by hypothesis, wrongly decided. 
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But I am not sure that such results would predominate. Product 
defendants win at least half of all jury trials, and juries 
sometimes resist the strict liability doctrine, not understand-
ing its logic or doubting its fairness. The Barker burden-of-
proof rule is very poor in its natural logic, and it dramatizes 
the strict liability issue in a rather queer way. The Barker 
rule is therefore conducive to jury deliberations that are con-
fused and erratic. 
G. Recommendation 
For all of these reasons, the Barker rule on burden of proof is 
wrong. One can therefore consider a return to what most law 
professors would have soon to be the pre-Barker rule: that the 
plaintiff must bear the burden of sho\ving a cost-beneficial 
design alternative. However, reversion to this professorial 
understanding may concede too much. First, it gives no weight 
to the access-of-information canon to which the Barker opinion 
properly refers. Moreover, that understanding evidently does not 
accurately reflect what was essentially happening at the trial 
level between Cronin and Barker. The trial process seems to have 
worked as follows: the plaintiff introduced evidence establishing 
the existence of a design alternative which would have prevented 
the injury, and also evidence indicating that the design alterna-
tive was technologically feasible. At this point--in fact, if 
78-704 21 
not in law--the burden of proof effectively shifted to the 
defendant to introduce evidence showing that the adoption of 
the plaintiff's design proposal would be too costly, would unduly 
interfere with the product's perfonnance, or would create addi-
tional safety hazards. The plaintiff would then seek to dispute 
or diminish the defendant's argument. With the evidence having 
been presented in this manner, the case would then go to the jury. 
It is my recommendation that the Legislature modify the 
Barker rule by legalizing what I understand to be this post-Cronin, 
pre-Barker practice. I.e., a statute should be passed establish-
ing that in design defect cases, the plaintiff can prove defect 
by identifying a technologically feasible design alternative 
(including any omitted safety device) that would have been success-
f 1 . . h . . I • d 
1 I h . . t th u ~n prevent~ng t e v~ct~m s ace~ ent; at t ~s po~n , e 
burden of proof should shift to the defendant to verify that the 
plaintiff's design proposal is not risk-beneficial after all. 
(I have no recommendation as to \vhich party should bear the ulti-
mate "burden of persuasion": i.e., which party loses if the 
evidence is deemed by the jury to be exactly fifty-fifty. I 
do not know enough about the dynamics of jury decisionmaking to 
know what the importance is of technical rules on the burden of 
persuasion.) To counter any incentive this recommendation might 
give plaintiffs to identify design alternatives that are plainly 
inadvisable, it should be made clear that if the defendant's trade-
off evidence is clearly persuasive and is not seriously contradicted 
by the plaintiff's evidence, then summary judgment or a directed 
verdict is in order (at least respecting the particular defect claim.) 
11 Under this proposal, the plaintiff needs a lawyer who is 
knowledgeable about products, in general or in particular. But 
even under Barker, a plaintiff with an unknowledgeable lawyer is 





This recommendation seems consistent with the explanation 
of design defect recently set forth by the Fifth Circuit in 
in Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(applying Texas law). The recommendation would be acceptable 
to defense counsel, even though it imposes on them a greater 
burden than that contemplated by what I have described as the 
professorial understanding. My suspicion is thatplaintiff's 
counsel would not strongly oppose the recommendation. As indi-
cated, it seems consistent with the pre-Barker practice, and 
many plaintiff's counsel do not contemplate relying on their 
full Barker rights. Moreover, certain plaintiff's counsel with 
whom I have spoken are unable to believe that Barker really 
means what it seems to say, and have suggested what the Barker 
Court really intended was very close to what is here recommended. 
IV. Consumer Expectations 
A. Introduction 
On the consumer expectations issue, the Barker Court was 
correct on one initial matter: its disparagement of consumer 
expectations in Cronin is not inconsistent with the emphasis 
it places on consumer expectations in Barker. Cronin merely 
ruled that non-compliance with consumer expectations was not 
a necessary test of liability; that holding leaves open whether 
such non-compliance is a sufficient liability test. Cronin and 
Barker thus are not in syllogistical conflict. Still, one can 
wonder what the need is for a consumer-expectation test once a 
risk-benefit test has been strongly asserted. 
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B. ''Expectations" 
1. There can be easy cases under a consumer-expectation 
standard,~·· a new car whose wheel is so badly designed 
that the wheel collapses during ordinary driving. But easy 
cases are by hypothesis easy, and they remain easy under virtually 
any imaginable strict liability standard. And even in such an 
easy case, the "consumer expectation" is in a way both negative 
and hypothetical: all one can really say is that if the consumer 
had pondered the matter, he would not have expected the wheel to 
collapse. 
2. Assume a product does contain a danger that is genuinely 
"unexpected''--~. , a sailboat so designed as to create a slight 
risk of electrocution while in ordi~ary use. In such a case, it 
is useful to ask how this unexpected design risk came about. 
There are two possible explanations. 
a. The risk was created by a poor design decision. If this 
is so, then the "consumer-expectation" standard is hardly needed; 
the risk-benefit standard easily produces the right result. 
b. The product is designed in a way that is untypical, but 
intelligent; the untypical design produces substantial benefits 
for the sailboat user (perhaps even of a safety nature) that 
adequately justify the product's slight risk. In such a case, 
the risk-benefit standard would not lead to liability. But for 
such a product, the manufacturer has a clear obligation to give 
the boat consumer a warning as to the unusual danger. The absence 




rules. But if a warning has been given, then the purchaser's 
"expectations" have been shaped by that warning; since the pur-
chaser's expectations have not been defeated, recovery is not 
allowable under a consumer expectation theory. 
Either way, therefore, the consumer-expectation standard 
seemingly adds nothing of value to products liability design 
litigation . 
3. Unless the consumer-expectation standard is construed 
narrowly (see below), it becomes a mess in any operational sense. 
Exactly what kind of trial testimony is legally relevant to the 
issue of consumer expectations? Can the testimony of a single 
consumer (called to the stand by the plaintiff) that such a pro-
duct does not (or would not) meet his expectations suffice to 
take the plaintiff's case to the jury? The Barker opinion refers 
to an earlier Court of Appeal case, Culpepper v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 509 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973), 
as one in which a design defect, in the consumer-expectation 
sense, was adequately proven by circumstantial evidence. In 
Culpepper, a VW bug rolled over when the driver turned the front 
wheel sharply (18 percent) while traveling at 55 miles per hour. 
This apparently was an inherent tendency of the VW bug. VW 
introduced evidence establishing that several A~erican cars, 
including the Gremlin and the Pinto, would themselves turn over 
under exactly the same driving circumstances. The plaintiff called 
as a witness an engineering expert (by no means an "ordinary consumer"~ 
who testified that in the United States there is an "implied standard" 
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that a car should not roll over on a smooth surface. Simply 
on the basis of this evidence (althoughnoting also that VW 
had not warned buyers of the Bug's roll-over tendencies), 
the Court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Since 
most of us have heard many negative out-of-court assessments 
of the Bug'·s design, we are probably sympathetic to this result. 
Legally speaking, however, it is uncertain whether the overall 
evidence in Culpepper justified the result. But at least in 
Culpepper there was expert testimony concerning an "implied 
standard." Under Barker, if a car were to turn over when its 
wheels were turned 30 degrees at a speed of 100 miles an hours, 
could the case go to the jury if the plaintiff and a friend of 
his both testified that as car consumers they would not expect 
a car to turn over under these driving circumstances? Many 
plaintiff's lawyers evidently think so; one described the "con-
sumer expectations" test as making products cases "a hell of a 
lot easier," and indicated that in almost every case it should 
now be possible for the plaintiff to get to the jury. 
4. Assume a typical product case like Barker itself, 
involving a sophisticated product with a complicated design avail-
able for a wide range of foreseeable uses, many of them "improper." 
What can one say in such cases about the product user's "expecta-
tions" of the product? 
a. A likely answer is that the consumer has no expectations 
at all that are relevant to the circumstances of a particular 
accident. In Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 
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(1967), a truck driven at normal speed by the plaintiff tipped 
over after hitting a rock which was half a foot in diameter. 
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the truck's performance in 
tipping over did not justify a plainti 1 S verdict under a "con-· 
sumer expectations" theory. 
Where. the performance failure occurs under 
conditions with which the average consumer has 
experience, the facts of the accident alone may 
constitute a sufficient basis for the consumer to 
decide whether the expectations of an ordinary 
consumer of the product were met. High speed 
collisions with large rocks are not so common, 
however, that the average person would know from 
personal experience what to expect under these 
circumstances ... The jury would therefore be 
unequipped, either by general background or by 
facts supplied in the record, to decide whether 
this wheel failed to perform as safely as an 
ordinary consumer would have expected. 
b. In the alternative, what the consumer "expects" may be 
nothing more than the product has been intelligently designed by 
the manufacturer in the light of foreseeable contingencies. But 
if so, then the "user-oriented" consumer-expectations standards 
has no independent vitality. It collapses into the "manufacturer-
oriented" risk-benefit standard. This has been recognized by the 
Oregon Supreme Court in a recent decision. Phillips v. Kimwood 
Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1033, 1037 (1974), 
followed in Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
[T]he two standards are the same because the 
seller acting reasonably would be selling the 
same product which a reasonable consumer believes 
he is purchasing. That is to say, a manufacturer 
would be negligent in marketing a given product, 
considering its risk, would necessarily be mar-
keting a product which fell below the reasonable 
expectations of consumers who purchase it. The 
foreseeable uses to which a product could be put 
would be the same in the minds of both the seller 
and buyer unless one of the parties was not acting 
reasonably. 
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c. Finally, in my view it is meaningful to say that the 
consumer ordinarily expects that the product's design will allow 
the product to perform about as well as other products of the 
same sort. Implied warranty law seems to validate such an expec-
tation. If I have correctly framed this "expectation," it pro-
vides a way to understand the weight placed on the "implied 
standard" testimony in Culpepper. 
C. "Consumer" 
As Barker notes, the "consumer expectations" standard embodies 
the implied warranty heritage of products liability law. Under 
implied warranty, the "consumer" is of course the retail purchaser 
of the product; the whole point of the implied warranty doctrine 
is to make sure that the product the purchaser acquires is of the 
quality he reasonably assumes it to be. Under the Restatement, 
the "consumer" whose expectations are legally relevant is also 
the product purchaser, as the explicit language of § 402(A) makes 
clear. As elaborated by the Court since 1965, however, the rule 
of strict liability also allov7S suits by employees who suffer pro-
duct-related injuries involving products purchased by their employers 
and by passengers and pedestrians injured in accidents in automo-
biles driven by car owners. Pure implied warranty law would allow 
none of these suits; the Restatement has a caveat about the 
bystander-pedestrian. (I should make clear that I approve 
of these post-1965 products liability results-although the 
availability of workers' compensation for the injured employee 




How does the Barker test work in cases of this sort? Given 
the Barker facts in conjunction with the Barker opinion, it 
appears that the Court regards the emplovee rather than the 
employer as the "consumer" for purposes of the Barker rule .. 
Likewise, the Barker Court's approval, during its discussion of 
consumer expectations, of its earlier decision in Elmore v. 
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr . 
652 (1969), suggests that Barker regards even the bystander (and 
a fortiori the passenger) as the legally relevant "consumers." 
Now, strict liability has been concerned with consumer expectations 
because it wishes to make sure that the product purchaser gets 
the full benefit of an "honest" sales transaction. See Twerski, 
~rom Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault--Rethinking Some Product 
Liability Concepts", 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 314 (1977). When the 
consumer expectation idea is extended to employees, passengers, 
and pedestrians, it forfeits most of its rationale. Moreover, 
since the employee and the passenger have "chosen" to use the 
product only in a very limited way, and since the pedestrian 
is a complete stranger to the product, none of these persons have 
expectations for the product that can be identified in any mean-
ingful fashion. (I agree with the argument plaintiffs make on the 
assumption of risk issue that given the nature of the employment 
situation, employees have no real choice but to work with the 
machines to which their employers assign them.) 
Assume an employer who purchases a factory product without 
an optional safety device, or a person who in buying a car chooses 
an optional but sharp-edged front fender potentially dangerous to 
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pedestrians. Cf. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). \-l'e can fully agree that the employee and the 
pedestrian should have potential causes of action against the 
manufacturer under a risk-benefit standard. But to allow causes 
of action in such situations under a consumer expectationsstandard 
would be without meaning. 
D. The Relevance of Warnings 
In Cronin, the Court was aware that a consumers expectations 
argument is eliminated if the product's danger is "patent." Like-
wise, the argument is eliminated if the consumer has been warned 
by the manufacturer of the product's danger. What if, after Barker. 
the purchaser, having received an entirely adequate warning from 
the manufacturer, turns the product over to an acquaintance without 
conveying the warning to that acquaintance (or, while using the 
product himself, injures a bystander without warning the 
bystander of the product's danger?) 
Under Barker, it would seem that the unwarned victim would 
be entitled to sue under a consumer-expectations theory, since his 
expectations were not reduced by any warning succeeded. This would be 
a bad result. It is highly desirable that products liability 
impose an important obligation to warn .. V.7arning cases are, 
however, somewhat slippery, since no matter what warning the 
manufacturer has given, the plaintiff can argue that it was not 
sufficiently ex~licit in its substance or not sufficiently effective 
in its style. Given the current state of warning law, the la-tv should 





difficult-to-define obligation that it somehow or other make 
effective efforts to warn persons other than the product's 
purchaser. In most cases, there is nothing realistic that the 
manufacturer can do. And the non-buyer's interests are in part 
protected by his cause of action against the product's purchaser 
for loaning him the product without conveying the warning. 
E. Conclusion 
The consumer expectation prong in Barker is inadequate. 
The Court's purpose in Barker was to dispel the confusion created 
by Cronin; it is highly ironic that Barker would endorse a standard 
that is conducive to equal confusion. I see two plausible options: 
1. Eliminate the consumer-expectation prong altogether. 
2. Adopt the following rule: A product's design is presump-
tively defective if the design, without warning to the purchaser, 
results in the product's performing at a level that is significantly 
inferior, for safety purposes, to the performance of other products 
of the same type. The defendant can rebut this presumption by 
showing that the product's design is risk-beneficial, pursuant 
to the second Barker prong . 
Option 1 is plausible. Option 2 gives plaintiffs more than 
Option 1 but less than they are given by the existing first prong 
in Barker. I regard Option 2 as an intelligent rule. It starts 
with the first prong "consumer expectations" idea. But then, 
accepting the analysis above, it specifies that what consumers 
really "expect" is that the product meets the norm of other 
products and that the product has been intelligently designed. 
31 
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The option relies on the other-product idea to lead to a presumption 
of defect, and on the intelligent-design idea to allow the rebuttal 
of this presumption. 
Option 2 would require the identification, in litigation, 
of the relevant product "type." Thus the VW bug in Culpepper 
should probably be regarded as a "sub-compact automobile" rather 
than an "automobile" generally. I regard these problems as manage-
able. A few products may be so unlque as to fall within no "type." 
They would therefore not be vulnerable under the proposed rule, 
although of course suit could still be brought under a risk-
benefit theory. 
I can imagine suggestions that the "without warning" proviso 
ln Option 2 be deleted. But this proviso is compelled by the 
consumer-expectations rationale on which this option is based. 
If the proviso is excluded, the option would be deprived of that 
rationale. Possibly, however, some other rationale for the 
option could be articulated. For example, a safety performance 
that is below the norm set by other products of the same type 
might provide strong circumstantial evidence (though less than a 
presumption) that the product's design is not risk-beneficial. If 
this analysis is correct, then Option 2 could possibly be derived 
from the risk-benefit rationale. 
V. Post Sale Intervening Technology as an Assessment 
of Defectiveness. 
There are two other issues raised by the Barker opinion, 
one by innuendo and one by a footnote. The first concerns the 
relevance of "state of the art" in products cases. The problem with 





If it merely means the "custom" of manufacturers at a particular 
time, then it is clear that while a manufacturer's compliance with 
product custom may be some evidence of non-defect, it is not con-
elusive, since the custom itself may be unduly dangerous. (Even 
in negligence cases, with their greater emphasis on the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct, custom compliance is a 
relevant factor as to non-negligence, but it does not suffice to 
prove the defendant's case.) 
In its stronger sense, however, "state of the art" refers 
to the full range of design optionswhich were technologically 
available at the time of the product's sale by the manufacturer. 
What if a safety device is invented or developed between the 
time of the product's sale and the time of the plaintiff's injury 
(or of the plaintiff's lawsuit)? Can such post-sale intervening 
technology be relied on in assessing the defectiveness 
of the product's design? On these questions, a standard strict-
liability locution collides with a standard strict-liability 
slogan. The standard locution is that the product must be "defec-
tive when sold." Given this locution, post-sale developments 
should not be legally relevant. The strict liability slogan is 
that strict liability does away with the "scienter" requirement 
(i.e., the requirement the manufacturer "knew or should have known" 
of the product's defect.) This slogan generally works well in 
production defect cases; but it does not necessarily follow 
that it states a correct principle in design cases. (The 
78-716 33 
sl0gan has not often heen invoked in the California case law·.) 
Given a broad understanding of the rejection of scienter, it be-
comes possible to conclude that intervening developments are 
entirely relevant after all. 
The case law on this issue in other jurisdictions is 
muddled, and there are no cases in California that are really in 
point. (Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 
528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974), allowed the admission 
of evidence in a strict liability action of a manufacturer's 
post-accident change in its product design; but there is no rea-
son to believe that the revised design in Ault--malleable iron 
replacing aluminum in a motor vehicle gearbox--was in any way 
unavailable at all relevant earlier dates.) The Barker opinion 
contains language v7hich can be read as deciding the intervening 
technology issue. At two important junctures, the Barker opinion 
indicates that the jury's decision on the risk-benefit design 
issue should be made with "hindsight."!_/ Now this may merely mean 
that the jury's review of the product's design should be sober 
and reflective. But it also can easily be read as signifying 
that intervening technology can be relied on in establishing the 
defectiveness of the product's design.~/ Of the lawyers I have 
1/ 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 239. 
2/ Another meaning is possible. What if the danger in the 
product's design was easily correctible--but the product was a 
novel one, and the manufacturer neither knew, nor reasonably 
could have known, of that danger? Should the "unkno-vrable risk" 





spoken to, some have not noticed these "hindsight" allusions; 
others don't know what the allusions are intended to mean; others 
still are convinced that the ex post facto perspective has now 
been emphatically endorsed by the California Supreme Court. 
If Barker does intend this result, then Barker is wrong, 
at least in my view. First of all, it seems unfair to manufac-
turers to have their products measured by a standard of technology 
that was literally unavailable at the time of their product's 
sale. Since a large number of products cases involve products 
that are at least 10 years old, both the number of cases in which 
this unfairness problem could arise, and the magnitude of the 
problem in those cases v1here it does arise, seem quite substan-
tial. (Indeed, if we are at all worried about imposing excessive 
liability on the manufacturers of older products, then the adop-
tion of a hindsight approach in design defect cases is clearly a 
bad idea.) As noted above, civil juries, on intuitive fairness 
grounds, are somewhat resistant to the strict liability doctrine. 
Instructing juries to give full weight to post-sale technology 
may aggravate this tendency . 
legal section of the recent federal study, courts have "uniformly" 
refused to take into account such unknowable risks. See Inter-
agency Task Force on Product Liability, IV Legal Study 91 (1977). 
Academic commentators have tended to frmvn on these rulings. 
Perhaps the Barker "hindsight" language is intended to approve of 
strict liability in such cases of "unknowable" risks. The inter-
vening knowledge-of-risk issue I regard as quite difficult--more 
difficult than the intervening technology issue--and I include 
no recommendation here. 
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Secondly, while it is said that one purpose of strict liability 
1s to encourage the development of safety technology, it is quite 
doubtful that a "hindsight rule" will achieve this objective. 
Indeed, such a rule might well operate as a drag upon the develop-
ment of safety technology. Consider the product manufacturer 
which is thinking about expending for research into possible new 
safety devices. Under a hindsight rule, that manufacturer knows 
that if its expenditure is successful, the new technology it 
develops can be used as evidence against it 1n later products 
liability cases concern1ng products sold at an earlier date. The 
Ault court, in considering the so-called "repair" rule, was able 
to conclude that its negating of the rule would not delay safety 
changes, since the disincentive unquestionably created by allowing 
the admissibility of repair evidence is effectively offset by the 
manufacturer's str•ong incentive to "repair" its product promptly 
so as to minimize its liability exposure 1n the future. By con-
trast, in the context of the development of genuinely new tech-
nology, I am unable to identify any similar offsetting incentive 
which would counter the clear disincentive entailed by a "hind-
sight rule." 
VI. Defectless Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Product. 
The second special issue in Barker arises from footnote 10. 
In that footnote the Court indicates that "in the instant case 
we have no occasion to determine whether a product which entails 
a substantial risk of harm may be found defective even if no safer 
alternative design is feasible. As we noted in Jiminez v. Sears, 




684, Justice Traynor has sugg-ested "that liability mav be imDosec 
as to products 'whose norm is danger.'" 
This language suggests less a new definition of defect, and 
more the prospect of partially eliminating the defect requirement 
by imposing strict liability on what could be called "ultrahaz-
ardous products." The obvious analogy for a rule of strict 
liability for products "whose norm is danger" is the strict lia-
bility rule, adopted in California, for "ultrahazardous activi-
ties"--those activities that remain very hazardous even when "the 
utmost care is exercised." However, the analogy to the rule of 
strict liability for ultrahazardous activities breaks down. 
First of all, one can think of few, if any, products that contain 
an enormous danger even when "the utmost care is exercised." 
Secondly, even in an ultrahazardous activity suit, there is a 
complete defense if the plaintiff was a participant in, and 
therefore a direct beneficiary of, the activity. (Without going 
into great detail, I will simply say that I regard the defense 
as entirely sound.) Thus, while in some states (not including 
California) aviation is considered ultrahazardous, it is not the 
airplane passengers who are allowed to rely on the strict 
liability rule--but only those who suffer ground damage when a 
plane crashes. The user of a product is the counterpart of a 
participant in an activity. Given therefore, the ultrahazardous 
activity precedent, even if there were strict liability 
for ultrahazardous products the theory should not be available 
to the product's consumer or user. Perhaps a bystander could be 
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allowed to sue--but it is hard to conceive of a product that 
imposes an utmost-care "ultrahazard" upon a bystander. 
The proposal quoted in footnote 10 is not really fleshed 
out by the footnote's references. The Jiminez opinion no more 
than mentions the idea of strict liability for products whose 
"norm is danger," and gives no examples of what such a product 
may be. In the Traynor defect essay to which both Barker and 
Jiminez refer, the chief example set forth is that of hepatitis-
infected blood. And this example does not even fit the "norm of 
danger" description. Only a small number of blood samples are 
infected with hepatitis. And the defect in question is not one 
of design: it is rather a production defect, albeit a defect that 
may happen to be unpreventable, at .least in part and at least 
for the time being. (By statute, there is no strict liability 
' ' 
for hepatitis-infected blood in California. Health & Safety Code 
§ 1606.) 
Lawyers to whom I have spoken have little idea as to the 
possible meaning or coverage of footnote 10. Are cigarettes a 
product whose "norm is danger"? automobiles? certain industrial 
solvents that employees are expected to use? None of the briefs 
in Barker asserted the position of strict liability for inherently 
dangerous products. Therefore footnote 10 is not a response to 
any party's argument; rather, it is deliberate action on the part 
of the Court, inviting counsel to assert a particular argument. 
in later cases. I see little merit in the notion of strict 
liability for ultrahazardous products--especially if full 
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common-law damages are available in such an action (see the 
discussion in IA above). Since the Court's calculated reference 
to a defectless strict liability is likely to unnerve rational 
insurance companies as they promulgate their rates, I would 
support legislative action negating the possibility of defect-
less strict liability for ultrahazardous products. 
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MORE TO COME 
One of the items we thought might be helpful as an under-
standing tool and valuable in its right is a history of tort law 
in California, 1850-1900. Professor Gary Schwartz is preparing 
such a paper. Included within this report is a brief discussion 
of the project by Professor Schwartz. 
The Joint Committee on Tort Liability desires to send a 
questionnaire concerning the judicial administration of tort law 
to each California superior court judge. The questionnaire will 
cover: lawyers; juries; damages; the law; judges, and procedure, 
all as viewed from the bench. The polling and tabulation will be 
only after contact with the Judicial Council • 
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Project - California Tort History 1850-1900 
1. Background 
I became interested in this project for three related 
reasons. The first is the Citizens Commission Report, which, 
in discussing tort-law history, jumped directly from a 
generalized discussion of Anglo-American tort law in the 
nineteenth century to a discussion of California tort law in 
the cid-twentieth century, without making any effort to 
determine whether California's nineteenth century tort law 
reflected the supposed Anglo-American pattern. A second spur 
to 37 project was two recent prizewinning books on American 
Legal History: Professor Friedman's History of American Law 
and Prof. Horowitz's Transformation of American Law 1780-1860. 
Bot~ books argue that nineteenth century tort law included a 
strong bias in favor of industrial and entreprenurial injurers 
and against ordinary-person victims. I wanted to determine 
whether these tendencies were at work in California--whose law 
is referred to in neither the Friedman nor the Horowitz book. 
The final reason for my project arose from my interest in 
California tort law in the 1970's. What are the continuities 
(and discontinuities) between California's 1970's tort law 
and California's tort law of a century ago? 
2. Xethodology. My original methodology was simple, if time-
cor.suming. I read and then re-read every tort case in the 
California reports decided between the opening of the court 
syste~ upon statehood in 1850 and the end of the nineteenth 
• 
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century. (During this period, the only reported decisions 
are those of the Supreme Court.) The second stage of the 
methodolo5y is in a way more difficult; this is to sort out 
and classify all these cases under appropriate headings. 
3. Expectations for Final Report 
My fL~al report is expected to deal at least with the 
following topics: 
1. Coreposition of tort law caseload. What kinds of tort 
cases were typical during the nineteenth century? How many 
suits by eoployees against employers? How many medical 
malpractice suits? Suits concerned with defective products? 
Suits agaiJst charities and governments? vfuo were the classes 
of victics ~ho were suing the railroads? 
2. Tort law doctrine. What were the rules of tort law 
in the 1850-1900 period? Had negligence emerged as the standard 
of liability? Were there any "pockets" of strict liability? 
\-las res ipsa loquitur available? Hhat were the affirmative 
defenses: Compliance with custom? Contributory negligence? 
Assumptions of risk? No duty to trespassers or license~? 
3. IJdications of Sympathy 
Hhere did the Supreme Court's evident sympathies lie? 
~nat language is there in court opinions expressing sympathy 
for railroads?; for industry in general?; for farming?; for 




4. Patterns of Decision-l1aking 
Here, questions such as the following are relevant: 
How willing were courts to affirm jury verdicts favoring 
plaintiffs? How often did employees win in their suits 
against employers? How often did railroads win (and lose) 
in their extensive tort litigation? 
Prof. Gary Schartz 
UCLA Law School 
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